Within Their Ranks: Ranked Choice Voting Reform and Intra-Party Coalition Management

1 Electoral Reform and the Significance of Party Factionalism and Coalitional Fragility

Party polarization may be a defining feature of the current political climate, but the presence of intra-party discipline (e.g. similar roll-call votes) does not necessarily mean a lack of coalitional disagreement. Polarization as a concept does not tell us much about the gradual developmental shifts in the balance of power (or the management of contention) within parties. Parties are increasingly fluid and open to the influence of advocacy organizations operating across all levels of government because the parties as institutions are neither strong nor weak, but “hollow” (Rosenfeld and Schlozman 2024).

Our assertion is not that inter-party threats are unimportant, but instead that a focus on intra-party tensions is a necessary corrective to classic accounts of party development and realignment which emphasize inter-party competition as the main determinant of party trajectories (e.g. Key 1955; Burnham 1970; Sundquist 1973). Building upon the realignment theory critique inaugurated by Mayhew (2002) and recently extended by Hejny and Hilton (2021, 2025), we argue that the factional reconfigurations that have occurred among party coalitions would be under-appreciated by an approach grounded in inter-party relations. In addition to a primary concern with the party system (rather than with the groups which organize the system), the realignment framework is inattentive to both the pace of change within parties and the asymmetry of change among parties (Hejny and Hilton 2021: 18–20). We claim that the impetus for reform reflects an intra-party factional struggle for dominance shaped by contemporary partisan dynamics.

Emphasizing parties as “contentious institutions” is not an original insight, but what is novel about our argument is connecting this understanding of parties as fragile factional coalitions to an explanation of RCV campaign emergence. In their overview of a proposed research agenda on parties as contentious institutions, Hejny and Hilton (2021: 25) invite “further theoretical elaboration and empirical examination” of the “level or degree of party contention.” Responding to this call, we argue that the greater the amount of party contention, the more likely that factions operating in these contingent circumstances will consider pursuing electoral reform to preserve (or improve) their internal power. Ranked choice voting may be – at this time – the least divisive, but sufficiently impactful, reform to achieve this objective.

The extent to which party factions shape large-scale changes in party alignment has long been a subject of scholarly debate. DiSalvo (2012: 5) defines factions as party “subunits” with a consistent ideological position, a recognizable organizational infrastructure, a durable presence, and an influence within the overarching party coalition. Blum (2019) describes factions as “miniature parties within parties” and emphasizes intra-party competition for influence over policy priorities and party direction. In both cases, the locus of contestation is within parties among party elites. Most established parties have mechanisms for socialization that seek to promote ideological cohesion, to provide structure and organization, to create a pathway to advancement, and to shape a party culture. Although electoral motivations largely shape the willingness to adopt RCV, related non-electoral motivations that stem from the hollowness of parties may provide further impetus for reform. One of the strategies employed by dominant party factions is to allow intra-party factions to be expressed, thus “facilitat[ing] an operational degree of cohesion and constraint” (Hejny and Hilton 2021: 10).

The relative openness of parties to newcomers (and the attendant lack of gatekeeping) is both a concern and an opportunity for party cohesion. With weak socialization mechanisms, it is a concern because the influx of newcomers to a party may undermine the cohesion of the party by diluting ideological and brand positions. Insurgent factions have the potential to shape the party brand (Clarke 2020) and identity (Cooper et al. 2024) in ways that entrenched party factions assume will damage their reputation on policy matters and undermine their general image. It is also an opportunity, though, because the newcomers already have significant support, the ability to reach potential donors, and a cultural appeal that leads to a high level of attachment and engagement by followers. Party coalitions attempt to incorporate newcomers by leaning on their existing advantages, particularly the intensity of their supporters. This becomes the basis for the emergence of – and the attempt to tame – factional subcultures within party coalitions.

Several mechanisms of electorally based socialization can be employed to mediate party challenges and to potentially prevent crowded primary fields. In some states, election laws erect barriers to candidate entry (e.g. closed primaries, party convention nominations, required history of voting in party primaries) or candidate exit (e.g. sore loser laws). The purpose of these barriers is to increase the socialization power of the party, to prevent newcomers from easily mobilizing a party subculture, and to limit concerns over party raiding. If suppressing factional subcultures directly is not pursued to bring order, there are a few states where fusion parties provide voters with an opportunity to actively support their party faction while maintaining party coalition cohesion (Drutman 2022).

Alternatively, ranked choice voting becomes a solution to a dearth of socialization options in specific electoral contexts. RCV allows for the open expression (and accommodation) of factional subcultures, the mobilization of each factional subculture within a single party primary, the mediation of the subculture conflict, and in some cases the moderation of party faction subcultures in pursuit of more second-place votes. RCV, therefore, can be a convenient electoral mechanism of intra-party socialization that draws on the advantages of maintaining party factional subcultures while promoting a sufficient level of coalition cohesion.

Additionally, the unintended impacts of past interventions will often necessitate the employment of later reform measures. For example, one of the consequences of post-2010 efforts at gerrymandering by (mostly) Republican-led state governments (Keena et al. 2021) was the creation of single party fortresses that incubated factional dissent within the party coalition. As this example demonstrates, coalition management can be pursued via reforms which result in the mobilization of targeted groups or in the demobilization of specific constituencies. In the attempt to shift the electoral terrain and lower the costs of maintaining power, the steering faction’s attempts unleashed a factional shift that once fomented was difficult for party leaders to control. By privileging short-term results over long-term coalition stability, the unintended consequence was to change the contours of the coalition. In dominant party systems, this led to intra-party factions and increased costs to maintaining the existing coalition. As coalition size increased to a maximalist coalition (without an inter-party threat), intra-party competition could thrive. In fragmented party systems, fragile ruling coalitions faced existential threats from intra-party competitors and an increase in the costs of maintaining power. In short, the coalitional pursuit of a status quo-oriented reform (RCV) was necessitated by the coalition’s prior efforts at advantage-oriented electoral reform (gerrymandering).

