Public Perceptions of the Supreme Court: How Policy Disagreement Affects Legitimacy
-
Logan Strother
and
Shana Kushner Gadarian
Abstract
It is widely agreed that dissatisfaction with Supreme Court decisions harms the Court’s standing among the public. However, we do not yet know how or why Court performance affects legitimacy. We examine the role that mass perceptions of the Supreme Court’s institutional nature—particularly how “political” it is—plays in assessments of its legitimacy. We find that policy disagreement with Supreme Court decisions causes individuals to view that decision, and the Court itself, as being political in nature. We then show that the more political people think the Court is, the less legitimate they consider it to be. In this way, we show that policy disagreement with decisions strongly and directly reduces Court legitimacy.
Appendix A: Instruments & Question Wording
Study 1: MTurk Panel Survey
Wave 1:
Questionnaire:
How well does the word political describe the Supreme Court?
Very well
Moderately well
Not well
Not well at all
How well does the word legal describe the Supreme Court?
Very well
Moderately well
Not well
Not well at all
Legitimacy battery:
(all use a 4 point Likert scale from Strongly agree to Strongly disagree)
If the U.S. Supreme Court started making a lot of decisions that most people disagree with, it might be better to do away with the Supreme Court altogether.
The right of the Supreme Court to decide certain types of controversial issues should be reduced.
The Supreme Court can usually be trusted to make decisions that are right for the country as a whole.
The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court favor some groups more than others.
Wave 2:
Treatment
Lewis v. Clarke
Brian and Michelle Lewis were driving in Connecticut and were rear-ended by William Clarke, an employee of the Mohegan Tribe (a Native American tribe), who was on the job at the time of the accident. The Lewises sued Clarke for damages in Connecticut state court, however the court ruled that because the tribe has sovereign immunity (and can thus only be sued with its consent), it (the state court) could not hear the case. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court ruled that since the suit was brought against the tribal employee in his individual capacity, the employee (not the tribe) is the real party at interest, and that as a result the tribe’s sovereignty is not relevant. In other words, the Supreme Court ruled that tribal employees are not protected by a tribe’s sovereign immunity just because they are employed by the tribe. As a result, the Court ordered the Connecticut state court to hear the Lewises’ case against Clarke.
Matal v. Tam
There is a rock band called “The Slants.” The band consists of all Asian-American musicians, who say they chose the name “The Slants” in order to “take on these stereotypes that people have about us like the slanted eyes, and own them.” The band wanted to trademark their name, but the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office denied The Slants’ trademark application on the ground that the name is disparaging to Asian-Americans. The band sued, claiming that it is not the government’s place to decide what counts as “disparaging,” and that attempting to do so violates the First Amendment’s guarantee of Free Speech. The Supreme Court heard the case, and ruled in the band’s favor, holding that the government cannot decide what counts as “disparaging” because doing so restricts Free Speech. More specifically, it struck down the law allowing the Patent and Trademark Office to deny disparaging trademarks on the grounds that the law violates the First Amendment’s Free Speech clause.
Trinity Lutheran v. Comer (v. Pauley)
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Missouri, operates a licensed non-profit preschool and daycare called The Learning Center, which has an open admissions policy and incorporates religious instruction into its programs. The Learning Center applied for a grant offered by the Missouri Department of Natural Resources to replace the pea gravel in their play area with a safer, rubberized play surface material. Their application was denied because the Missouri state Constitution states, “no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, section, or denomination of religion.” Trinity Lutheran sued, claiming that the exclusion of churches from an otherwise neutral and secular aid program violates the First Amendment’s guarantee of Free Exercise of Religion. The Supreme Court heard the case, and recently ruled that the exclusion of Trinity Lutheran for a benefit for which it is otherwise qualified, solely because it is a church, is unconstitutional.
