Startseite Investment Time Horizons in Family Versus Non-Family Firms and Among Family Firms with Governance Heterogeneity: Evidence from China
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Investment Time Horizons in Family Versus Non-Family Firms and Among Family Firms with Governance Heterogeneity: Evidence from China

  • Lina Zhu , Esra Memili EMAIL logo und Hanqing Chevy Fang
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 23. Januar 2025

Abstract

Investment time horizons (i.e. long-term and short term) remain under researched within the context of family versus non-family firms. This phenomenon also requires taking a closer look at the governance heterogeneity among family firms as it can lead to differences among family firms in terms of the temporal nature of the investments. Drawing upon a goal-based theoretical framework, we hypothesize that family firms are more likely to engage in long-term investments; and simultaneously, less likely to engage in short-term investments compared to non-family firms. We also hypothesize that the idiosyncratic investment time horizon in family business is primarily captured by de novo or “born as” family businesses, rather than family firms privatized and transformed from state-owned firms. A longitudinal analysis of 34,079 firm-year observations from 4,101 listed firms between 2007 and 2020 yields interesting findings with significant theoretical and practical implications.


Corresponding author: Esra Memili, The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, 27402-6170, NC, USA, E-mail:

Appendix

Real estate has been a reliable investment in China due to rapid and ongoing urbanization coupled with the growth of the middle class. Nevertheless, this type of investment is often considered short-term in focus (Lei, Cao, and Qi 2017). This is because many firms view it as a quick way to gain monetary returns, leading to corporate investment diverging from their primary industrial focus. For example, as early as 2006, Yunnan Baiyao, a company whose main business is traditional Chinese medicine, began venturing into the real estate market. In our sample, the proportion of non-real estate companies engaging in real estate investment reached 38.51 %.

Furthermore, the popularity of real estate investment is often driven by Chinese government policy initiatives aimed at growing the real estate industry, and as a result the industry is vulnerable to policy shifts. For instance, from 1998 to the present, China’s real estate policy regulation has alternated between relaxation and tightening seven times. Each cycle of relaxation and tightening forms a cycle. The country has experienced four such cycles: from the end of welfare housing allocation in 1998 to before the 2008 financial crisis (first cycle), from the 2008 financial crisis to the end of 2011 (second cycle), from 2012 to the end of 2013 (third cycle), and from the end of 2013 to the present (fourth cycle). Currently, we are in the fourth tightening period, which started in the second half of 2016 (see Table 9). As a result, real estate investment is considered short-term because its returns depend on external government policies, which frequently change.

Table 9:

History of policy shifts in China’s real estate industry.

Industrial cycles Market reactions
First Round of Relaxation (1998–2003) To counter the financial crisis, housing market reforms were initiated, leading to increased demand and rapid housing price increases
First Round of Tightening (2003–2008, Pre-Financial Crisis) As the economy overheated, regulators implemented strict land management and demand control measures to curb real estate investment
Second Round of Relaxation (2008–2009, Financial Crisis) To counteract the 2008 financial crisis, financing restrictions for real estate companies were relaxed. The industry rebounded quickly
Second Round of Tightening (Late 2009-End of 2011) In the context of an overheating economy and rising inflation, policies were tightened again, helping to control the growth rate of housing prices
Third Round of Relaxation (End of 2011–2012) Under economic downward pressure, macroeconomic policies were proposed to revitalize the national economy. While the central government’s real estate policies were not significantly relaxed, local governments made policy adjustments. New rounds of interest rate cuts and reserve requirement reductions led to a market recovery in real estate
Third Round of Tightening (2013) The “Five National Policies” aimed at regulating the real estate market by the previous government could not prevent the continued warming of the real estate market, with housing prices in first-tier cities continuing to surge
Fourth Round of Relaxation (End of 2013-First Half of 2016): Faced with the pressures of stimulating economic growth, real estate policies were relaxed by the Chinese government. Monetary easing and the policy of monetizing shantytown renovations jointly drove housing prices to rise
Fourth Round of Tightening (Second Half of 2016-Present) New real estate policies were proposed with the slogan “housing is for living, not for investment.” specifically, strict monetary policies were developed to control the flow of monetary resources into the real estate industry. The government also began to advocate for the housing rental market instead of the sales market. Lastly, financing regulations were again strengthened, increasing the difficulty of obtaining bank loans for real estate investment

Lastly, our claim is supported by market reactions. Over the years, we have observed significant fluctuations in the market’s assessment of real estate companies. For instance, according to the Real Estate Index in China from 2002 to 2023, the Chinese real estate industry has experienced considerable ups and downs, reflecting its dynamic and sometimes unstable nature (Figure 1). This indicates that even market investors hold time-variant attitudes toward real estate companies, suggesting that real estate investments are best viewed as short-term ventures rather than long-term safe bets.

Figure 1: 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) Real Estate Index from 2006 to 2024. Note: Figure extracted from the following link https://www.tradingview.com/chart/?symbol=SSE%3A000006, accessed on July 12, 2024.
Figure 1:

Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) Real Estate Index from 2006 to 2024. Note: Figure extracted from the following link https://www.tradingview.com/chart/?symbol=SSE%3A000006, accessed on July 12, 2024.

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Received: 2024-04-04
Accepted: 2024-12-05
Published Online: 2025-01-23

© 2024 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Heruntergeladen am 9.9.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/erj-2024-0148/pdf
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