Inter-group conflicts in the horn of Africa: The case of Diz and Suri people, Ethiopia

Introduction

The Dizi and the Suri are among the many cultural groups in Ethiopia that linguistically belong to Omotic and Nilo-Shara group respectively. Before 1991 these people were included under the Kaffa administrative region. In the recent administrative reorganization of Ethiopia they are placed in the Bench Maji Zon+6e of the Southern Nation, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (Abbink, 1991, p. 22; Fleming, 1973, p. 251; Cerulli, 1956, pp. 917-919). The Suri and the Dizi had strong cultural attachment. Especially, the Dizi alleged capacity to have control over the fortune of rain was to have a strong effect in sustaining such a relation between the two. At times of drought and famine the Dizi would be called on to practice their ritual to help the Suri deal with developing natural disasters. That is, when the Suri faced drought or other natural disasters they would bring sacrificial animal to the Dizi chiefs, who believed to have ritualized control over rain. Such an invitation would give the Dizi the right to initiate the ritualized rain ceremony so that the Suri would have much needed rainfall and the clearing of their land from drought and famine (Nicholas, 1976, p. 50; Harberland, 1983, p. 24). This ritualized relation has become gradually eroded especially since the 1940s because of two fundamental reasons. First, since the 1940s the Dizi, probably due to their inflated status in the area, attracted the good of the imperial government and they became mediator of the central government. In the process of such central government’s encroachment into the area, the Suri consider them as the agents of the government. Secondly, as the Suri had acquired automatic rifles in the 1960s and 1970s, the balance of power changed between the groups. Consequently, the Suri began to disregard the Dizi traditional practices, and thus the ritualized relation between them started to be strained. This, informants averred, evidently resulted in diminished cultural and economic relation between the two (Informant 1). Abbink, an anthropologist, has conducted extensive researches on the agro-pastoral groups in southwest Ethiopia, the Suri. Though he overlooks the pastoral situation during the imperial and Derg regimes, he remarks that the post-1991 deep feeling of conflict is the order of the day between the Dizi and the Suri. People have been threatened, wounded, or killed almost on a daily basis in the Dizi and Suri areas (Abbink, 1993, p. 677). The main objective of this research is to examine cause and consequences of the conflict between the Suri and Dizi people.

Methodology and sources of data

In terms of design, the study is exploratory. Hence, the methodology adopted for the purpose is a qualitative one. It strives to reconstruct the history of insecurity related problems between the Dizi and Suri of Ethiopia from a historical perspective. Though this study has made use of both primary and secondary data sources, much emphasis was given to primary sources. As the nature of the study required the identification and selection of informants was purposive sampling employed. Moreover, snowballing was used to identify key informants. Accordingly, twenty-six informants were involved in this research. Individuals who are well versed in the culture, tradition, and the history of their respective group were selected as key informants. The area’s administration representatives were used as contact persons to identify knowledgeable elders and clan leaders. Oral information was collected from three districts, namely Bero, Maji and Surma districts, two parishes from each district. All the oral information were checked and crosschecked with archival sources which were collected from NALA (National Archive and Library Agency), BMZAO (Bench Maji Zone Administrative Office), MWAO (Maji District Administrative Office), and secondary sources that are available at Addis Ababa University Libraries.

Concept of conflict

Conflict is not a new social phenomenon rather it is as old as the history of mankind. It always exists as long as human beings live together and it is an inescapable human experience. Conflict is a circumstance that two or more human beings or group threat each other’s goal or one considers the other as barrier to their goal (Abbink, 1998, p. 102). There are many types of conflict such as interpersonal, intergroup, multiparty and symmetrical conflict. Ethiopia has experienced different kinds of conflicts. In the medieval period the sultanates of Adal and the Christian highland kingdom were strongest rival groups who fought each other to control long distance trade routes and natural resources. Assuming political power was also the causes of conflict in Ethiopia that clearly observed in the period of Zemene Mesafint (era of the princes) and later during the year between 1906 and 1930. In the period between 1906 and 1930 the crises were caused by internal power struggle that was resulted with the illness of emperor Menelik II. Similarly, the Derg government of Ethiopia (1974–1991) faced serious opposition from political contender parties like Ethiopian people revolutionary party (EPRP) and others (Abbink, 1998, p.102). Besides, Ethiopia has experienced with domestic intergroup conflicts such as Dizi and Suri over resources (Abbink, 2009, p. 27). There is no single cause for the conflict between the Diz and Suri. It is the result of interplay of a number of factors. The specific political and economic experiences had shaped the nature of interactions between the groups (Dejene, 2007, p. 22). Thus, here, I have broadly grouped the sources of conflict between the Diz and the Suri into administration, resources, cultural practices, drought and famine.