McWilliams v. Dunn
James McWilliams was convicted of the rape and robbery of Patricia Reynolds, who died from injuries sustained in the attack. McWilliams was arrested, tried, and convicted of murder during rape and murder during robbery. At the sentencing phase, McWilliams’ attorney requested that the Court order psychological testing to determine McWilliams’ mental capacity. The psychological testing was conducted by a doctor employed by the Alabama Department of Corrections. McWilliams sued, claiming that he was denied due process of law because no report by a fully independent doctor was considered when he was sentenced. The Supreme Court heard McWilliams’ case, and decided that he was in fact denied the expert assistance that the law requires in the evaluation, preparation, and presentation of his defense. As a result, the Court vacated McWilliams’ sentence, and ordered the lower court to re-sentence him using the proper procedures.
Questionnaire:
How well does the word political describe the Supreme Court?
Very well
Moderately well
Not well
Not well at all
How well does the word legal describe the Supreme Court?
Very well
Moderately well
Not well
Not well at all
Legitimacy battery:
(all use a 4 point Likert scale from Strongly agree to Strongly disagree)
If the U.S. Supreme Court started making a lot of decisions that most people disagree with, it might be better to do away with the Supreme Court altogether.
The right of the Supreme Court to decide certain types of controversial issues should be reduced.
The Supreme Court can usually be trusted to make decisions that are right for the country as a whole.
The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court favor some groups more than others.
Wave 3:
Questionnaire:
How well does the word political describe the Supreme Court?
Very well
Moderately well
Not well
Not well at all
How well does the word legal describe the Supreme Court?
Very well
Moderately well
Not well
Not well at all
Legitimacy battery:
(all use a 4 point Likert scale from Strongly agree to Strongly disagree)
If the U.S. Supreme Court started making a lot of decisions that most people disagree with, it might be better to do away with the Supreme Court altogether.
The right of the Supreme Court to decide certain types of controversial issues should be reduced.
The Supreme Court can usually be trusted to make decisions that are right for the country as a whole.
The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court favor some groups more than others.
Study 2: SSI/Research Now Experiment
Treatment 1: Masterpiece Cakeshop # Political (Conservative)
The United States Supreme Court announced its decision in the Masterpiece Cakeshop case today. In a decision divided sharply along ideological lines, the Court’s five conservative members sided with the baker, ruling that he does not have to serve customers when doing so would violate his religious convictions. The conservative majority held that the baker does not have decorate cakes for gay clients. Conservative advocacy groups such as the Alliance Defending Freedom hailed the decision as a win for religious liberty.
In July of 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins went to Masterpiece Cakeshop and requested that its owner, Jack Phillips, design and create a cake for their wedding. Phillips declined to do so on the grounds that he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his religious beliefs. Phillips believes that decorating cakes is a form of art through which he can honor God and that it would displease God to create cakes for same-sex marriages.
Treatment 2: Masterpiece Cakeshop # Political (Liberal)
The United States Supreme Court announced its decision in the Masterpiece Cakeshop case today. In a decision divided sharply along ideological lines, the Court’s five more liberal members sided with the couple, ruling that the baker illegally discriminated against Craig and Mullins when he refused them service. The liberal majority held that the baker must bake the cake for the gay wedding or face large fines for behaving in a discriminatory manner. Liberal advocacy groups such as Lambda Legal hailed the decision as a win for equality.
In July of 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins went to Masterpiece Cakeshop and requested that its owner, Jack Phillips, design and create a cake for their wedding. Phillips declined to do so on the grounds that he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his religious beliefs. Phillips believes that decorating cakes is a form of art through which he can honor God and that it would displease God to create cakes for same-sex marriages.
Treatment 3: Masterpiece Cakeshop # Legal
The United States Supreme Court announced its decision in the Masterpiece Cakeshop case today. The Court’s majority sided with the couple, ruling that the baker illegally and unconstitutionally discriminated against Craig and Mullins when he refused them service. The majority held that Colorado’s antidiscrimination law does not violate the baker’s First Amendment constitutional rights of freedom of speech or free exercise of religion.
