Startseite Nudging openly – An experimental analysis of nudge transparency in a public goods setting
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Nudging openly – An experimental analysis of nudge transparency in a public goods setting

  • Erika Große Hokamp ORCID logo EMAIL logo und Joachim Weimann
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 13. Mai 2021

Abstract

Around the world, policy makers and public authorities are increasingly turning to behaviorally informed interventions (“nudges”) in order to help tackle important contexts of public policy. Despite their impressive merit record, these policy tools have been heavily criticized as being obscure and manipulative, thus facing challenges for their legitimate assertion in the regulatory toolkit. In this study, we seek to assess whether transparency over the use of such interventions may constitute a viable way of addressing these ethical concerns, and focus particularly on the potentially moderating role of something we call “status quo experience”, i. e. subjects’ understanding of the behavioral consequences of different choice architectures. We conduct a laboratory experiment, whereby subjects play three rounds of a public good game, the first of which defaults them towards a fully non-cooperative contribution, while the rest default them towards a fully cooperative one. Subjects in our treatment groups further receive an “informational shock” at varying points in time, disclosing how and why a fully cooperative default contribution is being used. We find that providing subjects with informational disclosure about the nudge intervention did not result in significantly different aggregate behavioral measurements between control and treatment groups. This seems to be independent of status quo experience and of the timing of transparency provision. We nonetheless find some indication that the latter could help sustain cooperation over time.

JEL Classification: H41; D91; D78

Article note

Dataset and experimental instructions are currently stored at the X-econ Repository for Experimental Economics (http://x-econ.org/xecon/#!VerifyLink/93d4ed07-1016-4e87-a12e-fbaece26af13).


Appendix A Experimental instructions

The experimental instructions were kept as similar as possible across treatments, differing only in their description of the initial decision situation. The text presented here corresponds to treatments A–C, where subjects received the exact same instructions at the beginning of the experiment. In order to demonstrate how this text varied for treatments D and E, we include the alternative phrasing in brackets.

Instructions

You are now taking part in an economic experiment in which you can earn money. How much you will earn depends on your own decisions and on those of other participants. It is therefore very important that you read and understand the following explanations carefully.

From now on you are not allowed to communicate with other participants in any way. If you have any questions, please address them exclusively to us. If you fail to follow this rule, we will be forced to exclude you from this experiment and from any payout.

The instructions you have received are the same for all participants. During the experiment you will interact with other participants. Throughout this process your anonymity will be preserved. This means that no other participant will be informed of your identity. The experimenters also cannot observe how you behave because they do not know your ID number.

In the experiment, we do not use the euro but Taler as currency. At the end, the number of Taler you earn during the experiment will be converted into euros at a ratio of 3:1.

An ID number will be randomly assigned to you. For this you will draw a numbered card from an urn. It is very important that you keep this number in a safe place, as this is the only way to ensure that payments are assigned correctly. Due to the experimental procedure, the payout from this experiment will take place at a later point in time. You can pick up your payout today from XX–XX o’clock in building YY, room ZZZ upon presentation of your ID number.

The exact details of the experimental procedure will be explained further down below. This following section will firstly explain the basic decision situation to you.

The decision

In the beginning, all participants will be randomly divided into groups of four. Thus, in addition to yourself, there will be 3 other participants in your group.

Each participant will receive an initial endowment of 10 Taler. You must then decide how many of these 10 Taler you would like to contribute to a group project of your group and how many you would like to keep for yourself. Each group member will face the same decision situation.

The payout

Any Taler you keep for yourself is yours and will be added to your private account. The following happens with the Taler contributed to the group project: the sum of all contributions will be multiplied by a factor of 2 and then divided equally among all four group members. For example, if 1 Taler is contributed to the group project, the value of that Taler increases to 2 Taler. That amount is then divided equally among all four group members. Consequently, each member of the group receives 0.5 Taler from the group project.

The income of each group member is calculated in the same way and thus consists of two parts:

  1. the Taler, that a participant keeps for himself (“income from private account”)

  2. the “group project income”. This is calculated as follows:

    [ 2 ( Sum of all Taler contributed to the project ) ] 1 4 = 0.5 ( Sum of all Taler contributed to the project )

Your complete income is thus calculated as follows: = (10 your contributed Taler) + 0.5 (Sum of all Taler contributed to the project)

The default contribution

Each participant can contribute any integer amount between 0 and 10 Taler to the group project. There is however a “default contribution” which will be automatically contributed to the group project unless you specify another amount. This “default contribution” is 0 Taler [10 Taler]. Thus, if you do not specify another amount, you will contribute 0 Taler [10 Taler] to the group project and keep 10 Taler [0 Taler] for yourself.

[We have chosen the default rule in this way because it is known from empirical and experimental research that people have a tendency to choose, or accept, default settings. Thus, setting a default rule, whereby everything is paid into the group project, leads to an overall increase in contributions and to improved outcomes for the group as a whole. This is exactly what this default contribution is intended to achieve.]

The experiment

The experiment consists of the decision situation described above. In order to make sure that each participant has understood the basic decision situation, you will first be given some control questions on the computer, which you must answer correctly in order to continue.

In the next step, you will see a summarized description of the decision situation on the screen. Right below it, you will see two different buttons: one with the inscription “Default” and the other with the inscription “Select another contribution”. By clicking the “Default” button, you can go directly to the next part of the experiment where you will be informed how to proceed with it. At the same time, you will be making the “default contribution” to the group project.

By clicking the button “Select another contribution”, you have the possibility to change the “default contribution” from 0 Taler [10 Taler] and to specify a different amount to contribute to the group project. The printed slips of paper and the envelopes that are at your seat are intended for this purpose. How to proceed in this case will now be explained. This information will also be displayed on your screen after clicking the button “Select another contribution”.

First, clearly write your ID number on the indicated slip of paper. You can then specify your desired contribution by writing down the following sentence and filling in the gap with the corresponding number:

I would like to change my contribution to the group project from 0 Taler [10 Taler] to ___ Taler.

You can contribute any integer amount between 1 and 10 Taler [0 and 9 Taler] to the group project. Once you are finished, place the folded sheet of paper in an envelope. Open your cabin door slightly so that you can hold out the envelope and put it into the sealed box that we will bring to your cabin. Then click on the “Next” button to proceed to the next part of the experiment.

Please note that it is not possible to go back once you have clicked one of the buttons. Also note that in this experiment you have no time constraints to make a decision. Depending on your decisions, the whole experiment can take between 10 to 40 minutes. Once you are done with the experiment, you may leave.

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Published Online: 2021-05-13
Published in Print: 2022-02-28

© 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Heruntergeladen am 4.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/ger-2019-076/html?lang=de
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