Abstract
Under the sign of “the journeying self,” I offer a sketch of a Christian pilgrimage from narcissism to solidarity and doxology. Developmental psychology can help frame questions about growth in self-awareness from childhood (Fivush) to early adulthood (Habermas). Often this kind of growth is expressed in the language of narrative (Ricoeur), but a “minority report” summarizes several different critiques of life narratives – in the work of Derek Parfit, Galen Strawson, Hayden White, and Jean-Francois Lyotard, among others. Nevertheless, a positive assessment of narrative recommences, thanks in part to Twenge’s interest in how human beings can reach out beyond themselves to others and to God (Josselson, McAdams). A reflection on Psalm 51 seeks to help pilgrims further along a path from narcissism to solidarity with others and further on toward doxology.
1 On the journeying self
Human beings are born with a deep-rooted narcissism and self-centeredness. We can simply count on it being there from the beginning (Pearl 2013). Yet we are also storytellers who seek a sense of community with others (Cochrane 2007). Folktales, legends, myths, epics, histories, films, opera, novels, biographies, phone calls, jokes – we use these various forms of narrative to entertain, to educate, to warn, inspire, or persuade other people to join with us. These stories can make us feel anger, horror, shame, and guilt, or lead us to grow in faith, hope, joy, and love.
Ricoeur suggests that the interpretation of narratives helps us discover a way beyond the preoccupation with self, a path from narcissism to doxology. The experience of faith, Ricoeur says, is shaped by an archaeology, a teleology, and an eschatology (Ricoeur 1974a). An “archaeology of the self” can be discovered as we look back into the past to retrieve meaning from previous experiences. The “teleological self” is situated primarily in the present, in the flow of experience, but also with a view to completing chosen tasks and fulfilling obligations to others. An “eschatology of the self” searches for the widest and deepest horizon for understanding one’s experience, as religious believers might say, “in the presence of God.” Taken together, these three metaphors – archaeology, teleology, eschatology – suggest a more encompassing image: that of “a journeying self.” And it is under the sign of this journeying self that I want to try to trace an itinerary from narcissism to solidarity with others and compassion for them, and then to doxology, all with the help of narratives.
1.1 The growing self-awareness of the pre-school child: Neisser’s account
An inquiry about the journeying self might begin by asking about the kind of cognitive skills human beings must develop if they are to construct a coherent narrative of their overall experience. Neisser (1988) proposes a psychological model of growing self-awareness in pre-school children, in which the following five dimensions are thermalized.
The ecological self: the self as aware of being situated in this specific place, engaged in this particular activity. What Neisser calls the “optical flow” dominates this level of experience (36).
The interpersonal self: the self as engaged in social interaction with another person, exchanging signals of emotional rapport and communication. The bond between mother and child is the basic paradigm for this level of intersubjectivity (41).
The extended self: the self as informed by memory and anticipation outside this present moment. I am the person who has had certain specific experiences in the past, and the one who engages in familiar routines that will stretch on into the future (47).
The private self: this dimension of selfhood appears when children first notice that some of their experiences are not directly shared with other people. Descartes’ cogito ergo sum is situated at this level. I am, in principle, the only person who can feel this unique and particular emotion (50).
The conceptual self: This is the self as it is capable of reflecting on his or her own traits of character and as it is aware of taking on a social role in the midst of a family, a small group, or a larger gathering of people (56).
According to Stern (1989), for a person to be able construct a narrative about the self, these five elements will probably need be to be present in some combination. In Neisser’s model, it is normal for a child to have all five of these strands of self-awareness by the age of five, perhaps even as early as three years of age. We can expect these five strands to figure in the construction of identity by adults, too, as they continue to form and re-form narratives about themselves throughout the course of their lives.
1.2 How children construct and interpret autobiographical and family narratives
Autobiographical narratives are first constructed in dialogue with family members (Fivush and Haden 1997; Reese et al. 1993). Children learn that certain linguistic markers can help give temporal order to their accounts: first, next, then, before, after. If causes are involved, another set of markers may be used: so, since, because. Their narratives are evaluative, too. “We went swimming at the beach – it was the most fun ever!” “His dog can do a lot of tricks!” “The snow was really cold!” Judging from these sorts of narratives, it appears that young children are best able to construct stories that deal with a “landscape of action” (Bruner 1987: 20).