In July of 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins went to Masterpiece Cakeshop and requested that its owner, Jack Phillips, design and create a cake for their wedding. Phillips declined to do so on the grounds that he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his religious beliefs. Phillips believes that decorating cakes is a form of art through which he can honor God and that it would displease God to create cakes for same-sex marriages. Craig and Mullins sued, alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Phillips counters that being forced to make a cake that violates his sincerely held religious beliefs violates the Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment.
Treatment 4: Janus # Political (Conservative)
The United States Supreme Court announced its decision in the Janus case today. In a decision divided sharply along ideological lines, the Court’s five conservative members sided with Mr. Janus, ruling that the union cannot mandate fees from non-members. The conservative majority held that mandatory fees for non-members are essentially subsidies for government advocacy that they [non-members] oppose, and thus struck down the fees. Groups like the conservative Freedom Foundation celebrated this success in court.
The state of Illinois has a law requiring public employees (like social workers, nurses at public hospitals, and corrections officers) who are not members of a public-sector union to pay fees to the union because they benefited from the union’s collective bargaining agreement with the employer. A public-sector employee named Mark Janus sued, claiming that the policy wrongly requires employees who disapprove of the union to contribute money to it.
Treatment 5: Janus # Political (Liberal)
The United States Supreme Court announced its decision in the Janus case today. In a sharply divided decision, the Court’s five liberal members sided with the government, ruling that the union can indeed mandate fees from non-members. The liberal majority held that mandatory fees are not unreasonable since the non-members may benefit from the union’s activities. Groups like the liberal American Federation of Teachers celebrated this success in court.
The state of Illinois has a law requiring public employees (like social workers, nurses at public hospitals, and corrections officers) who are not members of a public-sector union to pay fees to the union because they benefited from the union’s collective bargaining agreement with the employer. A public-sector employee named Mark Janus sued, claiming that the policy wrongly requires employees who disapprove of the union to contribute money to it.
Treatment 6: Janus # Legal
The United States Supreme Court announced its decision in the Janus case today. The Court’s majority sided with Mr. Janus, ruling that the Constitution says that the union cannot mandate fees from non-members. The Court majority held that mandatory fees for non-members are essentially subsidies for government advocacy that they [non-members] oppose, and which thus violate the non-members’ right to free speech enshrined in the First Amendment to the Constitution.
The state of Illinois has a law requiring public employees (like social workers, nurses at public hospitals, and corrections officers) who are not members of a public-sector union to pay fees to the union because they benefited from the union’s collective bargaining agreement with the employer. A public-sector employee named Mark Janus sued, alleging that the law violates the First Amendment by compelling employees who disapprove of the union to contribute money to it.
Questionnaire:
Do you agree or disagree with the Supreme Court’s decision in this case?
Strongly agree with decision
Agree with decision
Somewhat agree with decision
Somewhat disagree with decision
Disagree with decision
Strongly disagree with decision
Some people think Supreme Court decisions are based on law, some think Supreme Court decisions are based on politics, and some people think the decisions are based on both law and politics. Use the sliders below to tell us how much you think the decision was based on law, and how much it was based on politics.
The totals must add to 100.
Decision was based on law. [slider 0 to 100]
Decision was based on politics. [slider 0 to 100]
In general, how well does the word political describe the Supreme Court?
Extremely well
Very well
Moderately well
Slightly well
Not very well
Not well at all
Legitimacy battery:
(all use a 6 point Likert scale from Strongly agree to Strongly disagree)
If the U.S. Supreme Court started making a lot of decisions that most people disagree with, it might be better to do away with the Supreme Court altogether.
The right of the Supreme Court to decide certain types of controversial issues should be reduced.
The Supreme Court can usually be trusted to make decisions that are right for the country as a whole.
The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court favor some groups more than others.
The U.S. Supreme Court ought to be made less independent so it listens a lot more to what the people want.
It is inevitable that the Court gets mixed up in politics; we ought to have a stronger means of controlling the Court.
Manipulation Check
To ensure that the “political” and “legal” frames are conveying the content we intend for them to, we conducted a manipulation check.
