Philosophy, politics and religion: Origins of environmental ethics

Environmental ethics is a field of ethics research tackling increasingly urgent global issues. It is important to keep abreast of developments linked to the acceleration in climate change and increase in ecological threats. The future of humankind may depend on environmental ethics solutions, which are particularly reliant on cross-disciplinary research, ranging from the natural sciences and philosophy to social, political and even religious studies. This is the kind of approach adopted in Environmental Ethics by Robin Attfield, emeritus professor of philosophy at Cardiff University. The book was published as part of the Oxford University Press series, A very short introduction, which introduces various topics to anyone wanting an approachable way into a new subject. Robin Attfield was asked to write this volume as he is a world-renowned authority in the field. He is the author or editor of 15 books and over 250 articles and chapters in philosophical domains such as ethics, philosophy of religion, history of philosophy and environmental philosophy. Environmental Ethics: A Very Short Introduction does not proffer a deep analysis but comprehensively and fittingly presents climate change to the general public.

In the eight chapters Attfield writes about the ethical approach to crucial environmental problems, which he characterises as interaction-based issues between humans and the natural world. These are pollution, the depletion of resources (including fresh water and fish-stocks), degradation of land, loss of biodiversity (cultivars, wild species, habitats) and global warming. According to most researchers, specialists and even politicians, these are the main environmental problems of the present time. The 2015 Paris Climate Agreement is testimony of this. Ratified by 187 parties it is the most successful attempt at international collaboration (Paris Agreement—Status of Ratification, 2020). Attfield emphasises the fact that despite the backsliding by the United States following the election of President Donald Trump, it is good to see that environmental issues are able to garner such huge political power. It is yet another sign of the pressing nature of environmental ethics.

Robin Attfield begins by referring to the new geological epoch—the Anthropocene—in the first chapter, “Origins”. He agrees with researchers working in the natural sciences and arts that our anthropocentrism is so marked that our activities have the same impact as previous geological forces that have changed our planet. Humans are now acting as a force that is changing the face of the Earth (unfortunately in a negative way as well). Philosophers have understood some negative natural phenomena since ancient times, as Attfield points out. For instance Plato, in his Critias dialogues, wrote about soil erosion and deforestation. But ancient thinking was unable to foresee the capacity of humankind to interfere so profoundly with nature. For example Aristotle, in his Meteorologica, describes nature as fundamentally changeless. It is bewildering that it was not until the nineteenth century that people began to realise the vulnerability of nature. Attfield dates the establishment of the ecological sciences to even later—the twentieth century—and considers the American philosopher Holmes Rolston to be the founder of environmental ethics. Rolston’s essay “Is There an Ecological Ethic?” (1975) lays down the essential groundwork. Rolston and other influential specialists in the field, Richard Routley and Arne Naess (despite their different approaches), agree that anthropocentrism is no longer a sustainable model of human existence. Although an instrumental ethical approach may prove useful, humanity must change its moral assessment of the environment and come to the profound realisation that we are not alone on the planet but part of a global interconnected ecosystem full of living creatures which depend on their local ecosystems.

In the second chapter Attfield discusses three main human theoretical approaches to nature. Besides anthropocentrism there is also biocentrism and ecocentrism. The difference between these theories lies in the moral understanding of each element in the human–nature relation. While biocentrism values all living creatures, ecocentrism additionally emphasises the intrinsic value of non-living entities such as trees, rivers and whole ecosystems. Attfield presses on us the importance of making the concept of value clear. Humans naturally attribute value to something insofar as it is useful to them. In environmental ethics this type of value has no place. Here it is not instrumental value but intrinsic value that is important. The concept of value is a voluminous philosophical topic and unfortunately there was not the space for Attfield to tackle this issue in greater depth, although it would have been well worth it. However, Attfield makes a very interesting addition to the concept of value. He defines aesthetic and symbolic values as derivative values alongside instrumental value. I agree with his opinion because this can be seen in the fascination with the symbolic natural world, significant in developed urbanised parts of the world. People transform the missing element of wild nature into deep allegorical imaginations. A good example of this, I would suggest, is J. R. R. Tolkien’s newly formed mythology, characterised in “Mythonomer”: Tolkien on Myth in His Scholarly Work (Kuteeva, 2015). Following Tolkien’s scholarly work, Kuteeva points out that Tolkien’s unique synthesis of different pre-Christian, pagan and religious tales leads him to form a new original concept of the mythical history of humankind. This illusionary world of Middle Earth, in which nature plays a strong supernatural role, has had a significant impact on the modern world.