Family narratives about a shared past are a significant site for a preadolescent’s emerging sense of self both as an individual and as a member of a unified family. When it comes to the “performance” of family narratives, Bohanek et al. (2006) identify three broad styles. In the first, the telling of the family narrative is dominated by one family member who imposes his own meaning on events, with little input from others. In the second, a family narrative is created when each family member simply takes his turn telling his individual thoughts and feelings about an event, without significant integration among the various perspectives. In the third, conversations with a coordinated perspective try to weave together information contributed by all family members. Each of these three styles has its own implications for a child’s sense of belonging and agency as a co-creator of the family’s identity. The authoritarian style of the first type is less likely to help a child develop skill in constructing and interpreting narratives. The second type seems to foreshadow a self-centered or narcissistic approach to the family’s story. The coordinated approach, with its more complex interactions, holds greater promise for the construction of family cohesion and solidarity.
When asked about traumatic or violent events they have witnessed or suffered, children are likely to construct narratives with very strong visual imagery. If a child must go to the hospital emergency room after being injured in an accident, for example, “flashbulb” memories are common features of the accounts children give to interviewers. Hyper-vigilance as a way of coping with these events seems to be the major factor in the shaping of these stories. If a child can work these dangerous events into a narrative, they may feel they can hope to avoid repeating similar negative experiences (Fivush et al. 2003).
1.3 Adolescent identity: Formed through narratives
Erikson theorizes that one of the major tasks of adolescence is the construction of personal identity. As he sees it, the struggle in adolescence is one of identity versus role confusion. Identity is “achieved” through a process of reviewing old beliefs and views of oneself, and by exploring a variety of possible new roles (Erikson 1968). Included in this process are the development and regulation of sexuality, making (and sometimes breaking) commitments to significant others, the formation of educational and work-related goals, and decisions concerning which moral values to embrace or leave behind.
Creating a life story – borne of remembrance of the events of one’s past and reflection on their meaning for the future – is an important means by which this reviewing and exploring are accomplished. Over time, teenagers build up a repertoire of autobiographical stories, and they begin to order them hierarchically through a process of autobiographical reasoning (Habermas and Bluck 2000).
Habermas and Paha (2001) describe four types of coherence in the narratives created by adolescents: biographical, temporal, causal, and thematic. Biographical coherence has to do with birth, and with transitions involving family, institutions, and geographical locations. Temporal coherence includes chronological time: “Before I got my driver’s license, it was hard for me to find work...” Causal coherence is often signaled by “ever since” statements that relate an event to a subsequent change: “Since I met Sandra, I have become a more open person...” Thematic coherence comes from linking various episodes that seem to converge on a common point: “I’ve learned that I like outdoor activities best – hiking, white-water rafting, volleyball [...]”
So the past is not simply “there,” waiting to be retrieved. Rather, it must be constructed, interpreted, revised (Bruner 1991). A considerable part of this meaning-making process goes on internally, in the secrecy of the adolescent’s own heart, but there is a social dimension to identity-formation, as well (Pasupathi and Weeks 2011; Pasupathi and Hoyt 2009). In the early years of adolescence, the audience for any story that has a bearing on identity is likely to be the teenager’s parents. In subsequent stages of development, however, adolescents are more likely to narrate the meaning of their lives to a circle of friends outside the family (McLean 2005; Bauminger et al. 2008).
When adolescents are asked to tell about their relationships with friends, typically there are three themes that emerge in their narratives: obligations, school transitions, and the dynamics of friendship (Azmitia et al. 2005). The obligations of friendship includes such values as trust, loyalty, and emotional support: “I was kind of depressed for a couple of months, but Robert stuck by me and tried to cheer me up when others didn’t.” School transitions are sources of opportunities and strains for friendship: when adolescents change schools or go off to college, they construct narratives about maintaining old friendships or letting go of them (Healy 2015; Rose 1984). “Since we don’t go home that often, we really don’t see each other much anymore, but we try to keep in touch through Facebook [...]” (Pempek et al. 2009: 234). Developing new friendships in new contexts is also part of this process (Vaccaro et al. 2015).