This manipulation check was conducted on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workplace. We restricted participation to MTurkers who are United States citizens, at least 18 years of age, and who have at least a 97 % MTurk approval rating. This study was fielded on June 6, 2019. Respondents spent approximately 5 minutes completing the survey, and were paid $0.50 for participation. Two-hundred-fifty individuals participated in this study.
We tested treatment 1 (Masterpiece Cakeshop * Political) and treatment 3 (Masterpiece Cakeshop * Legal) from Study 1 (SSI/Research Now Experiment), the full text of which are presented just above.
Respondents were randomly assigned to treatment with one of the two vignettes, and then responded to a series of questions about what sorts of things the “news story” (vignette) made them think about:
Q. To what extent does this story make you think about the following ideas?
The Constitution
Rule of law
Neutral decision makers
Partisanship
Activist Judges
Political winners and losers
Response item for each: slider ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much)
These six items were presented in random order to avoid any question-order effects.
To assess the frames, we constructed “legal” and “political” consideration indices from these six measured outcomes: items a-c constitute the “legal” index, while items d-f constitute the “political” index. Both items scale well, with scale reliability coefficients of 0.61 and 0.76, respectively.
As depicted in Table A.1, below, both treatments are performing consistent with our theoretical expectations: respondents in the legal treatment report significantly higher values on the index of “legal” items (rule of law, neutral decision making, the Constitution) compared to those in the political treatment. Conversely, those in the political treatment report significantly higher values on the index of “political” items (partisanship, activist judges, political winners and losers) compared to those in the legal treatment.
In sum, this manipulation check confirms that the frames used here induce the desired ideas and responses in our survey respondents.
Manipulation check for treatment frames.
| Variables | Index of “Legal” items | Index of “Legal” items | Index of “Political” items | Index of “Political” Items |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Legal treatment | 5.72* | 5.68* | ||
| (2.86) | (2.85) | |||
| Political treatment | 9.99** | 10.30** | ||
| (3.52) | (3.55) | |||
| White | −3.92 | −6.35 | ||
| (3.19) | (3.99) | |||
| Male | −0.92 | 2.28 | ||
| (2.96) | (3.70) | |||
| Age | −0.03 | 0.03 | ||
| (0.13) | (0.17) | |||
| Conservative | 4.95 | 8.22 | ||
| (6.51) | (8.16) | |||
| Republican | 8.32 | −0.13 | ||
| (5.39) | (6.75) | |||
| Constant | 53.73*** | 53.42*** | 38.53*** | 37.22*** |
| (2.01) | (5.70) | (2.51) | (7.11) | |
|
|
||||
| Observations | 246 | 245 | 246 | 245 |
| R-squared | 0.02 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.05 |
-
OLS models. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
Appendix B: Summary Statistics from Survey Samples, etc.
Study 1: MTurk Panel Study sample demographics
| Female | 46.15 % |
| Age | 37.31 (mean) |
| Education | 4-year degree (mode) |
| Democrat | 59.50 % |
| Liberal | 49.96 % |
Study 1: MTurk Panel Study summary statistics of key variables
| Variable | Mean | Observed range |
|---|---|---|
| Legitimacy Wave 2 | 0.66 | 0 to 1 |
| Legitimacy Wave 1 | 0.63 | 0.25 to 1 |
| SCOTUS political Wave 2 | 0.56 | 0 to 1 |
| SCOTUS political Wave 1 | 0.62 | 0 to 1 |
| Decision agreement (Agg., Wave 2) | 0.67 | 0.21 to 1 |
Study 1: MTurk Panel Study: panel attrition
Figure B1 shows that participation at wave N is unrelated to attitudes toward the Court (legitimacy, Court nature, decision agreement) and social and political demographics at wave N − 1. That is, participation in wave 2 is not driven by demographics or attitudes about the Court at wave 1, and participation in wave 3 is not driven by demographics or attitudes about the Court at wave 2.