2 The Likelihood of Reform: Dominant, Fragmented, and Balanced Party Systems

2.1 Levels of Intra-Party Competition and the Likelihood of Reform

We contend that ranked choice voting reform is a tool to maintain or enhance coalitional cohesion in the face of significant threats to the balance of power between party factions. Therefore, the likelihood of RCV reform efforts increases under conditions that are vulnerable to coalitional shifts or to internal fracture. The most significant factor is the party system. At the national level, the United States, given its first-past-the-post single-member district system, is governed by two major parties in which there is frequent turnover of party control. This model for inter-party competition is not uniformly reflected within each state. The nature of contemporary state party systems is shaped both by historically resonant deep factors (such as vestiges of the Jim Crow south, the legacies of machine or dynastic politics, and demographic shifts) and more recent proximate factors (including redistricting efforts and lower barriers to candidate entry). The variation in state-level party systems shapes the character and intensity of intra-coalition competition.

The cross-state variation ranges from highly dominant party systems to highly fragmented party systems. Dominant party systems are characterized by a non-competitive inter-party electoral landscape. Inter-party competition is instead substituted by a conflictual intra-party coalition. At the other extreme, fragmented party systems are similarly characterized by conflictual coalitions. But, unlike dominant parties, internal coalition factions spillover in fragmented party systems to produce formidable third party adjacent movements and/or independent candidacies (Gold 2002; Sakaiya and Maeda 2014). In contrast to both highly dominant and fragmented coalitions, some state party systems are characterized by relative intra-party cohesion in a competitive inter-party environment. Underlying intra-party differences are downplayed in these balanced party systems in favor of cohesion in the face of a viable external party threat (Table 1).

Table 1:

Party systems.

	Inter-party context	Intra-party coalition
Dominant	Non-competitive	Conflictual
Fragmented	Competitive	Conflictual
Balanced	Competitive	Cohesive

A maximal winning coalition is indicative of a highly dominant party in which there is little inter-party competition. At the state level, a dominant party consistently garners a sizable majority of seats in a state legislature, often holds a governing trifecta, and maintains a significant party registration advantage. Dominant parties can also be observed at the legislative district level (or in local municipalities) in which candidates regularly win general elections uncontested or prevail by a significant margin of victory. In both cases, the maximal winning coalition shifts electoral competition from outside of the party to inside of the party (Browne and Kim 2003). In some settings, intra-party competition takes place through contentious party primaries that reveal the existence of party factions (Masket 2020). In other settings, intra-party competition may lead to coalition leakages in the form of elite defections to third-party movements and/or independent campaigns. Parties also face other consequences of a maximal winning coalition, including potential legitimacy deficits due to low turnout rates, that result from muted inter-party competition (Frank and Coma 2023).

A fragmented party system is likely to emerge where there are salient and often influential intra-party factions, including party adjacent factions (who are frequently relied upon to provide crucial electoral support). Elections can be won or lost on the basis of holding together a coalition and satisfying factional demands. Fragmented party systems are often characterized by deep coalition leakage and a considerable number of non-affiliated (i.e. independent or unenrolled) voters. Both major parties may not experience the same level of internal conflict in a fragmented party system.

A balanced party system is more internally stable than a coalitionally fluid fragmented system, but it is not necessarily more competitive. A distinguishing element of a balanced party system is the presence of greater intra-party cohesion, which makes coalition infighting strategically unwise, particularly when a minimal winning coalition remains sufficient for electoral success. Given the greater intra-party cohesion, there will be a lower likelihood of coalition leakage in a balanced system than in a fragmented system. In addition, there will be more inter-party competition in a balanced system than in a dominant system and, consequently, more partisan shifts in governing.

Party systems are highly durable and exhibit continuity over extended time periods. However, they are not static and can evolve in response to political, institutional, or demographic shifts. Our typology captures ideal types, but in practice, states lie along a continuum with varying degrees of alignment to these categories. An important feature of a party system is its stability across multiple election cycles (e.g. five or more) rather than temporary fluctuations resulting from a single wave election. The relative stability of party systems distinguishes systemic patterns from momentary political changes.

Using the typology, we posit that elite pressures for reform occur at two poles where intra-party coalition competition is highest. This is observed in highly dominant coalitional space (e.g. Utah and Massachusetts) and in highly fragmented coalitional space (e.g. Alaska and Minnesota). For the former, the sheer dominance of the ruling coalition and expectation of electoral success allows for a more internally fractious coalition, while in the latter, there is a challenge of winning elections with an unstable coalition. The lowest likelihood of reform occurs in a balanced coalitional space (e.g. Pennsylvania and North Carolina) when there is neither high fragmentation nor a dominant coalitional bloc, and thus low levels of intra-party competition. We hypothesize that:

H1:

Dominant party systems exhibit high levels of intra-party competition.

H2:

Fragmented party systems exhibit high levels of intra-party competition.

H3:

As intra-party competition increases, the intensity of ranked choice voting reform efforts increases.

We posit a U-shaped relationship between the party system and the likelihood of RCV reform advocacy in which the level of intra-party competition is the prevailing factor (Figure 1).

Figure 1:

Likelihood of RCV reform advocacy. Note: The model illustrates the placement along the state party systems framework of the four cases analyzed in this article: Alaska, Minnesota, Utah, and Massachusetts. Pennsylvania and North Carolina are included in this figure as representative examples of balanced party systems.

3 The State of the States: Cases of Ranked Choice Voting Advocacy

To explore the relationship between party system and RCV advocacy emergence, we select four states that represent the tails of the fragmented–dominant party system distribution, with Alaska and Minnesota being highly fragmented and Massachusetts and Utah being highly dominant (Figure 1). Much has already been written about Maine and its earlier adoption of RCV reforms (e.g. Armstrong 2019; Santucci 2018), and while Maine fits well among the other highly fragmented cases, the states examined in this paper are less investigated cases clustered in a more recent time period. The case selection also controls for party as Alaska (fragmented) and Utah (dominant) lean Republican while Minnesota (fragmented) and Massachusetts (dominant) lean Democratic. Pennsylvania and North Carolina represent balanced party systems in Figures 1–3. Given that there have been no serious recent efforts at pursuing ranked choice voting in these balanced states, they are not considered in detailed case study analyses below.