Introducing “Some key concepts”, Attfield states that human civilisation and nature are antagonistic. He examines the concept of nature and posits the fundamental question of whether humans are distinct from nature or part of nature. Analysing the terms nature— supernatural and natural—artificial, he concludes that humans are an animal species (following Darwin’s theory of evolution) and so most definitely a creation of nature. However, based on the thinking of J. S Mill, he remarks that humans occupy the top of the animal hierarchy and have always fought against the merciless character of the natural world. Humans try to conquer and adapt nature for their own needs. Thanks to our humanism we stand in paradoxical antinomy to nature, which is why we often use the term nature to mean wildlife or something untouched by human activity. But Attfield emphasises that we remain part of nature, which he defines as “our make-up or what it is that makes us what we are”. He thereby arrives at the fundamental human characteristic that is behind climate change— anthropocentrism.

In the third chapter Attfield deals with the moral standing of “Future generations”. He attempts to answer an important question—Do we bear responsibility for future generations? Certainly, the environmental changes will do them profound harm, but there is an objection to the view that we have a responsibility towards future generations, Attfield states this as a non-identity philosophical problem. We can understand this better if we ask a different question – Can we be committed to something or somebody that does not yet exist? In answer, Attfield’s gives the example of nations in different parts of the world that have no direct contact with one another, but whose acts may have an effect on the others. I can add another example, not used in the book—the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe, which affected a large part of Europe, not just neighbouring countries. Thus Attfield confirms that we indeed have a responsibility to future inhabitants of Earth. Moreover, we need to realise the potentially irreversible losses. If an animal species becomes extinct because of human activity, it is a loss not just for future human generations, but for animals and ecosystems as well. Consequently, Attfield considers environmental ethics to be concerned with our responsibility towards future generations of Earth’s inhabitants (not only humankind).

Attfield is right to mention the possibility that human needs and preferences may change in the future. Nevertheless, he rejects this option, supposing that the main physical needs of humans cannot change. Here I would add that many scholars today are of the opinion that transhumanism will enhance the human body in a way that is unimaginable now. Even today the potential for human enhancement in the fields of genetics, medicine and biorobotics remains unknown to most people. I consider the main goal of the transhumanist movement—immortality—to be too optimistic. But there has been exponential growth in genetic research and biotechnologies and that will ultimately lead to transhumanism shaping the future of humankind. Philippe Verdoux, in his article “Transhumanism, Progress and the Future” (Verdoux, 2009), writes that in the future humankind will be polarised into two main groups—the transhumanists and the anarcho-primitivists. One group will continue to pursue technological evolution and radically adapt their environment (not just negatively; for example through Technogaianism). They will be opposed by people fighting for a natural, aboriginal way of life, rejecting all modern technologies. This theory demonstrates our relationship with nature will play a cardinal role in the most important future conflict of humankind. I think therefore that the chapter on “Future generations” would have benefitted from a discussion of this issue.

The chapter on “Principles for right action” deals with moral stances and the direction environmental ethics should take. Attfield starts from two basic theories—contract theory and virtue ethics. Both offer proposals on how ethics can be used to achieve our goals. Since contract theory cannot ensure equality between the generations and species, he considers virtue ethics more promising. Aristotle’s thinking on virtues, and the work of many philosophers, indicates that it is easier to improve people’s character than it is to establish impersonal moral principles. Nonetheless, Attfield emphasises that combining the two approaches could prove more fruitful. We cannot expect everybody to strive to achieve life’s virtues. And virtue ethics does not deal directly with the relationship between nature and people. Attfield proffers a hypothetical answer to this in his seventh chapter, “Environmental ethics and religion”. In this he examines human stewardship of nature, found mainly in the religious traditions. However, in most of the religions, human value is considered superior to the value of any other creation, suggesting the stewardship approach may be anthropocentric in nature. Nonetheless, Attfield, together with other specialists, advocates it on the grounds that it does not place humankind at the top of the hierarchy, but makes it accountable to a higher authority and responsible for looking after creation. This is a welcome approach in environmental ethics and Attfield believes that stewardship could be adopted in secular form as well, but needs extensive elaboration.

