472The Sanctions Principles-Based Regulation: A Blueprint for a New Approach for the EU Sanctions Policy (Part II)
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Iuliia Khort
Abstract
Despite the tremendous number of studies devoted to the effectiveness of economic sanctions, the unprecedented number of sanctions applied and the recent European Union (EU) reforms on sanctions, sanctions effectiveness should be still a matter of debate. More than a year after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but G7-led sanctions have not materially hindered Russia’s war effort. This study intends to address this problem by focusing on how to make the use and application of EU sanctions against Russia more effective. In doing so, I argue that the main impediments to EU sanctions effectiveness are systemic in nature and inherent to the EU sanctions policy framework. The piecemeal changes of the EU sanctions regulatory framework undertaken so far have not solved these systemic flaws that undermine the effectiveness of EU sanctions. A fundamental revision of the entire system of the EU sanctions policy framework is needed. This study proposes implementing a comprehensive principles-based framework for EU sanctions policy, where harmonisation and the risk-based approach are its foundations, to make sanctions more effective. The proposed sanctions principles-based framework is broader in its scope than is currently the case; it covers a broader set of principles. The proposed frame includes all the stages of the sanctions process, is addressed to a broader number of actors and its foundations are developed. I recommend that this sanctions principles-based framework should be mandatory for use.
Note
This study was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) funding (Scholar at Risk project). I am very grateful to Professor Dr. Kern Alexander for helpful advice and comments. Also, special thanks for the comments of the anonymous reviewer and the European Company and Financial Law Review editorial team. The preliminary version of this article was posted on the website of the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) on 27 June 2023, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =4492859. This is the final version of the article. This paper is based on the literature and materials up to end of 29 August 2023 (date of submission). The first part of this paper has been published in ECFR 2024, 192–233.
© 2024 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Frontmatter
- 269Redefining the Conceptual Ground of Corporate Governance Regulation
- Legal Transplants of Shareholder Voting Rights in the European Union – Evidence from the Past, Consequences for the Future
- Determining Economic Loss Due to Misrepresentations on the Stock Market Using Forward Casting
- Delisting Costs and Corporate Mobility in Europe
- 398Regulation of Takeover Bids in a Global Context
- Cross-border Mobility of Insolvent Companies Within the European Union
- The Assurance of Corporate Sustainability Reports and the Renewed Role of Certified Auditors
- The Sanctions Principles-Based Regulation: A Blueprint for a New Approach for the EU Sanctions Policy (Part II)
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Frontmatter
- 269Redefining the Conceptual Ground of Corporate Governance Regulation
- Legal Transplants of Shareholder Voting Rights in the European Union – Evidence from the Past, Consequences for the Future
- Determining Economic Loss Due to Misrepresentations on the Stock Market Using Forward Casting
- Delisting Costs and Corporate Mobility in Europe
- 398Regulation of Takeover Bids in a Global Context
- Cross-border Mobility of Insolvent Companies Within the European Union
- The Assurance of Corporate Sustainability Reports and the Renewed Role of Certified Auditors
- The Sanctions Principles-Based Regulation: A Blueprint for a New Approach for the EU Sanctions Policy (Part II)