Figure 2:

Institutional indicators of party systems (2000–2025). Blue: Democratic Red: Republicans; Green: Third Party/ Independent. Executive Leadership: Party in control of governorship. Legislative Supermajority: One party holding at least two-thirds of seats in both chambers of State Legislature. Government Trifecta: One party control of governorship and in both chambers of State Legislature. Congressional Delegation: One party holding at least three-fourths of federal seats (House & Senate). Note: The years correspond to the election cycle. The data reflects the results as of election day and does not account for changes that may occur just before and during the term.

Figure 3:

Average state ideological distributions (2000–2022). Note: Kernel density figures use NP Scores for State House and Senate legislators between 2000 and 2022 from Shor and McCarty (2025) State and Legislator Ideology Dataset. An NP Score of 0 is the ideological center.

3.3 Resulting RCV Advocacy

The intensity of RCV advocacy relates to different pathways for reform because of the variation in electoral mechanisms available in each state. Consideration of the most robust reform plausible under the existing framework leads advocates to pursue reform through the following pathways: (1) adoption by local jurisdiction with anticipated diffusion to other locales; (2) legislative enactment by state legislature; and (3) via citizen ballot initiative and referendum.

Local adoption largely avoids federal legal constraints, as well as the electoral uncertainties that may accompany state or national-level reforms. For advocates, the aim is aspirational: to increase the scale of the reform and use local models to promote the diffusion of RCV to higher levels of government. Advocates have exhibited high intensity in recent decades resulting in statewide adoption in Maine (2016) and Alaska (2020) and local adoption in over 50 jurisdictions including San Francisco (2002), Minneapolis (2006), Salt Lake City (2021), and New York City (2021) (Figure 4).

Figure 4:

Ranked Choice Voting in Practice (2025). Notes: * Figure reflects the highest level of RCV adoption and implementation in a given state. ** The municipalities that have adopted RCV in local elections are most likely to be jurisdictions with highly dominant party systems (e.g. Portland, OR; Burlington, VT; Boulder, CO) *** Since 2022, Republican-led state legislatures in 16 states – Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Mississippi, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, West Virginia and Wyoming – have passed laws that prohibit the use of ranked choice voting at the local and state levels (National Conference of State Legislatures 2025). Special exemptions may apply in states which use a two-stage runoff voting system, as four of these states (Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi) have permitted military personnel and overseas voters to use RCV to meet vote by mail deadlines in a condensed time period.

The legislative process can also reveal varying levels of intensity in reform efforts. State legislators, often with sizable sponsorship, in nearly 30 states introduced bills related to RCV in the 2023–2024 legislative session (FairVote 2025). In many cases, RCV proposals signal a modest interest and intensity in reform efforts as a vast number of bills languish in committee and are tabled each legislative session. In other cases, legislation has passed, including in Utah (municipal allowance), Colorado (municipal allowance), and Maine (select statewide offices).

The third pathway of reform is by employing ballot initiatives and referenda. These direct democracy measures may provide the best chance of more immediate reform, but the uncertainties associated with the results and the fact that only roughly half of the states provide participatory options means that advocates are sometimes cautious to proceed with the citizen-based pathway. Even among states where this pathway is available, there is variation in terms of ballot measure specificity with several advocacy campaigns having proposed RCV as part of a broader reform agenda. Serious recent efforts at ballot initiative campaigns are observed in Massachusetts and Nevada, with adoption success in Alaska and Maine. Dyck and Lascher (2019: 111) conclude that “parties use the ballot initiative process strategically and with partisan ends.” Indeed, this pathway may be especially useful for party elites because of its relative lack of saliency to voters – even less of a stated priority than ballot initiatives which promise more particularized benefits.

Behind each pathway for reform, advocacy groups such as FairVote (along with place-based lobbying organizations such as Utah RCV and Alaskans for Better Elections) commit varying amounts of resources and expertise to achieve adoption. The intensity of the advocacy is often correlated with an assessment of whether elites are seriously committed to RCV reform and whether the probability of adoption is high. This makes the resource and attention of advocacy groups a good barometer of the level of intensity in a given reform effort.

Even though our focus is on the emergence of RCV advocacy efforts, rather than their success, it is important to note that the most intense efforts do achieve some level of success either in adoption or in widespread interest. Looking at our case studies, the variation in success is illustrated. The Alaska reform campaign in the post-2020 climate may be characterized as one of implementation (due to approval of the statewide RCV ballot initiative), and the Massachusetts effort could be considered abeyant (due to rejection of the statewide RCV ballot initiative).

Utah and Minnesota illustrate the ability for RCV to be utilized to address coalitional challenges in politically (and geographically) diverse contexts and promoted by ideologically heterogenous support networks. Utah represents an example of RCV reform advancement. While the movement’s roots are found in the state Republican Party’s candidate nomination conventions, a 2018 opt-in pilot program passed by the state legislature has resulted in Utah being home to more than a dozen municipal jurisdictions that make use of RCV in local elections (the largest nationwide). Distinct among these four cases, Minnesota does not have a state-level initiative option and therefore RCV advocates, who have had significant municipal success among the home rule charter cities, have pursued a currently stalled legislative strategy at the state legislature (Figure 5).

Figure 5:

Case Studies in Summary Form. Note: Figure illustrates the results of each pathway pursued: the vote share in support of the ballot measures in Alaska and Massachusetts and the municipalities in Minnesota and Utah that currently employ RCV. The most common form of RCV, when one seat is decided, is referred to as the alternative vote (AV) system. When multiple seats are decided by RCV, this is referred to as the single transferable vote (STV) system.