“Sustainability and preservation” is one of the most important chapters in the book because it is concerned with the crucial question of how the development typically found in modern civilisations can be maintained in a sustainable way. As in the third chapter, the author emphasises the importance of national and international policies, declarations and agreements. He does not refrain from criticising some of them, specifically the UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2001–5) and the ensuing Millennium Development Goals. Attfield thinks agriculture should be included among the development goals, something I fully agree with. It is a particularly important aspect of environmental protection. If we consider that most poor people live off the land, then agriculture is clearly an important environmental issue and should not be left out of the equation. Eliminating poverty is crucial to solving global environmental issues.

While a scientific consensus is required if nature is to be protected, Attfield says the relevant authorities and activists will have to take action without it if the threat becomes too serious and the time limited. The reasoning behind this is supported by the precautionary principle “which specifically applies wherever complete scientific consensus is lacking”. Without this principle we risk irreversible losses.

How important are “Social and political movements” in environmental ethics? This question is answered in the sixth chapter of the book. There are many social and political movements concerned with environmental issues, and Attfield presents only the most influential of them. Deep Ecology is one such movement, found in Australia and the United States of America. It is mainly based on the self-realisation of its members and follows the assumption that humankind occupies the same value level as all living creatures. I agree with the author’s view that the movement’s aspiration to reduce the human population is controversial. Another movement Attfield discusses is Ecofeminism, which views the relationship between men and women as analogous to the relationship between nature and humankind. Nature and woman find themselves in an unequal, degrading position in both, and this should be changed. The next movement he explores is Social Ecology, founded by the socialist Murray Bookchin. He considers ecological problems to be fundamentally social issues. To resolve them, Bookchin would not hesitate to use genetic engineering to develop humans and eliminate inequality, but for Attfield that would be just another anthropocentric attempt at conquering nature. The last two movements are the Environmental Justice Movement and the Green Movement. Both of these are about raising public awareness of natural disasters and threats, which is a positive thing. The Green Movement is the only one to operate in politics, which makes Attfield question whether it is possible for environmental ethics to coexist with liberalism and capitalism, which are focused on constant growth. Following J. S. Mill, he points out that there are different forms of liberalism with limits and that these could be applied here.

The final chapter in the book “The ethics of climate change” summarises the main conclusions of the whole book. The author demonstrates an in-depth familiarity with the field. Besides the solutions to the ecological issues already mentioned, Attfield highlights the pressing need for renewable sources. However, I feel the book lacks an open critique of some false green solutions. These are very often merely marketing tools for corporations or governments and contain hidden costs. For example, current battery production methods are not very ecological, but this is not mentioned in the section on renewable sources. Another example is biodegradable disposable dinnerware, made mainly from paper. The growth in production may well reduce plastic pollution, but it also increases the rate of deforestation and soil erosion. It is essential we start discussing the countereffects of so-called green solutions because further development cannot be achieved without honesty.

As Attfield emphasises at the end of the book, protecting the natural environment and ecosystems whilst ensuring sustainable growth depends on enforcing activities at the individual and political, local and global levels. I believe that individual responsibility needs to be stressed most of all, because I see that many people are still leaving that responsibility to the authorities. But if we are to reverse the coming climate changes without dictatorship, then everybody will have to start changing their life styles.

I would highly recommend Environmental ethics: A Very Short Introduction to the wide range of readers who are interested in environmental topics and seek a personal ethical guide on the issue. This publication will provide them with an expertly written and easily understood introduction. Since a significant part of the book addresses eco-philosophy and political issues, I would like to particularly underline the author’s contribution to the field of environmental ethics. I believe the specificity of Robin Attfield’s approach lies in his characteristic rejection of anthropocentrism. He continues to believe in humanity and this can be seen in his combining contract theory with virtue ethics. The ancient ideals are very much still alive for him and he has incorporated them into environmental ethics. His own addition is the philosophy of stewardship which forms part of his religious studies, but he also proposes it as a secular approach, which sets it apart. Stewardship may well prove to be the right ethical solution for the human race. One cannot deny that humans sit at the top of evolutionary development and it is this that has led to the environmental crisis and while stewardship does not necessarily knock humankind off its throne, it does make us accountable to a higher authority and gives us a sense of responsibility and ministration. In relation to this I wish to underline the precautionary principle Attfield highlights as an important foundation for political and scientific consensus. There are unquestionably situations that cannot await agreement, that need immediate decisions, and it is in such moments that we need good leaders or as Attfield says stewards. I believe it is the right legacy to hand down to future generations of people as we have a commitment to them as Attfield so clearly declares. They will have to deal with more serious consequences of climate change. And logically the precautionary principle will need to be adopted much more frequently by future leaders, who will hopefully be inspired by the legacy of virtue ethics and stewardship as Attfield suggests.