Abstract
During the 2016 election cycle, both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders received roars of approval from supporters when discussing plans to roll back decades of trade liberalization and more specifically North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In the past, protectionist politicians who failed to follow through on promises paid little electoral cost, arguably because NAFTA received relatively little media or political attention after it was passed. Now in the spotlight, could trade policies cost President Trump voters in 2020? I argue that the highly partisan nature of today’s trade discourse – a new dimension for trade opinion – creates obstacles for electoral accountability because preferences follow rather than drive partisanship. Drawing on previous research and a 2017 survey experiment fielded before and after Trump’s trip to China, I show that the ability of trade messaging to cross party lines has weakened and that Trump’s followers strongly react to information cues from Trump but fail to react to information based accusations of flip flopping on his most prominent trade related promise: increased protection against China. The ability of politicians to shape preferences rather than respond to the will of constituents calls into question the electoral connection on critical government policies even when they become salient.
Appendix A: Survey Questions
Beliefs about trade benefits [Grid format]
The US government continues to expand opportunities to trade through bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements with foreign countries. What do you believe has been the effect of trade on the following:
Rows: |
Your employment |
Employment in your region |
Employment in the US |
Columns: |
<1> Benefit Greatly |
<2> Benefit Slightly |
<3> No Difference |
<4> Hurt Slight |
<5> Hurt Greatly |
<6> Don’t know |
Standard ANES Question
Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to protect American jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and hurt American exports. What do you think? Do you favor or oppose placing new limits on imports – or haven’t you thought much about this?
Favor |
Oppose |
Haven’t thought much about this |
Trump Approval Question and Treatment Conditions
[China]
During his campaign, President Trump pledged to come down hard on China, promising to increase tariffs on Chinese goods to 45%.
After his return from Asia last Wednesday, President Trump announced stronger economic engagement with China saying “In China, we also announced $250 billion worth in trade-investment deals that will create jobs in the United States.”
[Japan]
During his campaign, President Trump pledged to come down hard on Japan, noting “When did we beat Japan at anything? They send their cars over by the millions, and what do we do? When was the last time you saw a Chevrolet in Tokyo?”
After his return from Asia last Wednesday, President Trump announced stronger economic engagement with Japan saying “Japanese manufacturers, Toyota and Mazda, announced that they will be opening a new plant in the United States that will create 4000 jobs.”
[Or South Korea]
During his campaign, President Trump pledged to come down hard on South Korea, promising to renegotiate the US Korean Free Trade agreement so as to retain the “the tariffs South Korea presently pays us to sell their stuff in our country.”
After his return from Asia last Wednesday, President Trump announced stronger economic engagement with South Korea saying “Last week, 42 South Korean companies announced their intent to invest in projects worth more than $17 billion dollars in the United States, and 24 companies announced plans to purchase $58 billion dollars in American goods and services.”
Do you approve or disapprove of President Trumps performance in office?
<1> Strongly Approve |
<2> Somewhat Approve |
<3> Not Sure |
<4> Somewhat Disapprove |
<5> Strongly Disapprove |
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©2020 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Introduction – January 2020 Volume of Forum
- Articles
- Trump’s Trade Revolution
- Pro-Trade Blocs in the US Congress
- Trump, Trade, and Immigration
- Consumers and the Sources of US Trade Openness
- How Have Members of Congress Reacted to President Trump’s Trade Policy?
- Trade Policy is Back in the News: Will Voters Care?
- The Counties that Counted: Could 2020 Repeat 2016 in the US Electoral College?
- It’s Trump’s Party and I’ll Cry if I Want To
- Book reviews
- Review of The Politics of Institutional Reform: Katrina, Education, and the Second Face of Power
- Review of The Meritocracy Trap: How America’s Foundational Myth Feeds Inequality, Dismantles the Middle Class, and Devours the Elite
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Introduction – January 2020 Volume of Forum
- Articles
- Trump’s Trade Revolution
- Pro-Trade Blocs in the US Congress
- Trump, Trade, and Immigration
- Consumers and the Sources of US Trade Openness
- How Have Members of Congress Reacted to President Trump’s Trade Policy?
- Trade Policy is Back in the News: Will Voters Care?
- The Counties that Counted: Could 2020 Repeat 2016 in the US Electoral College?
- It’s Trump’s Party and I’ll Cry if I Want To
- Book reviews
- Review of The Politics of Institutional Reform: Katrina, Education, and the Second Face of Power
- Review of The Meritocracy Trap: How America’s Foundational Myth Feeds Inequality, Dismantles the Middle Class, and Devours the Elite