Abstract
Objectives
Diagnostic reasoning in clinical medicine is permeated by uncertainty. This study aims to analyze how errors in the estimation of pre-test probability affect the application of Bayesian inference in diagnostic reasoning.
Methods
We examined the propagation of pre-test probability misestimation through Bayes’ Theorem, focusing on its interaction with different likelihood ratios and pre-test probabilities. The analysis explored the mathematical consequences of prior misestimation on post-test probability estimation.
Results
We demonstrate that misestimation of prior probabilities has a nonlinear impact on posterior probabilities, with errors propagating differently depending on the likelihood ratio of the diagnostic test and the real pre-test probability. Misestimated priors can produce substantial distortions in posterior probabilities, leading to misplaced confidence in diagnostic test results.
Conclusions
Accurate estimation of pre-test probability is essential for the validity of Bayesian diagnostic reasoning. Objective and evidence-based approaches to pre-test probability estimation are necessary to minimize diagnostic errors and to enhance the reliability of clinical decision-making.
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Research ethics: Not applicable.
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Informed consent: Not applicable.
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Author contributions: All authors have accepted responsibility for the entire content of this manuscript and approved its submission.
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Use of Large Language Models, AI and Machine Learning Tools: None declared.
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Conflict of interest: The authors state no conflict of interest.
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Research funding: None declared.
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Data availability: Not applicable.
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