4 Alaska: Republican Coalition Fragmentation and Ranked Choice Implementation

Alaska illustrates party fragmentation on the right exhibited by intra-party competition within the Republican Party and coalition adjacent competition with the right-wing Alaskan Independence Party (AIP). The coalition fragmentation is compounded by a large number of voters identifying as non-partisan (14 % of party registrations in 2020) or undeclared (43 % of party registrations in 2020). The combination of historically weak state parties and anti-party sentiment has often resulted in personality-centered factions focused on candidate style rather than strict fidelity to ideologically specific policy aims. In this electoral context, RCV advocates intensified efforts to advance reform, culminating in a successful statewide 2020 ballot measure.

State elections throughout Alaska’s history reveal significant party system fragmentation. Walter Hickel, for example, served as Alaska’s 2nd governor as a Republican (1966–1969) and later as a member of the AIP (1990–1994). In 1994, Democrat Tony Knowles won the governorship with 41 % of the vote, while conservatives split their votes between the Republican candidate (41 %) and the AIP candidate (13 %). This fragmentation persisted in 1998 when Knowles was re-elected against a write-in candidate (18 %) and a Republican (18 %). To address vote splitting, some Alaska Republicans considered RCV, but the party won successive races for governor in largely two-candidate races shortly thereafter, and the push for RCV subsided.

This modest consolidation of the Republican coalition was challenged when a corruption scandal involving Governor Frank Murkowski, provided an opening for social conservatives, culminating with the 2006 election of Sarah Palin as Governor. Vulnerabilities in the fragile coalition were fully exposed in the 2010 U.S. Senate race in which Joe Miller – a candidate from the libertarian faction – bested incumbent Lisa Murkowski by 2,006 votes in the primary. Murkowski proceeded to run as a write-in candidate and comfortably won reelection (with 39.5 % in a multi-candidate race). The pressures for further fragmentation emerged in the mid-2010s with the ascendancy of Donald Trump and his appeals to social conservatives, libertarians, and AIP members. Anti-Trump Republicans felt threatened as their influence in the party waned.

Moreover, in 2016, Democrats achieved a majority in the state house when the party entered a coalition with three Republicans and two independents. A similar arrangement emerged when the “Coalition Caucus” achieved a majority in the lower house with 14 Democrats, two Republicans, and four independents in 2020.^[3] The major question was whether these developments would lead to further fragmentation and electoral failure of more establishment Republicans, handing victories to Democrats as was the case in the mid-1990s.

Within a fragmented party system, the Alaska ratings scorecard issued by the American Conservative Union allows for examination of possible contentiousness among Republicans (and party adjacent factions) in emphasizing legislator faithfulness to the organization’s agenda preferences (e.g. opposition to LGBTQ+ protections, decreased regulation, support for gun rights). In their most recent ratings scorecard, the ACU’s lowest ranked Republicans were Gary Stevens (Senate President) and Representative Louise Stutes (former House Speaker), both of whom have presided over bipartisan majority coalitions in their respective chambers (American Conservative Union 2023). In short, electoral results and factional divisions contributed to the desire of some Republicans who enjoyed a more cohesive coalition in the 2000s to propose an electoral system change.

The 2020 ballot measure proposed a two-round process whereby the four candidates who receive the most votes in a nonpartisan primary would advance to the general election to be determined by RCV. This Top 4 system, advocates claimed, would promote good governance, moderation, and cooperation. They also argued that the open primary that precedes the RCV runoff would protect the privacy of residents because voters would not need to ask for a partisan ballot – something that would resonate with Alaska’s large number of non-partisan and undeclared voters.

What the advocates suggested about their motivations would likely not be enough though to compel citizens or elites to back electoral reform. Scott Kendall, author of the ballot measure and a Republican election attorney, for example, was Trump-skeptical and supported Republican business elites, like Lisa Murkowski. Kendall had served as Murkowski’s counsel during the 2010 campaign (Berman 2021). Murkowski was silent on the ballot initiative, perhaps not wanting to endorse a measure that could be beneficial to her own electoral prospects. Ballot Measure 2 passed narrowly 50.55 %–49.45 % with analysts surprised by the result (Figure 5).

Part of the surprise comes from the narrow coalition needed to garner majority support. Republicans urging reform would need Democratic support in much the same way coalitions were formed within the state legislature. There were signs that some Democratic elites had misgivings about electoral reform. Former U.S. Senator Mark Begich vocally opposed the ballot measure, but his brother, State Senator Tom Begich joined advocates to write op-eds in support of the measure. Judging by the results of the initiative in comparison to voting patterns for Biden in the presidential race, it is clear that Democrats and the broader Biden coalition tended to support the measure.^[4]

Registered Republicans largely rejected the ballot measure. It is likely, though, that Ballot Measure 2 would have failed without the support of some Republicans in wealthier and more urban areas of the state. For instance, in State House District 1 (Fairbanks), Republicans hold a voter registration advantage of 21 %–16 % (Democrats) and Bart LeBon, a Republican, won handily in 2020 (with 55 %). House District 1 voted for the ballot measure in similar numbers (54 %–46 %). Other hypotheses about the narrow victory of the measure focus on linkage of the RCV proposal with other “clean election” reforms. The Anchorage Daily News Editorial Board (2020) endorsed the measure leading with changes to the electoral system and briefly suggested that transparency in donations would be an added improvement.

RCV reform in Alaska reached the stage of implementation in 2022 as more than 40 candidates competed in a special election nonpartisan primary to succeed deceased Rep. Don Young. Former Governor Palin earned the most votes in the first round, but lost in the general election to Democrat Mary Peltola who had finished fourth in the primary. Peltola drew support from Democrats and second choice support from voters who supported Republican Nick Begich as their first choice. In effect, RCV denied Palin a victory that may have been more likely in a plurality vote. In the first round of the 2022 Senate election, Lisa Murkowski had a 2,000 vote advantage over Trump-endorsed Kelly Tshibaka, which widened to nearly 19,000 votes in the third round of RCV distribution. Both 2022 results underscore the intended motivation of RCV in Alaska, denying the hard right-wing of the coalition electoral success and allowing centrist Republicans to achieve, if not their desired result, a second-best outcome and thus preserving their near-term relevance. By 2024, Republicans had consolidated support around Begich who defeated Peltola in her reelection bid, but a proposed repeal of the 2020 RCV ballot measure appearing on the same ballot narrowly failed, with observers crediting the mobilization efforts of the Alaska native community for this outcome (Sabino 2024).