With respect to the dynamics of friendship, their stories cover periods of increased or decreased intimacy and closeness between friends, similarities and differences between friends, inclusion versus exclusion, and how conflicts with friends might be managed. A passage from Book IV of St. Augustine’s Confessions touches on these themes:
And there were other things in our companionship that took strong hold of my mind: to discourse and jest with him; to indulge in courteous exchanges; to read pleasant books together; to trifle together; to be earnest together; to differ at times without ill-humor, as a man might do with himself, and even through these infrequent dissensions to find zest in our more frequent agreements; sometimes teaching, sometimes being taught; longing for someone absent with impatience and welcoming the homecomer with joy. These and similar tokens of friendship, which spring spontaneously from the hearts of those who love and are loved in return – in countenance, tongue, eyes, and a thousand ingratiating gestures – were all so much fuel to melt our souls together, and out of the many made us one. (Confessions IV.8.13)
If we take Augustine’s phrase “made us one” and press it just a little further, we arrive at the threshold of a wider solidarity between the journeying self and others. We have a narrative description of solidarity in the actions of the Good Samaritan, who stops to help the stranger who has been beaten and left for dead on the Jericho Road (Luke 10). We should take note that the innkeeper, too, relinquishes the role of bystander, when he enters into “a conspiracy of goodness” with the Good Samaritan. The innkeeper agrees to continue caring for the victim and says he will accept payment for his trouble at an unspecified time in the future. “Whenever I return...” is the promise made by the Good Samaritan.
Will the adolescent construct a life narrative that embraces religious commitment, or will she reject faith? Regnerus and Uecker (2006) speak of four kinds of religious or spiritual transformations in adolescence: (1) intensified devotion within the same religious structure, (2) a shift from no religious commitment to a devout religious life, (3) change from one religion to another, (4) losing faith – a transformation in which religious commitments or behaviors are suddenly left behind, replaced by nothing in particular (Gooren 2010).
Fredriksen (1986) suggests that reflection on religious conversion begins with a retrospective glance: How did I get here? And it is by construction of a narrative account that the self is able to unify his past and present: “I’ll tell you how I got here, it was like this [...]” (Ricoeur 1979: 123). Yet the narrative that emerges from that telling and re-telling also helps the journeying self consolidate her current understanding of meaningful projects and obligations to others. The story that she is constructing is not merely retrospective. This narrative helps her name the goal-oriented actions to which she is presently committed and to identify the companions she finds beside her on the road (Scott 2004).
2 A contrarian interlude: Diverse voices against narrative
We should, however, also take note of several kinds of objection that have been be made by theorists who are dissatisfied with this enthusiasm about “a narrative self.” According to a radically empiricist conception of the self, my present state of consciousness is not something that I “remember,” or that needs to appear in any kind of “story.” What I am aware of as my “self” is a constantly changing bundle of perceptions. As David Hume said, “I can never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception” (Hume 1978: 252).
The Paradox of Theseus’ ship presents another kind of problem for a narrative approach to identity. Theseus sailed to Crete to kill the Minotaur, and after his return to Greece, the ship became something of a floating museum that was preserved for many years. At some point, however, every sail, every rope, every plank of wood had to be replaced as the old ones rotted (Smart 1973; Sedley 1982). So the question the Greeks asked each other was: Is this the same ship on which Theseus first embarked, or has it become a different one now, after so many years and so many changes? Following that analogy, every human being is a different person now, in body and mind, from the person they were at an earlier stage of life, so how can we speak of personal identity as persisting – as narrative accounts of identity seem to presuppose – even as we grow older? Taking this to one kind of extreme, a person who took out a loan in the past might try to claim, “I am not obligated to repay it because I am no longer the same person who signed the contract.” Or, in the context of religious commitment, “I am no longer that person who was converted as a teenager [...]”