Administration since 1941

In the immediate post-1941 period, the imperial regime wanted to broaden and consolidate its power base via various administrative and tax reforms. The administrative restructuring was one of the measures that the imperial regime had effected in the effort to establish a more centralized government (Zerihun,1993, p. 12; Seltzer, 1993, p. 31; Werner, 1982, p. 58; Salvadori, 2010, p. 74). Accordingly, the Dizi and Suri inhabited areas were put under Kefa awraja jurisdiction. During the post-1941 period, political offices in many parts of the country were entrusted to officials who were alien to the local power base. They were appointed at various levels of the imperial regime’s administrative apparatus. Such tradition of political designation was also evident in areas of Dizi and Suri. But in some occasions, Dizi officials were appointed as a district and vice district governors in various parishes of the Dizi and Suri areas. Hence, antagonism between the Suri and Dizi grew more after 1946 when the Dizi men were appointed as a district and vice district governors in the Suri localities. For instance, in 1947 Fitawrari Kuri, a Dizi man, became the governor of Adikas district and his center was Tid (Suri area). Ato Komoro Adikyas, a Dizi man, became governor of Tid and Tirma sub-district making Bambu his center. Like other parts of the country, district and vice district governors were in most cases negligent to carry out their responsibilities. The Suri had an aversion to the appointment of the Dizi and others personals on their territory. They strictly opposed any representative of the Dizi born local governors in the Suri localities. They were politically dissatisfied with the active role the Dizi played in the establishment of the imperial regime’s presence in their localities. This dissatisfaction led to the refusal on the part of the Suri to see the introduction of government-led reforms (Abbink, 2002, pp. 199-206; Archive, 1958; Informant 2).

In 1974 the Derg government took power and the previous administrative structure of the country totally abandoned and new arrangements were organized. In its radical modernization drive, the Derg succeeded, more than the imperial regime ever did, in removing these traditional chiefs from the political arena, replacing them with peasant-association chairmen, a new style of politicized and dependent local leadership. The Dizi and Suri inhabited area was put under Maji awraja in Kefa province. In the last days of the Derg the previous Maji awraj which was consisted of seven districts was divided into two awrajas, Maji and Bero Shasha awraja, consisted of three districts each. Accordingly, Maji awraja had consisted of Mehal Maji and Kurit (Dizi area), and Tirma Tid district (Suri area). Bero Shasha awraja had consisted of Bero, Shasha and Gesha district (mainly Dizi and Me’en area). In this arrangement the Dizi people who live in Bero district merged with the Nilo Sahara group, Me’en people, who had no strong language attachment with Dizi (Report, 19,1988; Donham, 1986, p. 76; Beachy, 2005, p. 8; Informant 5). The new administrative arrangement made the boundary porous for smuggling and thieves from Sudanese and Kenya. This had a destabilizing effect on the local security of the Dizi and augmented the conflict between the Dizi and Suri, and it disrupted the daily interactions of the Dizi of Bero and the Dizi of Maji (Amare, 2007, p. 15; Cerulli, 1956, p. 59; Informant 4; Report, 19, 1988).

In the post 1991 ethnic based federal government has been installed in Ethiopia. It was in this broader national political system, the Diz and the Suri become part of the newly arranged regional state of Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples. Accordingly, all parishes in Mehal Maji, Kurit and Bero districts merged to Dizi district. The previous Tirma Tid districts also became Surma district. However, such new administrative reshuffling was not wholeheartedly accepted by the local populace of Dizi and Suri. Their grievances even went further to the point of demand self-administration. The local people referred to the recurring problems of rampant insecurity, poor infrastructural development and related developments in unearthing their dissatisfaction toward the administrative reshuffling. In the process of this political wrangling, claimed, the Suri have forcefully taken some previously Dizi controlled areas, notably, Damie, Kurie, Moga, Ziyami and Tulget (Abu, 2003, p. 20; Young,1998, pp.191-204; Birhanu, 1997, p. 8; Informant 3).