5 Minnesota: Democratic-Farmer Labor Coalition Fragmentation and Ranked Choice Stall

Since 2000, Minnesota has experienced executive party control turnover by three parties, including an Independence Party led by Governor Jesse Ventura. During this period, the Democratic–Farmer–Labor Party (DFL) has achieved brief periods of legislative supermajorities and government trifectas (Figure 2). Unlike the other state cases, partisan attachments are less formalized in Minnesota due to the absence of party registration. With a history of third-party movements and recent changes in the electoral map, Minnesota represents a fragmented party system in which heightened intra-coalition divisions often shape electoral outcomes. In turn, persistent internal party conflicts have led to efforts, particularly by DFL elites, to manage coalitional differences by proposing ranked choice voting.

State party history uncovers the basis for coalitional alliances that have shaped Minnesota’s electoral landscape. In 1944, the Farmer-Labor and Democratic parties merged to provide viable opposition to Republican dominance. Despite rancor between ideologically flexible Democrats and the more doctrinaire agrarian wing of the Farmer-Labor Party, the DFL first achieved success in 1945 with the election of Hubert Humphrey to the mayoralty of Minneapolis.^[5] The DFL coalition reflected support from rural areas across the state and the Iron Range in the northeast, whereas Republicans excelled in metropolitan suburbs.

A more recent sign of party system fragmentation was the success of Ross Perot in the 1992 presidential election. The Reform Party candidate garnered nearly a quarter of the vote (24 %) in Minnesota while Bill Clinton only won the state with plurality support (43 %). This significant vote in 1992, and another strong showing by Perot in 1996 (12 %), laid the groundwork for an influential third-party movement that grew out of discontent with existing Republican state-level representation and the failure of the DFL to perform well in major cities.

Using his celebrity status as a professional wrestler, Jesse Ventura won the 1998 gubernatorial race, thus demonstrating the extent to which Minnesota still exhibited a fragmented party system.^[6] The rise of the Reform Party and, thereafter, the Minnesota Independence Party, reflects the failure of major parties to adequately manage their coalitions. Another indicator of a fragmented party system came in the 2008 U.S. Senate race in which Al Franken of the DFL won with a plurality of the vote and a slim margin of 312 votes. Dean Barkley – who had been appointed by Governor Ventura to complete the term of Paul Wellstone upon his passing in 2002 – garnered 15 % and likely attracted voters sympathetic to the DFL (Ostermeier 2008).

Beyond the party fragmentation of the 1990s and early 2000s, more proximate factors supplied added interest in RCV reform, namely, coalition shifts in the DFL, exploitation of third-party movements to manufacture disproportionate electoral outcomes, and experimentation with RCV at the municipal level. After 2010, the DFL increased its vote share in the traditionally Republican suburbs around Minneapolis-St. Paul, while losing ground in the Iron Range and other former strongholds. The changes in political geography presented a coalition challenge between centrist DFL members gaining ground in the suburbs and a consolidation of urban support among progressive representatives.^[7] In response to the 2020 murder of George Floyd, for example, Minneapolis city councilors entertained progressive proposals to overhaul policing, whereas DFL elites in the suburbs spurned meaningful police reform (King 2021). Despite differences over policy, electoral success requires an alliance between the centrist suburbs and progressive city centers, as the DFL continues to lose support in rural areas and the Iron Range.

Close elections in the demographically changing suburbs were also vulnerable to third-party spoiler movements. In 2020, Republicans Jim Hagedorn (HD-1), Erik Mortensen (HD-55A), and Gene Dornink (SD-27) all won narrow contests in which either the Grassroot-Legalize Cannabis or Legal Marijuana Now parties garnered more than the winning margin between the DFL and Republican candidates. At the time, Minnesota had not yet passed a bill to legalize recreational use of marijuana, and sensing that this could draw support away from the DFL, Republicans recruited and staged third-party candidacies on pro-marijuana platforms (Bierschbach 2020). This trickery prompted considerations from the DFL about how to prevent spoilers from threatening their electoral success.

In many DFL-supporting areas, RCV had already been adopted for local elections at the municipal level, including, in Minneapolis (2006), St. Paul (2009), St. Louis Park (2018), Minnetonka (2020), and Bloomington (2020). Advocates viewed the municipality-first approach as the most promising and immediate pathway to reform. Most municipalities operate under Dillon’s Rule, however, which does not give remaining Minnesota jurisdictions the ability to enact changes to local voting. State law would need to be amended to grant municipal autonomy to enact RCV or to provide a framework for statewide RCV.

Legislative pursuits have been spearheaded by Rep. Steve Elkins of Bloomington. A self-described moderate Democrat who was at one time a Republican typical of Minnesota’s suburbs in earlier eras, Elkins has been a lead sponsor of RCV bills across recent legislative sessions. A 2019 bill called for all localities to have the right to enact RCV. This bill paired RCV with ballot counting and security measures in order to be framed as an election quality improvement bill. With Republicans in control of the state senate, the proposal languished in committee only to be reintroduced as a more sweeping measure in a later session. The 2021 bill proposed RCV for statewide and federal offices and also failed to progress out of committee.

While RCV proposals are supported by the vast majority of DFL legislators – e.g. a 2023 version reached the floor and narrowly failed due to the absence of a quorum – assessing RCV support in the context of caucus participation is helpful in understanding intra-party dynamics. Elkins, who is active in the Civility Caucus, a bipartisan centrist-led group which sees efforts to bridge partisan divisions as a way to model democratic collaboration, signals his work on RCV as an extension of this project. The Inclusive Democracy Caucus, a DFL intra-party organization founded in 2023, represents a more comprehensive approach to democratic reform (e.g. expansion of voting rights for marginalized constituencies). Led by younger legislators (i.e. those with fewer years of legislative service), membership reflects the increasing diversity of the DFL coalition and the ambitious demands of the voters who elected these representatives to serve. Participants in both caucuses will vote for RCV adoption, but the differences in terms of issue prioritization and scope of necessary reform reflect the tenuous DFL coalition.