Study 2: SSI/research now survey exp. sample demographics
| Female | 56.50 % |
| Age | 40.47 (mean) |
| Education | High school (mode) |
| Democrat | 39.33 % |
| Liberal | 37.91 % |
Study 2: SSI/research now survey exp. summary statistics of key variables
| Variable | Mean | Observed range |
|---|---|---|
| Legitimacy | 0.44 | 0 to 1 |
| SCOTUS political | 0.65 | 0 to 1 |
| Decision political | 0.43 | 0 to 1 |
| Decision disagreement | 0.40 | 0 to 1 |
Study 2: SSI/research now survey exp. randomization check
Appendix C: Full Model Specifications
Full models for Figure 1
| Variables | SCOTUS legit | SCOTUS legit |
|---|---|---|
| Wave 2 | Wave 3 | |
| Wave 1 legitimacy | −0.01 | −0.00 |
| (0.01) | (0.01) | |
| Agg. decision disagreement | 0.28*** | 0.21* |
| (0.07) | (0.08) | |
| Republican | 0.04 | 0.01 |
| (0.03) | (0.05) | |
| Conservative | −0.01 | 0.03 |
| (0.05) | (0.07) | |
| Female | 0.04* | 0.06** |
| (0.02) | (0.02) | |
| Education | 0.02* | 0.02 |
| (0.01) | (0.01) | |
| Income | −0.01 | −0.01 |
| (0.01) | (0.01) | |
| Constant | 0.47*** | 0.47*** |
| (0.08) | (0.10) | |
| Observations | 444 | 345 |
| R-squared | 0.07 | 0.05 |
-
Model specification: OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
Full model for Figure 2
| Variables | SCOTUS legit |
|---|---|
| Wave 2 | |
| SCOTUS political (W2) | −0.37*** |
| (0.03) | |
| Wave 1 legitimacy | −0.01 |
| (0.00) | |
| Agg. decision disagreement | 0.20*** |
| (0.05) | |
| Republican | 0.04 |
| (0.02) | |
| Conservative | −0.03 |
| (0.03) | |
| Female | 0.01 |
| (0.01) | |
| Education | 0.00 |
| (0.01) | |
| Income | −0.00 |
| (0.01) | |
| Constant | 0.80*** |
| (0.06) | |
| Observations | 684 |
| R-squared | 0.27 |
-
Model specification: OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
Full Models for Figure 3
| Variables | SCOTUS | SCOTUS |
|---|---|---|
| Legitimacy full Mod | Legitimacy Mod2 | |
| Wave 2 SCOTUS political | −0.31*** | −0.32*** |
| (0.03) | (0.03) | |
| Agg. decision disagreement | −0.05*** | |
| (0.01) | ||
| Wave 1 legitimacy | −0.01 | −0.01 |
| (0.00) | (0.00) | |
| Wave 1 SCOTUS political | −0.11*** | −0.12*** |
| (0.03) | (0.03) | |
| Republican | 0.04 | 0.04 |
| (0.02) | (0.02) | |
| Conservative | −0.02 | −0.02 |
| (0.04) | (0.04) | |
| Female | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| (0.01) | (0.01) | |
| Education | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| (0.01) | (0.01) | |
| Income | −0.00 | −0.00 |
| (0.01) | (0.01) | |
| Constant | 1.03*** | 0.98*** |
| (0.05) | (0.05) | |
| Observations | 684 | 684 |
| R-squared | 0.28 | 0.26 |
-
Model specification: OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
Full Models for Figures 4, 5, and 6
| Variables | Fig. 4 | Fig. 5 | Fig. 6 |
|---|---|---|---|
| DV: Decision political | DV: SCOTUS political | DV: Legitimacy | |
| Treated to disagree | 0.12*** | 0.04** | −0.04** |
| (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | |
| Constant | 0.37*** | 0.62*** | 0.47*** |
| (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | |
| Observations | 863 | 863 | 863 |
| R-squared | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
-
Model specification: OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
Appendix D: Supplementary Analysis
Directionality of Key Relationship of Interest
Some might be concerned that, contra our theory, that those who view the Court to be more political also view unliked decisions to be politically-driven. Here, we present evidence that causality runs in a direction that is only consistent with our theory.