State lead development interventions

Whilst, state intervention in the name of development projects like the establishment Omo National Park and Koka plantation in the year 1965 and 2010 respectively fueled the conflict. Deprivation of hunting right and access to grazing land was one of the deeply felt impacts of these state-led development interventions. Instances of clashes between the Suri and the park administration, for example, have been an extension of such deprivation. The Suri considered the Dizi people as agents who paved a way for the subsequent introduction of government development projects. Against such perceived cooperation between the Dizi and the central government, the Suri perpetrated killing on Dizi dwellers. Such a clash, sources indicate, had resulted in the death of people, 3 in 1976, 15 in 1980 and 12 in 2010 (Abbink, 2003, p. 182; Report, 1981; Informant 4). Governments have sometimes failed to deal with such Suri opposition, for the administration installed was loose and the Suri land was comparatively one of the remote areas of the country for political integration. Even though the Suri were brought under the political influence of Addis Ababa since 1898, the central government was unable to forge strong grip over the area due to the aforementioned reasons. Moreover, their location near to the British-dominated Kenya and Sudan gave them the chance to elude the central government’s sight after perpetrating such acts of opposition. They even have developed an identity that oscillates between Ethiopian and Sudan due to the very location on the Ethio-Sudan border (Abbink, 2003, p. 182; Informant 4).

Reports confirm that in the 1989 the Suri opened shoot on security guards who travel from Jemo to Jeba and killed some of them. They planned to continue the attack to the town Jeba, Jinka, Baskito, Aor, Kolo and Tum. In same year the Suri individuals were killed by unknown people and as revenge the Suri killed more than twenty-seven Dizi people and looted more than fifty cattle from Duit and Siski parishes. In 1991 when they were completely free from the central government control due to the change of government in Ethiopia the Suri people damaged a village in Tum and more than ten children, women and men were killed. Some of the areas of the Dizi such as Tulgit, Bero-kurit, Kiyafi, Ziyami, Moga, Kari, Damie, Haro, Muye, some portion of Addikas and Glekem were taken by the Suri. This terrorized the Dizi people who begun exchange their oxen with guns. Individuals who did not have both oxen and land fled to the gold mining areas to collect money for hand gun (Informant 2).

Added to the administrative caused problems, the Dizi and the Suri were beset by natural resources competition. The porous nature of the Etho-Sudanese-Kenya boundary has exacerbated the demographic pressure on these people. For example, since the 1940s the Bume of Kenya, crossing Geleb made frequent attack and sacked Nebrebus and Haro parishes which were under the firm control of Suri and Diz. Bume of Kenya who occupied an area south of the Suri land was well armed with automatic rifles (Fleming, 1973, p. 252; Edwards, 1982, pp. 3-14; Gezaw, 1989, p. 45).

A certain informant recounts how the Bume periodic infiltration in the land of the Dizi and Suri was as “the ethnic group, Bume, kills people in Tid, Tirma, Bero, Muye, Gelkem areas, and have a tradition of anointing the blood of others.” In the 1940s the Bume had controlled more than eight places such as Yargeg, Lomiya, Liwon, Neruz, Netefer, Libitkel and Lokoruwa of Ethiopian territories. Nekwa a very strategic place which was under the firm control of the guards of Ethiopia between 1934 and1935 became under the British-Kenyan police control in 1946 ( Report, 1946; Informants 5).

The local people, having seen the absence of the Ethiopian flag on the border, began to accept the propaganda of the British Sudan that all territories as far as Kibish River is part of Sudan (Report, 1946).

The other group that computes over grazing land on the Dizi and Suri were the Toposa, who came from the side of the Sudan. Buoyed by the easy access they had to automatic rifles (access to refills ensured the ongoing civil war in the Sudanese land), the Toposa began to infiltrate the areas controlled by the Suri pastoralists. In reaction to such competition coming from the Toposa side, the Suri began to move into some areas controlled by the semi-agricultural people of the Dizi. The computing effect was thus of a spiral development in a way that the Toposa affected the Suri pastoralists who in turn to compensate what they have lost started to take the areas of the Dizi. What makes both the Toposa and Suri similar was that they had access to automatic rifles, which were used to good effect to put their pressure felt especially on the Dizi. Reports of the Ethiopian government indicate that some local leaders in the region were engendered by the British-Sudan to loot commodities and take away territories from Ethiopia. The English merchants from the Sudan cross the border of Ethiopia carrying cotton cloth and exchanged it for natural resources and crops which were abundant in Ethiopia markets along the border.

Their heavy tracks carried large amounts of crops, cattle, sheep, goat and natural produce from Ethiopia territories to Liktab the town in Sudan per a day (Report, 1946, p. 6; Berhanu, 2000, p. 21). Contrary to the demographic pressure presented by the Toposa, there were some moves on the part of the Dizi and Suri to look for British protection than Ethiopian. Such a development is attested by an archive as:

The local elder of Tirma, the son of Wozlig who lived in Boma (Ethiopia and Sudan border), knew the language of the British and became the agent of the British-Sudan preaching to the local peoples (Suri and the Dizi) as far as the Kibish River to be part of the British-Sudan. He was able to win the heart of some inhabitants (Report, 1946, p. 8).