Certain claims about memory, too, often play a pivotal role in accounts of “identity understood as narrative.” But what if my memories have no basis in reality? The science fiction film Total Recall is based on a story by Philip K. Dick (2013), We Can Remember It for You Wholesale. Douglas Quail believes he is a regular construction worker with a normal family life, but these are merely implanted memories. He was a highly trained assassin who could remember the smallest detail from all of his missions, but all the memories of his real-life assignments have been “wiped” by a company that specializes in this kind of procedure. So who is Quail now? Which narrative world does he inhabit?
Derek Parfit (1984: 325–328) raises further questions about the legitimacy of privileging certain selected memories over others. He imagines a Russian aristocrat who decides to give all his farmland to the serfs. He prepares a document that describes his decision and the date that the transfer should take place. Next, he makes his wife promise, “No matter what I may say at a later date, the decision to hand over the land to them must not be revoked.” The problem is, what makes one moment of his life more significant than another? Why should the decision he made in 1850 take precedence over a different decision he might make in 1870? With respect to life understood as a religious narrative, why should I hold a few special experiences and memories to be so privileged that they provide the key to interpreting all my other discrete experiences?
Fleur Jongepier (2014) likewise takes exception to claims that (1) we must see our lives in story (Taylor 1989: 51), or (2) that people who live non-narrative lives “are not persons” (Schechtman 1996: 101). These claims are simply too elitist to be fruitful or helpful. Perhaps only a few people are able to achieve that maximal level of self-awareness and personal unity. For many people it is “already enough” to survive, to acknowledge some “smaller” locus of personal moral responsibility, to have private interests and pursue them, without trying to situate these things in the trajectory of a narrative (Lane 2011).
For his part, Craib (2002) believes that narratives hide more than they reveal about the dark regions of our life-experiences. Certainly it is possible that some narratives can act as camouflage, distracting us from digging deeper into the moral dimension of our lives. We might also construct a narrative about wrongs that were done to us in the past, and convince ourselves that we do not have the radical freedom that would allow us change the course of our lives now. Stories that have the effect of masking our true moral choices in these ways ought to be regarded as forms of “bad faith.”
Galen Strawson (2004, 2005) is keen to argue against assigning any normative status to a narrative view of the self. He imagines a spectrum of “temporal temperaments.” One end of this spectrum is populated by “Diachronics,” a group of people who do experience the self as a unity persisting across time. At the other end of the spectrum, however, are a tribe of “Episodics,” those who do not experience their inner life as a sustained narrative at all, but rather as unconnected events. Rather than consciousness having the character of a narrative, these Episodics say it is punctuated by interruptions, half-completed thoughts, images and events that would clutter our attention if we did not let go of them almost immediately. Diachronics look down upon Episodics, believing that Episodics cannot properly inhabit the realms of responsibility, obligation, loyalty, or friendship. But Strawson claims that they are wrong about that. If anyone is going to be weighed down unnecessarily by guilt about one’s past, for example, it will be a Diachronic – someone who is zealously committed to one narrative, and not an Episodic.
As for narrativity, it is in the sphere of ethics more of an affliction or a bad habit than a prerequisite of a good life. It risks a strange commodification of life and time – of soul, understood in a strictly secular sense. It misses the point. “We live,” as the great short story writer V. S. Pritchett observes, “beyond any tale that we happen to enact” (Strawson 2004: 450). As Strawson sees it, there is no moral reason to prefer Diachronics over Episodics. We might even be justified in concluding that Diachronics are more likely to fall victim to self-deception, insofar as they commit their lives to narratives that might very well turn out to be illusions. On the other hand, Patrick Stokes (2010) is critical of Strawson’s defense of Episodic consciousness. His critique of Strawson is rooted in Soren Kierkegaard’s sense of a self who is always being called upon to examine his conscience in order to give an account of his entire moral life before God, not just this or that episode.
