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On game-theoretic characterisation of stochastic independence
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V. L. Kreps
Published/Copyright:
July 8, 2010
Abstract
Dropping the assumption of the stochastic independence of players' randomised choices in non-cooperative games, we introduce the notion of a type of dependence. It is proved that the stochastic independence is the unique type of dependence for which any finite non-cooperative game has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Received: 2008-11-18
Published Online: 2010-07-08
Published in Print: 2010-July
© de Gruyter 2010
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Articles in the same Issue
- A limit theorem for the logarithm of the order of a random A-permutation
- On game-theoretic characterisation of stochastic independence
- On the potential divisibility of matrices over distributive lattices
- On learning monotone Boolean functions with irrelevant variables
- Barriers of perfectly balanced Boolean functions
- On the classification of Post automaton bases by the decidability of the A-completeness property for definite automata