In general, with the help of the British, in the1950s, the Toposa and the Bume, drove out the Suri from some of their territory. The Suri who were pushed by the Bume and Topesa in turn raided the less armed Dizi and occupied Dizi grazing land and forest. This competition over grazing land caused spiraled into a continuous conflict between the Suri and Dizi. This aggravated the insecurity problem in the region and brought the long havoc on the sides of the Ethiopian people who settled on the southwest of Ethiopia (Zerihun, 1993, p. 40; Informants 3).

Firearms and cultural practices

In the 1960s and 1970s illicit trafficking of firearms was considered as one factor that aggravated the insecurity between the Dizi and Suri, and the neighboring territories. The main sources of guns and bullets that circulated were Addis Ababa (the center of the central government of Ethiopia) and the Sudan. Traders transported firearms from Addis Ababa by airplane as far as Maji and Mizan Teferi and exchanged it for gold. At a time, the main local as well as regional market centers for firearms were Shola Meda, Gesena and Boma (near to Sudan). The Suri were the main buyers of the firearms since they had gold and large number of cattle.

Nowadays the war weapons are transported by airplane from Addis Ababa to Mizan Teferi and Maji, and it would be sold publicly in Kefa and neighboring awraja and it is distributed to the mass (Report, 1950, p. 2).

The well-equipped Suri people gradually began to develop superiority feelings over the Dizi people and conflicts began to be the day to day activities of the Dizi and Suri (Gezaw, 1989, p. 25).

Informants argue that the source of the security problem in the Dizi area also emanates from the Suri marriage tradition, and individual desire for getting status among the society. A Suri young needs to have more than thirty cattle to marry a wife. Demanding such gifts are sometimes unaffordable for the young and his family that motivates individuals to raid and loot the Dizi’s cattle and property. Besides, sometimes the Suri men go to war because of the desire for receiving recognition for being brave in warfare. A Suri who kills Dizi or anybody outside Suri will be praised by his mother, father and the community as a whole. Girls sing a song about his braveness (Abeje, 1997, p. 13; Informants 1; Hodson, p. 406).

Drought and famine

Another factor that aggravated the security problem during the period under discussion was drought and famine. The region was frequently exposed to drought in 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. The famine, mainly caused by drought, was aggravated by many factors. First, the majority of the Suri people had engaged mainly in pastoral activity and few of them were plow agriculturalist using very traditional instruments like hoes. In the time of drought they inter to the territories of Dizi for hunting, grazing and water. The Dizi, less armed, unable to protect themselves from the Suri. In this regard, archival materials confirm that

In Maji awraja the Suri pastoralists who were continuously prone to drought moved to areas controlled by the Dizi killing the people, plundering their property and burning what was left. The majority of the deceased recorded were from the Dizi who were less armed and unable to protect themselves and their territories… (Report, 1962).

Secondly, as informants revel, the bandits disrupted the security and peaceful coexistence of the people. Looting and killing became the order of the day. This had hindered the merchants and farmers from neighboring districts to come to the region with their commodities and products. Thirdly, different types of diseases followed the famine, such as diarrhea, influenza, malaria and others. As a result of this, a large number of people died and others were displaced from their areas. Fourthly, heavy taxes of the government had its own contribution for the famine in the area. The appeal of the people to the government in 1961 reads as:

We are balabats living in Bero district haven’t seen such heavy disaster throughout our life in this land. Since last year, all our harvests were destroyed by heavy rain and wild animals; we, including our children, are dying of malaria, above all, the government requests us to pay heavy taxes. Therefore, we beg you (Emperor Haile Selasie I) to do something. Previously, we were able to survive the effects of the famine for we received aid from the British government in Sudan but now we could not, for we are Ethiopians (Report, 1964).

The government of Ethiopia did not give immediate response and solutions rather it tried to hide the problems. Government letters confirm this.

We know that in Bero and Mehal Maji district, there is a shortage of food, therefore, the local governors should tell the local people that the problem is temporary and people should have patience until the government solves it (Report, 1968).

However, the local governors who also were victims of the famine, therefore, they replied that

In Maji town, at this moment, there is no crop at all in the market, and the local people themselves have nothing to eat, and the people say that if you(local governors) are the real representatives of the government, tell our problem to our father (emperor Haile Selasie I) (Report, 1968).