The historian Hayden White is critical of scholars who try too hard to impose a certain narrative on historical events. He makes a distinction between three kinds of writing: annals, chronicles, and historical narratives. Annals are essentially no more than a list of what happened in the past – they make no attempt to link the meaning of one event to another. Chronicles occupy a zone between annals and historical narratives. They do provide a sense of the flow of historical events, more so than annals do. The basic problem of chronicles as a genre, however, is that they merely terminate without offering a genuine sense of closure. Historical narratives, says White, are plagued by difficulties of a more ideological nature. Told from a specifically moral point of view, their design favors certain actors and certain outcomes over others. Historical narratives pretend to come to a proper end in which “everything is wrapped up.” In reality, however, there simply is no end in history. Certainly there are “episodes” that happen one after the other. Historians need to admit, however, that their narratives about historical events do not qualify as mirror images of reality. They proceed by the displacement, condensation, symbolization of events, and this means that they are inevitably distorted by the historian’s desire to impose his own moral judgment on the events of history (White 1980 a, White 1980b).
In The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge (1979), Jean-François Lyotard also describes “grand narratives” or “master narratives” as problematic. In tribal societies, knowledge was passed from one generation to the next in the form of story telling. Myths and legends offered aetiological explanations – such and such a social practice came about because of something that happened inillo tempore. The narrative not only explained, but also legitimated existing social arrangements. The great religions of the feudal world – Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism – institutionalized this kind of narrative knowledge, and monotheism invested the story with a transcendent subject who was the central agent in a grand narrative. In the modern era, however, physics, chemistry, biology, and the social sciences began to introduce naturalistic explanations based on materialistic processes and causes. Eventually the old moral vocabulary lost its coherence and explanatory power. It became easier to imagine that grand narratives were oppressive, because they are associated with hegemonic conquest and totalitarianism (Boeve 2011, Kearney 1997). As a consequence, people are less willing to embrace grand narratives today, since they are always subject to contestation in agonistic political discourse (Mouffe 1999).
So Strawson, Parfit, White, Lyotard, and others raise various cogent objections against the view of narrative that I have been arguing for. Even so, while I take their protests as warnings that appeals to narrative cannot solve every question that emerges in life, I am not at all convinced that they undermine the project of trying to understand our experience through narratives. Human beings are drenched in time, and narrative is the way we make sense of our temporal experience and moral relationships with other people. And so now I want to recommence my account of how religious faith is shaped by narratives, by turning to the confession of sin.
3 The confession of sin and the narrative self
In the analysis of public institutions and power offered by Michel Foucault, there are many settings in which biographical information is generated and collected (Foucault 2014; Mayes 2009; Hahn 1998). The hospital follows routines in which interviews are conducted and a medical history of the patient is created. For the person sentenced to serve a term in prison, a different kind of biographical record is compiled which aims to identify “the dangerous individual” (Foucault 1978: 10). Whoever applies for public assistance is required to submit to an interview and provide sensitive personal information of yet another sort, to see if they qualify for benefits (Pattyn 1998). These quasi-narratives can become a source of anxiety for us because they have various implications for surveillance, manipulation, and control of our actions.
Foucault himself regarded the Christian confession of sin with deep suspicion, believing a priestly bureaucracy had captured and reshaped it in a desire to exercise power over others (cf. Tell 2010). For that reason he ascribed a more privileged place to the unmediated self-examination of conscience favored by the Stoic philosophers (cf. Foucault 1993). Let us suppose, however, that Foucault’s suspicions do not altogether exhaust the meaning of that liturgical summons – the one that calls us to reflect on our lives in the presence of God. The Confiteor or “Confession of Sin” assumes the presence of a narrative self, understood in a moral and religious way.
I confess to almighty God
and to you, my brothers and sisters,
that I have greatly sinned,
in my thoughts and in my words,
in what I have done and in what I have failed to do,
through my fault, through my fault,
through my most grievous fault;
therefore I ask blessed Mary ever-Virgin,
all the Angels and Saints,
and you, my brothers and sisters,
to pray for me to the Lord our God.