The movement for ranked choice voting in Minnesota is presently stalled given that legislative support is not yet available for passing RCV bills and the diffusion across home rule charter cities has reached its limit. The legislative pathway has also been pursued because Minnesota does not allow for state referenda or ballot initiatives. During the recent 2-year term (2023–2025) in which the DFL held a governing trifecta, the party pursued an ambitious policy agenda which included legalizing the recreational use of marijuana yet notably did not include ranked choice voting reform as three Democrats joined with all Republicans to oppose passage of an RCV bill under consideration. The conditions that make RCV an attractive mechanism for coalition management are still prevalent, though, given that the DFL coalition will likely rely on an alliance between suburban centrists and urban progressives, and elections will continue to be close and prone to spoilers. Moreover, Minnesota’s fragmented party system and its historical roots make coalition politics difficult to maintain over the long-run and always susceptible to the rise of party adjacent factions.

6 Massachusetts: Democratic Coalition Dominance and Ranked Choice Abeyance

The Democrats have held supermajorities in the Massachusetts legislature for decades. The Massachusetts delegation to Congress are all Democrats. Underneath this dominance, though, is a burgeoning factionalism in which an insurgent minority seeks to shape the policy direction of the coalition. Massachusetts is an outlier case in this regard as RCV reform advocacy has been concentrated among a minority faction seeking to undermine entrenched party leadership. The 2020 ballot measure allowed for a test of the electoral strength of the party’s progressive faction and demonstrated that the state party cannot perpetually expect to rely upon the loyal support of weak partisans to sustain its coalition.

Divisions within the Massachusetts Democratic coalition have often been framed along an insider/outsider axis of power rather than strictly along ideological lines (O’Brien 2022). With Democratic insiders targeting similarly situated members of the professional managerial class, intra-party outsiders have sought to advance the coalitional interests of an increasingly large and diverse working class cohort, a conflict while not unique to this time, has become more pronounced in recent years (Cunningham and Ubertaccio 2022: 166–169). The tensions between party factions are compounded by the concentration of power in the Massachusetts state legislature, one of the most professionalized chambers in the nation (Jenkins 2022).

Recent electoral outcomes underscore concerns with maintaining broad Democratic dominance. Martha Coakley’s surprising loss to Scott Brown in the 2010 special election to fill Ted Kennedy’s seat was blamed on the inability of the Democratic coalition to coalesce around Coakley after a contentious (four-candidate) primary. The Chairperson of the 2020 Yes on 2 RCV campaign, Evan Falchuk, cited his own experience running as an independent for governor in 2014, where he received more votes (3.3 %) than the difference between Democrat Martha Coakley (46.5 %) and Republican Charlie Baker (48.4 %). Falchuk’s service as chair possibly indicates that Democratic Party insiders were not committed to the initiative; otherwise, we would expect party leadership to have installed an ally to lead the effort.

More proximate to reform efforts, supporters of RCV often referenced the 2020 Democratic primary in CD-4 and the 2018 Democratic primary in CD-3 to illustrate the benefits of a preference-based voting system (Volić 2020). In both races, the winning candidate earned less than 25 % of the votes. Given that neither Democrat – Jake Auchincloss nor Lori Trahan – would face a serious challenge in the general election, RCV advocates sought to convince voters that officials would be more responsive to constituent interests if candidates were forced to demonstrate majority support. While the conventional wisdom about RCV is that the system produces more consensus-oriented centrist winners, in the dominant party system of Massachusetts, RCV could lead to more progressive outcomes. In the Auchincloss race, for example, 78 % of the voters supported a different candidate, all of whom positioned themselves to the left of the plurality winner.

Electoral reform is a central feature of the democracy agenda endorsed by advocacy organizations like Progressive Massachusetts and has been of interest to parts of the Democratic coalition since the aftermath of the 2016 presidential election, when several reforms proposed by Sanders supporters, including support for RCV, were added to the state party platform (Anderson 2017). Ballot Question 2 in 2020 on RCV provides a window into the factionalism within the Democratic Party.

The ballot question was publicly endorsed by 8 members of the Congressional delegation, 87 members of the Massachusetts state legislature (a narrow majority of party members), and 2 former governors. Progressives were largely in support of RCV because they viewed reform as a way to advance their policy aims, but the size of the progressive bloc is not yet large enough to be determinative. The higher levels of nonvoting on the ballot question in the most racially diverse and economically precarious areas of the state also suggest that rank-and-file party stalwarts were less enthusiastic about the proposed reform than some of the elite national actors who campaigned for its passage.^[8] In addition to intra-party motivations, some in the dominant Democratic Party also thought that RCV would benefit Democrats in gubernatorial races. Since 1990, all but one Massachusetts Governor (Deval Patrick) had been a Republican (William Weld, Paul Cellucci, Mitt Romney, and Charlie Baker).

The three most centrist members of the congressional delegation – Richard Neal (CD-1), Stephen Lynch (CD-8), and Bill Keating (CD-9) – did not publicly endorse Question 2. Neal and Lynch have both withstood recent primary challenges and Keating represents the least Democratic district in Massachusetts. In these cases, modifying the electoral system may allow the progressive wing to coalesce around an outsider challenger. Republican Governor Baker urged voters to oppose the measure as Republicans would likely have even more of a challenge winning elections in non-plurality systems (Duchin et al. 2019).

Ballot Question 2, which failed to pass by an almost 10-percentage point margin (54.8–45.2 %), received the greatest levels of support in Boston and the high-income, highly-educated towns that border the capital city, in the most politically progressive areas in the centrally-located Pioneer Valley, and in the culturally elite areas in Western Massachusetts. It is noteworthy that Cambridge and Amherst were the two jurisdictions that supported the referendum by the highest margins, as both have local experience with RCV. Opposition to the measure was present across the state from small Republican-voting towns along the Connecticut border to the second and third-largest cities of Worcester and Springfield to the economically and ethnically-diverse coastal towns of Fall River and New Bedford (Figure 5). Biden outperformed Ballot Question 2 by approximately twenty-points throughout the entire state. Around 6 % of all voters left their ballots blank on the RCV referendum. The relative silence of Democratic leadership in the state legislature likely served as a signal to strong partisans that voting for RCV was not a party priority. On the morning of the vote, Rep. Ayanna Pressley asserted that “Massachusetts is very good at being progressive in theory, less so in practice” (DeCosta-Klipa 2020).