This continued in the early days of the Derg (1970s). Many people from Suri, Dizi, Me’en, Sheko and Selmamo died. In the same year, more than 20,000 Suri were exposed to hunger and out of this more than 1300 Suri people fled to Jeba, Mizan and Hamer Bako but forty-one of them died on the voyage. According to government reports, more than 10,000 people from the Shasha district (mainly the Me’en) were affected by drought and began to flee to the neighboring districts (Report, 1987).

The central government of Ethiopia opened refugee camps in Mizan, Mardure and Jeba. In these centers a large number of people from Dizi, Suri, Me’en, Sheko and others were sheltered. However, because of absence of transport and communication the problem was tough. Air transport was the only means that transported food and other logistic to the victims at the camp sites. The government also provided medicines to Jeba clinic and assigned additional nurses. In addition, the government designed a mechanism to collect money from each district employee and individuals. So, about 22,527 birr. 68 cents were collected and it was invested to buy crops from other regions of Ethiopia and distributed it to the victims (Report, 1988).

The famine did not only affect the local people of the area, but also those government employees, civil servants and town dwellers. The police members in Mehal Maji, Kurit and Tirma Tid district were also victims that made them unable to keep law and order. In 1967 the administrator of Tirma Tid district Mershi Adikas reported the absence of crops in the markets and requested the government to get his salary in kind from the central government instead of money. They wrote:

We, the workers in the awraja police office and staff members in Mehal Maji and Kurit district, have nothing to eat, we are suffering from hunger and we could not cope up with it. What we can buy by our salary, we need a bread of Kocho or enjera instead of a monthly salary (Report, 1967).

To solve this problem the central government of Ethiopia began provide some amount of flour, wheat and teff for the civil servants. In the last days of the Derg the administrative workers in Tirma Tid were forced to provide fifty percent of their monthly salary to buy crops from other areas. However, the majority of civil servants dropped their work and fled to the other areas (Informants 4; Report, 19,1988).

Government response to the conflicts

In the period under discussion the government made an attempt to solve the conflict between the Dizi and Suri. The administration established some soldier posts in the Suri and Dizi areas and made an attempt to collect taxes from the Suri. In 1946 major Yohannes from the central government of Ethiopia came to Maji and assigned policemen to protect the borders of Ethiopia from the illegal peoples from Sudan and Kenya, the case in point were grazmach Gebere Sellasie Dejenie and Yirdaw Teferi. Besides, in 1949 by the order of Abiy Abebe, Ras Mesfin Seleshi accompanied by five hundred soldiers marched to Maji. The attempt to disarm the local people restored temporary peace. However, after 1950 the conflict in the area became much more complicated again. In 1955, due to lack of logistics of the Ethiopian government and the threat of the British in Kenya, the guards left the border and came to Maji. As a result, the Nebrebus parish (previously called Asfaw Wosen Kela), which was the territory of Ethiopia for a long period, became part of Turkana of Kenya (Zerihun, 1993, p. 45; Informants 5).

In the 1960s to halt undisclosed armament trading the pen Minster of Ethiopia granted the right and power to the nech lebash (local soldiers) to hunt and control the underground armament traders. Besides, Balambaras Mahteme Sellasie the then Labor and Communication Minster of Ethiopia remarks in his letter to the Ethiopian airline authority that any armament without the permission of the government should not be transported by the Ethiopian airlines to Maji. However, it was not fruitful because some of the officials and police members were collaborators with the secret traders in smuggling firearms. A few police members in Maji and all soldiers at Kullie center were identified by the people that directly participated in the secret trading activities. However, the government did not take serious measures except transferring them to other districts. This in turn discourages the local people to cooperate with the government (Amare, 2007, p. 61; Informants 2). In the post the 1991 government sponsored mediation at district and zone levels to resolve conflicts remain without success. The local governors continuously report the deeds of the Suri and the need to open additional police stations in various parishes and still demanding new solutions (Abbink, 2000, p. 530; Report, 1977; Informants 4).

Conclusions

As a conclusion, lack of genuine state interventions and population pressure for computing natural recourses has remained the main causes of conflict between the Dizi and the Suri since 1941. Illicit trafficking of firearms, drought and famine has also aggravated the social, political and economic insecurity of the people that consume the life a large number people from both sides. Hence, formal institutions that allow genuine state intervention are essential because the conflict in the study areas can be exacerbated by factors beyond the scope of informal institutions (e.g. illicit trafficking of firearms). In general, peace building endeavors should address major cause/s of the conflicts through both changes in attitude and in the application of policies designed within the context of the region that is first consulted and largely approved by the local people.