A key strength of the panel design of study 1 is that it mitigates such concerns. In addition to the fundamental virtue of analysis at the within-respondent level, the panel provides multiple measures of the same concept over time. Figure 3 in the main text, for example, shows a strong, highly significant effect of viewing the Court as “political”, and of decision disagreement, on SCOTUS legitimacy after treatment net of views about how “political” the Court is at wave 1. For the full table, see the full models for Figure 3 in Appendix C, above. This shows that the effects we discuss are net of pre-existing views about the Court’s political nature.
Relationship between Court outputs and view that Court is “Political”.
As discussed in the text and in Appendix A, respondents in the panel survey answered questions about their attitudes on a series of issues pre-treatment (i.e. in wave 1)—some of which were the subject of the treatments they would ultimately see in wave 2. Figure D.1 depicts the (bivariate) correlation between SCOTUS legitimacy (y) and SCOTUS political (x), subset on the number of decisions the respondent agreed with /would agree with (measured at wave 2), for each wave. In other words, Figure D.1 shows that respondents’ pre-existing attitudes on these issues do not correlate with views that the Court is political pre-treatment (wave 1, panel at left), but that they do strongly correlate post-treatment (waves 2 and 3).
Robustness of Findings Across Measures
We use multiple measures of perceptions of how political the Supreme Court is and how political Supreme Court decisions are across the three studies. Our findings are robust to these different question wordings.
Robustness of key finding across measures of Court’s political nature
| Variables | SCOTUS | SCOTUS |
|---|---|---|
| Legitimacy (Study 1) | Legitimacy (Study 2) | |
| SCOTUS political | −0.31*** | −0.33*** |
| (0.03) | (0.04) | |
| {SCOTUS political measure} | “How well does the word political describe the Supreme Court?”
|
“In general, how well does the word political describe the Supreme Court?”
|
-
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Estimates presented here are from the full models presented in Appendix C.
Robustness of Court political across measures of decision being political
| Variables | SCOTUS | SCOTUS |
|---|---|---|
| Political (Study 1) | Political (Study 2) | |
| Decision political | 0.26*** | 0.51*** |
| (0.05) | (0.06) | |
| {Decision political measure} | “Some people think Supreme Court decisions are based on law, some think Supreme Court decisions are based on politics, and some people think the decisions are based on both law and politics. Use the sliders below to tell us how much you think the decision was based on law, and how much it was based on politics. The totals must add to 100.” Decision was based on law. [slider 0 to 100] Decision was based on politics. [slider 0 to 100] |
“Do you think this decision was based on the law, based on politics, or some of both?”
|
-
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Estimates presented here are from the full models presented in Appendix C.
Accumulation of “Wins” and “Losses” and the Relevance of Polarization
As discussed in the main text, not all respondents change their views of the Court’s legitimacy in the wake of new information about Court outputs. The panel study allows us to probe this directly, as all respondents (in the treatment condition) were treated with information about four separate cases.
There are certainly some respondents—those about in the middle of the graphed range—for whom legitimacy was a push. This is depicted in Figure D.2 just below. The panel at left shows that those who agreed with 2 decisions and disagreed with two did not change their legitimacy assessments; those who agreed with all 4 increased their views of legitimacy; those who disagreed with all four reduced their views of Court legitimacy. The panel at right shows that these effects persist out to wave 3.
In sum, this alternative analysis reinforces our contention that updating ones’ views on the Court is an iterative process. “Wins” and “losses” before the Court can cancel each other out, and leave legitimacy unchanged—but wins and losses can also accumulate, and seriously harm (or reinforce) legitimacy. The prospect of consistent losses in a polarized era creates the threat for serious, if one-sided, erosion of Court legitimacy.
Alternative specification of agreement from Panel Study (Study 3).
