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Utilization Management in the Medicare Part D Program and Prescription Drug Utilization

  • Martin S. Andersen ORCID logo EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 4. Oktober 2022

Abstract

Medicare Part D has significantly enhanced access to prescription drugs among Medicare beneficiaries. However, the recent rapid rise of utilization management policies in the Medicare Part D program may have adversely affected access to prescription drugs. I study the effects of expected and observed exposure to utilization management in prescription drug utilization using Medicare Part D claims data from 2009 to 2016 and an instrumental variables strategy based on the interaction of lagged health status and the set of plans available to each beneficiary. I find that the expected share of spending subject to utilization management increases the observed share, with the smallest effect for prior authorization. Increases in the expected share of drug spending subject to prior authorization increases Part D spending by $122.27 per percentage point, with almost three-quarters of this increase being paid by the Medicare program, rather than beneficiaries or plans. Comparable increases in step therapy and quantity limit exposure increase spending by $46 and decrease spending by $31, respectively. Interestingly, increased exposure to prior authorization and quantity limits increases the average price per 30-day prescription.

JEL Codes: I11; I13

Corresponding author: Martin S. Andersen, Department of Economics, UNC Greensboro, Greensboro, NC, USA, E-mail:

Vincent Lorenz and Anurag Pant provided helpful research assistance. Support from the National Institute on Aging of the National Institutes of Health (Award Number R21AG058132) is gratefully acknowledged. The content of this paper is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Institutes of Health.


Appendix

Table 12:

Simulator correlations.

Year Raw correlation Adjusted correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spending Out-of-pocket TrOOP Spending Out-of-pocket TrOOP
2010 0.716 0.930 0.931 0.985 0.940 0.940
2011 0.687 0.949 0.967 0.974 0.974 0.980
2012 0.519 0.905 0.94 0.952 0.967 0.973
2013 0.747 0.930 0.955 0.862 0.950 0.965
2014 0.722 0.892 0.934 0.841 0.925 0.951
2015 0.765 0.889 0.934 0.940 0.940 0.961
2016 0.694 0.850 0.911 0.916 0.937 0.958
  1. Source—Author’s analysis of Medicare Part D claims files. Each cell is the correlation coefficient between the observed and simulated values for the column variable in the row year. The adjusted correlation is after restricting the sample to beneficiaries who are never in the top or bottom 0.1 percentile of errors on each of the three listed measures. “TrOOP” is the true out-of-pocket, which account for spending in the Medicare Part D coverage gap.

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Received: 2022-03-03
Accepted: 2022-09-13
Published Online: 2022-10-04

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Heruntergeladen am 23.9.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/fhep-2022-0007/html?lang=de
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