The broad features of this liturgical rite move along a narrative arc from the past, to the present, and on into the future. The journeying self acknowledges fault, an avowal of trespass, of wrongdoing. Those who turn to God in prayer say of their past: “I have greatly sinned [...] in what I have done, and in what I have failed to do.” After this avowal concerning past experiences, there comes a description of a burden of guilt that is being carried in the present moment: “through my fault, through my fault, through my most grievous fault [...]” The third movement along this narrative arc looks to the future for pardon and a renewed sense of service among brothers and sisters, asking them to “pray for me to the Lord our God.”
To be sure, the “conflict of interpretations” (Ricoeur 1974 b: 469) applies to the language of confession just as it does to every form of symbolic communication. According to Lacan, for example, any form of testimony that attempts to describe a religious conversion simply cannot be trusted to put us in touch with the reality of the sacred (Sarema 2016). The experience of forgiveness, comfort, and hope that Christians cherish after the confession of sins might turn out in the end to be an illusion. On the other hand, it might be the skeptic who is mistaken in his attempt to uncover the “oppressive” meaning of the rite of reconciliation. In any case, I cannot escape the contest between these two interpretations of confession by a fiat of my own will. Faith is a risk, a wager, and it can never become a matter of absolute knowledge.
3.1 Twenge’s view of narcissism
If we take narcissism to mean, “an excessive preoccupation with the self,” it might be claimed that all these themes – the child’s development of self-awareness through narratives, the adolescent’s construction of identity through autobiographical stories, the preoccupation with my own sins in confession – are narcissistic. There may be good reasons for resisting this “narcissistic” interpretation: the child tells his story to family members, the adolescent is oriented to a circle of friends, the confession of sin anticipates reconciliation with God and with fellow human beings (Leith and Baumeister 2008). The journeying self is never simply egoism “all the way down.”
Perhaps, though, it would be a mistake to dismiss this question of narcissism too quickly. In their essay, “Egos Inflating over Time,” Twenge et al. (2008) try to show that today’s young people are more narcissistic than young people of the recent past. They are less interested in community concerns than previous generations have been (Campbell et al. 2002). Their efforts to enhance the self-range from attention seeking and taking credit from others, to seeking high-status romantic partners (Campbell 1999), and looking for opportunities to receive public glory (Wallace and Baumeister 2002). In sum, young narcissists seek self-esteem and advantage over others through a variety of social means, but that they have little regard for the consequences of their actions as they are borne by others. In the tale they are spinning, they themselves tend to be at the center of everything (Slotter and Gardner 2011).
3.2 Generativity/doxology
So how do human beings who are “endowed” with a natural narcissism learn to care about others? If we approach this question in light of the “retrospective self,” the self that critically assesses his own moral transgressions, we are likely to find several important turning points. McAdams describes two typical stories that emerge from this process – a contaminated self and a redeemed self. A narrative of “contamination” begins with what is whole and good in life, and by degrees, tells a story of how that goodness was effaced by self-centered actions. Narratives of “redemption,” on the other hand, begin with a low point, a nadir, and then describe an upward movement, a process of healing and integration, after which it is easier to regard other people and their struggles with newfound compassion (McAdams 2001).
Other stories of commitment may emphasize how, after a prolonged period of living only for oneself, a person began to feel a desire to “give back” to the world (Maruna 1997; McAdams et al. 1997). Generative people seek to nurture, guide, and care for those in a wider community. The autobiographical stories told by generative adults often incorporate an early awareness of the suffering of others. Josselson (1995) sees in some narratives “a process of overcoming distance rather than accepting it or creating it.” Or a person may describe what it feels like to be guided by “an expanded radius of care” (Peterson and Klohnen 1995).