The movement for ranked choice voting in Massachusetts has entered a period of abeyance – a stage where its prospects are limited, but infrastructure remains in place to reemerge when new opportunities arise. While local jurisdictions may continue to pursue RCV at the municipal level, the statewide ballot initiative pathway is currently foreclosed and, given the absence of support among party leadership, a legislative route is unlikely to advance in the state legislature. With Baker not seeking reelection in 2022 (due to a primary challenge from Trumpist elements), Maura Healey, the Democratic nominee assumed the governorship in 2023, thereby providing Democrats with a governing trifecta. Consequently, the dominance of the Democratic Party will increase as will its internal conflicts (Duquette 2023). No longer able to blame Republican governors for obstructionism, Democratic leadership will likely face increased scrutiny from within its own ranks, which could spur a revival of electoral reform efforts.

7 Utah: Republican Coalition Dominance and Ranked Choice Advancement

Utah’s party system is the most dominant among the cases. Republicans in Utah hold a supermajority in both houses of the state legislature, regularly win all statewide offices by 30–40 percent, and members from within its ranks consistently comprise the entire congressional delegation. Over 52 % of Utah registrants identify as Republicans, while only 14 % of Utahns register as Democrats – one of the largest disparities in the nation. Utah’s dominant party system is a phenomenon usefully understood in the context of a mid-20th century conservative backlash to the civil rights era and the partisan sorting resulting from these developments. Prior to the 1970s, Utah could be characterized as a balanced party system with frequent turnover for state and federal offices. Republican national messaging, which increasingly centered around an anti-federal traditionalist agenda, appealed to Utahans of a certain doctrinal background (who make up a majority of the state’s electorate). As Brown (2018: 35) succinctly describes, “Utah became Republican because Mormons became Republican.”

The consequences of the contemporary partisan imbalance in Utah include “low turnover among officeholders, low turnout among voters, and low unity among Republicans” (Brown 2018: 45). Of any state won by Trump in 2016, he received the lowest percentage in Utah (45.1 %) due to the ballot presence of Evan McMullin, a Republican running as an independent, who earned over 21 % of the vote. McMullin’s presidential campaign, as well as his 2022 campaign for the U.S. Senate against Mike Lee, represents the strategy of an embattled faction in a dominant party coalition. In such electoral circumstances where one major party is not competitive, running as an independent provides an opportunity to forcefully counter a certain kind of factional style rising within the coalition. Parallel to this approach is the growth of ranked choice voting in Utah, which we argue is a corresponding development, motivated by similar objectives.

Utah is the state with the greatest number of jurisdictions where RCV is currently practiced. RCV was introduced for the first time in Republican party conventions in the early 2000s, with its first high profile usage being in the 2004 gubernatorial primary convention where sitting governor Olene Walker was eliminated from consideration for nomination in the fifth round of voting (Cotti 2011: 5). Seeking his party’s renomination in 2010 for a fourth term, U.S. Senator Bob Bennett lost in the second round of voting to two candidates, including then-newcomer Mike Lee. Having failed to reach the requisite 60 % support threshold in the pre-primary convention, Lee advanced to a top-two primary to determine the party’s nominee and, inevitably in Utah, to a general election victory. In 2014, in response to the convention nomination process which could preclude a primary election if the support threshold is met, the state legislature (aiming to reduce the influence of party delegates) passed Senate Bill 54, which provides a dual candidate nomination system that allows candidates who do not earn their party’s endorsement to force a primary by submission of ballot signatures (Roche 2020).

The broader point is that factions in dominant parties have many mechanisms of party regulation at their disposal – including ranked choice voting. RCV bills have been introduced in the Utah State Legislature since the 1990s, but the first bill receiving serious consideration was House Bill 349 in 2017, which would have required RCV in all primary and municipal elections in Utah, stalled in committee. In the following session, the Legislature succeeded in passing House Bill 35, an opt-in pilot project which allows municipalities to use RCV for nonpartisan mayoral and city council elections. The jurisdictions that have adopted RCV are located in Salt Lake, Utah, and Wasatch counties (Figure 5). The size of Republican dominance in Utah assures the party (and its competing factions) multiple reform pathways to address intra-party challenges.

The nature of contemporary intra-party factional conflicts cannot be captured only through the lens of ideology. Republicans in Utah are all deeply conservative. An examination of the voting records of two Republican Senators from Utah – Mike Lee and Mitt Romney – would not lead one to conclude that they represent distinct party factions. The conflicts between what we might call the Romney-McMullin faction and the Lee-Trump faction are largely not about policy, but rather about style, temperament, and concerns over character. The Romney-McMullin critique of what they see as the erosion of democratic norms and the undermining of values by their co-partisans is especially resonant given the potent influence of Mormonism in Utah politics. Utah Republicans were initially quite skeptical of Trump. Trump finished a distant third in the 2016 presidential caucuses; lost a sizable percentage of the Republican vote to McMullin (particularly in areas with highly educated residents); and when Trump sought reelection, Lee received strong criticism for suggesting that Mormon voters should view the president as the modern incarnation of a righteous figure from the Book of Mormon (Romboy 2020).

Opposition to this factional ascendancy is concentrated among the political elite associated with the Romney-McMullin faction who worry about losing party control and are therefore intrigued by RCV as a way to thwart the progress of their intra-party adversaries. Further developments speak to this elite schism. Romney declined to endorse Lee for reelection citing conflicts of interest because “people in the race are my friends” (Romboy 2022), and fearing a 2024 primary challenge, chose not to run for reelection. Additionally, the factional tensions are increasingly present in the state legislature. On the final day of the 2022 legislative session, Gov. Spencer Cox (who is perceived as sympathetic to the Romney-McMullin faction) vetoed legislation which targets trans student participation in high school athletics. The veto was swiftly overridden by the Republican supermajority (McKellar and Beal-Cvetko 2022).

