Peirce’s Semiotics in a Commercial Context

1 Introduction

Problems remain with the application of Peirce’s semiotic thought in the fields of linguistics and sociology. On the one hand, the works of this great American pragmatist involve a wide range of disciplines, from mathematics to philosophy and psychology, and expound extremely profound and unique ideas; on the other hand, the empirical application of his thought in the social sciences, humanities, and other fields is far from satisfactory. In this sophisticated ideological system, some focus has only been placed on isolated concepts such as the difference between icons, indexes, and symbols.

This paper will examine this phenomenon from a particular social background (namely, commercial signs) with two aims: to prove the inspiration Peirce’s theory brings to our research work; and more importantly, to recognize the limitations of the application of his thought in anthropological research of signs and characters.

As for the analysis of signboards, there are two opposite attitudes, neither of which are satisfactory: one is to use signboards as an object of specific analysis to illustrate the subtle differences between Peirce’s semiotic classifications, or to further enrich Peirce’s theory; or conversely, the other is to extract the unique concepts and points of view from Peirce’s ideas as a pure tool to examine a particular thing (signboards).

If we take the first attitude, we are most likely to fall into an unknown situation. Peirce’s ideas are systematic and were constantly improved. From his early essays on the classification of logic to the systematic papers of his later years, Peirce attempted to classify the signs into 66 categories (see Letter to Lady Welby on December 23, 1908). The symbolic and human aspects of the signboards risk becoming fragmented in this systematic logical thinking. With the second attitude, in contrast, Peirce’s ideas become a tool to enrich our habitual, empirical description of the various signboards, which fails to make a fair evaluation of Peirce’s thought. If we do not take into account both of the development processes, however, difficulties are inevitable. Therefore, we first try to follow Peirce’s thought to understand the uniqueness of his theory and his initial objective. Second, based on our understanding of his theory, we return to specific objects of research. We emphasize that we cannot always remain loyal to Peirce’s philosophical intention.

There is no absolute justification (logical or conceptual) for the transition from the first attitude to the second one; it is a purely practical decision based on specific research objects. Meanwhile, systematic research on the universality of Peirce’s concept does not necessarily bring effective results when examining the totality and specific practice of signs (e.g. signboards of restaurants, which contain double practical significance for both the guests and the business). So an appropriate choice should be made to depart from Peirce’s philosophy to adapt to the particularity of each discipline (such as sociolinguistics, social semiotics, anthropology, etc.). In fact, from some angles, this realistic attitude also reflects Peirce’s pragmaticism.

2 Peirce’s semiotics theory

We can consider this basic problem thus: first of all, Peirce is not a semiologist; instead, he is a philosopher. The “thought-symbol” on which he meditated throughout his life is not limited to the subject and the field of semiotics (Tiercelin 1993). Peirce intends to understand all human experience with his symbolic ideas. Therefore, he views human society (a sign) from a metaphysical, ontological, and even religious standpoint. This extends far beyond the study scope of language science and other semantic sciences.^[1] In this sense, Peirce is no more a semiologist than Wittgenstein is a linguist, although linguistics and semiotics are constantly absorbing its philosophical connotation (Hadot 2005).

Comparing the semiotics of Barthes or Umberto Eco with Peirce’s thought is arbitrary, as it means using some isolated elements of his ideas to create a logic not his own. We consider Peirce’s semiotics theory long completed, and that the task now is to “apply” his theory to a particular field of study, such as signboards on shops. For sociolinguists or anthropologists, “the proper application” of Peirce’s theory requires a more complex research strategy.

From this point of view, the experience of art historians, especially painting historians, is worthy of our study. Their connection with Peirce’s thought has some similarity to the problems we have encountered. But it should be emphasized that the objects of our study (the signs in a specific context) benefit more from Peirce’s pragmaticism than traditional painting works with a purely visual representation.

James Elkins, a renowned American art historian, pointed out that some of his colleagues’ recent conclusions about Peirce’s ideas are far from convincing (Elkins 2003). One important reason is a fuzzy understanding of Peirce’s thought. Many historians of classical painting call on the concepts of Peirce’s iconicity and indexing, but they simplify these concepts. For example, iconicity is simply considered solely as visual reflection (for Peirce, however, this concept is quite extensive, and includes sound). It was also limited to its dimension of resemblance to the object, and serves to specify the reality of image in painting, which leads to the replacement of the old dichotomy (word/image) with the new dichotomy (image/index) as a new universal tool (Bal 1991; Bryson 1981). On the other hand, modern art and postmodern art experts have started considering indexing when analyzing works that exclude image references, and focusing on material traces left on the canvas. Peirce’s index is characterized as an associated relationship (a causal relationship) between an object, a sign, and a mark. The material effect on the work is considered to be an indication or index that reflects the influence of the object or physical participation of an artist (Krauss 1985: 196–219). Similarly, Elkins believes that this problem is also reflected in the discussion of photographic art as a sign (should it be distinguished as an icon, or as an index symbol reflecting the actual effect through the refraction of light to the photographic paper?). In fact, in the course of their application to some specific theory, Peirce’s concepts were distorted and became sufficiently vague as to be impractical.