With respect to this new scope for compassion, Ricoeur (1995) speaks of the self as being “summoned” by God through narratives. The prophets of the Hebrew Scriptures tell of being called by God, commanded and sent with a mandate to speak out against injustice. The prophet Nathan knows that King David’s hands are “steeped in blood,” and now he hopes to catch the conscience of the king by means of a parable (Bar-Efrat 1980). Ostensibly, the story is about a powerful landowner who has stolen a poor man’s only sheep. In reality, the parable refers to David’s conspiracy to murder his loyal soldier, Uriah, in order to take Uriah’s wife Bathsheba for himself. When David’s sense of justice is offended by the actions of the powerful man in the parable, he rises up in anger, ready to punish the evildoer. At that very moment, however, Nathan springs the trap and declares: “That man is you!” (Gaiser 2003).
In stories such as these, the journeying self arrives at a threshold in which he is being summoned to become a more responsible person (Human 2005). Tradition says that after Nathan confronted David, the great king humbled himself and called upon the Lord for pardon and renewal in Psalm 51: “Have mercy upon me, O God, according to thy loving kindness: according unto the multitude of thy tender mercies blot out my transgressions [...] I acknowledge my transgressions, and my sin is ever before me.” This is followed by a prayer for personal transformation: “Create in me a clean heart, O God.” If David’s supplication had ended at this point, we might be justified in regarding it as a narcissistic prayer, one in which he is concerned only with his own status before the Almighty.
After these requests for personal cleansing and healing, however, David makes a commitment, a promise to serve others in an expanded radius of care: “Then will I teach transgressors thy ways; and sinners shall be converted unto thee.” Moreover, David asks the Lord to “rebuild the broken walls of Jerusalem” (Lowndes 2011). Here David is speaking not of the city’s literal walls, which are made of stone, but of the symbolic walls that once defined a cohesive community and a strong sense of solidarity in Israel – the symbols that were ruined by his own wrongdoing. The overall aim of David’s prayer indicates the journeying self’s desire to move from an archaeology of a broken past, to a teleology within a horizon of renewal, anticipating an eschatology in which hope and compassion for others will figure prominently. King David, whose beginning was bounded by narcissism, is searching for a way to move toward doxology: “O Lord, open Thou my lips; and my mouth shall show forth Thy praise.”
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© 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Titelseiten
- Preface
- Introduction
- Narrating Narcissus, reflecting cognition: Illusion, disillusion, “self-cognition” and “love as passion” in Ovid and beyond
- Narcissus has been with us all along: Ancient stories as narcissistic narratives
- Narcissism in cultural theory: Perspectives on Christopher Lasch, Richard Sennett, and Robert Pfaller
- On the seductions of psychoanalytic story-telling: Narcissism and the problems of narrative
- The journeying self: From narcissism to solidarity and doxology
- The “Me Decade”: Textual and figural narcissism in Robert M. Pirsig’s motorcycle narrative Zen and the art of motorcycle maintenance: An inquiry into values (1974)
- Representations of CEO narcissism in films by Ethan and Joel Coen
- Ahead of the curve in the MBA bubble: Institutional narcissism and the narrative reconstruction of moral agency
- General Section
- How an author’s mind made stories: Emotion and ethics in Tagore’s short fiction
- Narrative Theory, 2006–2015: Some highlights with applications to Ian McEwan’s Atonement
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Titelseiten
- Preface
- Introduction
- Narrating Narcissus, reflecting cognition: Illusion, disillusion, “self-cognition” and “love as passion” in Ovid and beyond
- Narcissus has been with us all along: Ancient stories as narcissistic narratives
- Narcissism in cultural theory: Perspectives on Christopher Lasch, Richard Sennett, and Robert Pfaller
- On the seductions of psychoanalytic story-telling: Narcissism and the problems of narrative
- The journeying self: From narcissism to solidarity and doxology
- The “Me Decade”: Textual and figural narcissism in Robert M. Pirsig’s motorcycle narrative Zen and the art of motorcycle maintenance: An inquiry into values (1974)
- Representations of CEO narcissism in films by Ethan and Joel Coen
- Ahead of the curve in the MBA bubble: Institutional narcissism and the narrative reconstruction of moral agency
- General Section
- How an author’s mind made stories: Emotion and ethics in Tagore’s short fiction
- Narrative Theory, 2006–2015: Some highlights with applications to Ian McEwan’s Atonement