The future of ranked choice voting in Utah is likely one of continued advancement at the local level, but potentially fraught at the state level. Patterned after the successful 2020 referendum in Alaska, a Utah top-five RCV initiative was initially filed for the 2022 ballot, but later withdrawn by supporters before the signature submission stage, perhaps as an act of deference to legislators working on the issue (Woodruff 2021). Sparked by the 2020 primary election for CD-4, in which Burgess Owens earned the Republican nomination with 43 % in a crowded field, two Republican state legislators introduced House Bill 178, which would require RCV to be “used in multi-candidate primary and general election races statewide” (Asay 2022). While the bill was not voted on during the 45-day legislative session, it is instructive to consider the possible motivations of the lead sponsors – State Sen. Curt Bramble and State Rep. Mike Winder. Bramble recently faced a strong primary challenge from a candidate whose slogan was “Make Utah Great Again.” Along with his sponsorship of the RCV reform bill, Bramble was also a lead sponsor of the anti-trans legislation. Both of these actions can be understood as coalition management related decisions to fend off a rising factional threat. Winder represents West Valley City, a house district in the Salt Lake City metropolitan area. The district is located within the state senate district of the Democratic minority leader, and as such, Winder’s relatively moderate constituency would likely be more open to electoral reform. The inability to advance HB 178 in 2022 might portend a challenging future for the legislative pathway to RCV reform in Utah. With an increasing number of Lee-Trump Republicans serving, the Romney-McMullin Republicans may have waited too long to pursue statewide reform, as both factions increasingly agree on whose faction would benefit most from passage.

8 Conclusion

Due to the recent adoption of ranked choice voting in an increasing number of U.S. jurisdictions, scholars have begun to examine the effects of reform, yet have not dedicated significant attention to the causes of reform efforts. Our examination of elite motivations and the management of intra-party factional conflict begins to fill this research gap. We argue that RCV is a nonpartisan tool to achieve partisan aims. Actors in both major party coalitions, in party systems both dominant and fragmented, and through multiple pathways, have sought to advance RCV in response to within-party challenges. A developmental stage has been reached where party elites within specific factions perceive threats to their coalition status and are, therefore, searching for a minimally disruptive corrective that would minimize electoral uncertainty. Ranked choice voting provides such a mechanism.

Soon after entering Congress, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) acknowledged that “[i]n any other country, Joe Biden and I would not be in the same party, but in America, we are” (Freedlander 2020). AOC was simply recognizing that given the structural constraints that make running as a third-party candidate overwhelmingly difficult, she saw the Democratic Party as the most efficient venue to achieve maximum influence. She understands her role as representing a distinct faction in the party from Biden. The rise of candidates like AOC, who in many ways threaten the existing party order has resulted in parties seeking to both limit the impact of emerging factions as well as to accommodate these voices because of their ability to bring in the supporters and resources that a hollow party craves.

We have also drawn attention in this essay to the insufficiency of characterizing factions simply by their ideological differences and argue that contemporary factions are better understood as subcultural brands with distinct styles. Contemporary factions are differentiated along multiple dimensions – sometimes along ideological lines, but often not. When Mitt Romney was asked during a 2022 television interview about his Republican colleague in the House, Marjorie Taylor Greene, speaking at a white nationalist conference, the Senator responded, “Morons, I’ve got morons on my team” (Pengelly 2022). While Romney is clearly expressing his contempt for Greene’s appearance, perhaps more revealing is his use of the word “team.” Romney understands that the Congresswoman from Georgia is a reliable Republican vote and therefore an ideological ally, but certainly not a member of his party faction despite sharing a similar voting record.

Intra-party factions are reflected in these national-level conflicts. State-level politics provides an opportunity to observe a diverse set of approaches to coalition management including the pursuit of ranked choice voting. State-specific circumstances, including the pathways of reform that are available in any given state, the relative professionalization of the state legislature and its members’ policy ambitions, and the influence of national party cues will impact the intensity of RCV reform efforts. Legislators will not have the option of pursuing the ballot measure route, for example, in a state where citizen referenda are not available, and therefore, their intra-partisan calculations will be constrained.

Nationalization has increasingly shaped state politics in many policy domains, and we see this reflected in electoral reform as well. While we have highlighted examples of both major parties using RCV as a mechanism of coalition management, Republicans, with Trump as their national leader, have increasingly distanced themselves from RCV in recent years, and become negatively polarized around matters of electoral reform, more generally. Since 2022, Republican-led state legislatures in 16 states have passed laws which prohibit the use of ranked choice voting, suggesting that Trump-aligned legislators perceive RCV to be a threat to their intra-party coalition. Consequently, Republican dominated states will increasingly rely on other mechanisms for coalition management.

Skepticism by Republican elites has trickled down to the mass level as support for RCV is increasingly tied to partisan identity with Republican-identifiers increasingly expressing strong opposition (Endersby and Towle 2025: 153–155). The growing politicization of RCV is a matter for reformer advocates to monitor, but it is also important to note that partisan asymmetry on the issue of reform has been visible for some time. In the Republican-leaning states spotlighted in this article (Alaska and Utah), for example, Democratic voters have often been more supportive of RCV measures than Republican voters.

Regarding the future prospects for ranked choice voting, we expect to see continued efforts at intra-party regulation via RCV (more so by Democrats, but not exclusively) by parties in their nomination processes (e.g. primary elections, party conventions). We also expect RCV to be pursued in urban municipalities, with the caveat that Republican-governed states may seek to thwart these local efforts. Speaking to the motivations of the reformers, we expect to see a rollback of RCV under any of the following conditions: when elites conclude that the reform is no longer necessary because the vulnerability within their ranks has passed; when RCV is unable to resolve the coalitional challenges that it was meant to address; or when another reform emerges that can serve the same regulatory function as RCV, but in an even less risk averse manner.