Democratic Values
Because some prior studies have found a correlation between Court legitimacy and “democratic values” (e.g. toleration, support for the rule of law, etc.), some might think that democratic values should necessarily be measured and included in any model of legitimacy.
We first note that the study 1—the panel study—directly mitigates this concern. The panel approach, by examining within-respondent effects, by its nature controls for time invariant omitted variables (e.g. Allison 2009). Democratic values, such as support for the rule of law, political tolerance, and the like, are widely recognized both inside and outside the legitimacy literature to be quite durable (Gibson and Caldeira 1992; Gibson 2007; Gibson and Caldeira 2009b). As Nelson and Tucker put it, “Because these democratic values are themselves unchanging and rooted in childhood socialization into the political process, exposure to displeasing actions by an institution is not enough to change one’s fundamental commitment to the institution,” (n.d.: 9; see also Easton 1965; Mondak and Smithey 1997). Thus our panel study does control for democratic values, thereby mitigating this general omitted-variable concern.
With this said, it is of course true that some democratic values can be moved at the margins in times of crisis—so one might be concerned that democratic values are not sufficiently time invariant to be controlled for in the panel study. We disagree with this view, but recognize that some may have this concern. Even if one holds this concern, it should be noted that the importance of democratic values in models of judicial legitimacy has been the subject of considerable empirical debate. Many recent studies have found that democratic values do not meaningfully moderate the relationship between political attitudes (partisanship, ideology, policy agreement, etc.) and legitimacy (see Bartels and Johnston 2013; Christenson and Glick 2015a; Christenson and Glick 2019)—and building on the discussion in the previous paragraph, this is likely the case, at least in part, precisely because democratic values are quite durable.
Legitimacy may well correlate with democratic values, but there is no good reason to think that democratic values, being strongly durable, moderate or mediate the relationship between Court outputs and Court legitimacy.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Introduction
- Introduction: Volume 20 Issue 1: Public Opinion in America
- Articles
- Explanations for Inequality and Partisan Polarization in the U.S., 1980–2020
- Collective Narcissism and Perceptions of the (Il)legitimacy of the 2020 US Election
- Two Sides of the Same Coin? Race, Racial Resentment, and Public Opinion Toward Financial Compensation of College Athletes
- Public Perceptions of the Supreme Court: How Policy Disagreement Affects Legitimacy
- Do Elite Appeals to Negative Partisanship Stimulate Citizen Engagement?
- Who Are Leaners? How True Independents Differ from the Weakest Partisans and Why It Matters
- Nationalism in the ‘Nation of Immigrants’: Race, Ethnicity, and National Attachment
- The Social Foundations of Public Support for Political Compromise
- Books Reviews
- Meghan Condon, and Amber Wichowsky: The Economic Other: Inequality in the American Political Imagination
- Daniel W. Drezner: The Toddler-in-Chief: What Donald J. Trump Teaches Us About the Modern Presidency
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Introduction
- Introduction: Volume 20 Issue 1: Public Opinion in America
- Articles
- Explanations for Inequality and Partisan Polarization in the U.S., 1980–2020
- Collective Narcissism and Perceptions of the (Il)legitimacy of the 2020 US Election
- Two Sides of the Same Coin? Race, Racial Resentment, and Public Opinion Toward Financial Compensation of College Athletes
- Public Perceptions of the Supreme Court: How Policy Disagreement Affects Legitimacy
- Do Elite Appeals to Negative Partisanship Stimulate Citizen Engagement?
- Who Are Leaners? How True Independents Differ from the Weakest Partisans and Why It Matters
- Nationalism in the ‘Nation of Immigrants’: Race, Ethnicity, and National Attachment
- The Social Foundations of Public Support for Political Compromise
- Books Reviews
- Meghan Condon, and Amber Wichowsky: The Economic Other: Inequality in the American Political Imagination
- Daniel W. Drezner: The Toddler-in-Chief: What Donald J. Trump Teaches Us About the Modern Presidency