At the same time, for Elkins, Peirce’s semiotic theory cannot be conclusively applied to visual art works; this could be attributed to Peirce’s particular thought itself.

Peirce’s thought arouses the interest of semiotics experts because they wish to find a systematic classification of signs as strictly as images, a classification which contains various categories of “charts, drawings, graphics, text, and straight divisions,” because each image can be seen as a re-recognition of “the different standards of images, indexes, symbols” (McNeill 1985: 10–18). However, this method inevitably encounters two difficulties. One is the extremely complex and never-ending philosophical classification system. There is no doubt that Elkins, by highlighting the art historians’ simplified application of Peirce’s theory, reestablished a complete classification chart of Peirce’s trichotomy on signs. In this respect, he was limited to re-writing a comprehensive analysis on Peirce’s posthumous articles on the basis of the adaptation to this theory (Weiss and Burks 1945: 383–388; Deledalle 1978: 242–245). Another difficulty is that Peirce’s dynamic empirical data used in demonstrating his logical structure is highly uncertain and partial. “This logical thinking leads him [Peirce] to make certain propositions as realistic as possible,” says Elkins, and Peirce’s classification does not match the actual application of art history.

Elkins’ conclusion is that, to fully understand the particularity of Peirce’s continuous thinking, from which to find the logical structure that leads to the final result, and to analyze some unexpected details, “a kind of pleasant and immeasurable value [is] brought by the mixed phenomenon, from geometric figures to the famous ‘red feelings’.” In other words, Peirce’s thought is so uncoordinated, diversified, which allows artists to freely choose between the desire for the theory and the rich sensory experience in plastic arts. As Elkins wrote:

We did what Peirce had done, but what we did is not enough, and we did not take the utmost effort. Arguments with sort of accuracy and irregularity are occasionally mixed in our writings. However, in Peirce’s handwriting, it is not difficult to see his close and continuous logical thinking without lack of poetic light at the same time. But when the logic circuit encounters instinctive response, an extremely interesting analysis space is generated in these two cases. (Elkins 2003:142)

If we do not take a somewhat stable and practical attitude, can we attain a deeper understanding of Peirce’s theory? Here we shall consider the problem from a particular example: signboards.

If paintings make people stare and contemplate (and are sometimes used as religious prayers or political commemorations), shop signboards seem to be more in line with Peirce’s pragmaticism. The ultimate goal of signboards is not to satisfy an aesthetic sense, but a more practical commercial use: to have customers make their choice, that is, should they enter the store marked by the signs. The shop signboards go far beyond the structuralist framework of the pure signifier and signified and are closer to Peirce’s semiotic thought: a dynamic sign.

With regard to the dynamics of signs, Peirce, as a philosopher, has his own views different from those of semiologists and art historians. Claudine Tiercelin, in her book La pensée-signe: études sur C. S. Peirce points out:

In fact, the central idea of Peirce’s semiotics theory is neither symbolization nor representation, still less signs, but ‘behavior signs.’ It can be said that the thinking-symbol is far more than a general introduction, reorganization or re-interpretation of symbolic theory, or simply using a symbol to explain another symbol. The meaning of the symbol is that it can be interpreted by another symbol. (4.132)

This philosophical reinterpretation of Peirce’s “philosophy of mind or philosophy of psychology” gives us a clear idea of the vitality of Peirce’s overall thought (pragmaticism), but ignores the logical relationship and categorical differences between the various symbols which Peirce spent so much time exploring in his charts and illustrations.

Peirce’s philosophical, logical approach to studying signs makes him opposed to psychologicalism. In fact, what he calls semiosis can economize the psychological concept of consciousness; under certain conditions, it can be applied to certain machines or natural programs.

For those who are interested in the historicality and sociality of the exchange of signs, this is also a weak link in Peirce’s theory. In our research work, we must identify the groupment and individuality in different environments because they together constitute the interpreter to complete the specific operation and interpretation of the symbols. The problems we study (such as the difference between the use of traditional Chinese signboards and modern signboards, and the different ways of interpreting the signboards between the customers and the owners or producers of the signboards) would not necessarily draw Peirce’s interest.

In fact, Peirce presents us with a perspective on a nearly anonymous, infinite process of translating one sign into another sign, rather than limiting himself to the social or historical images involved in this process.

Based on a trichotomy of signs, Peirce’s semiotic system is extremely complex. The foundation of the system is a three-category classification complex created by Peirce, based on all possible experience, namely, firstness, secondness, and thirdness. Firstness is the category of pure features or simple possibilities. Secondness refers to the category of existences, facts, and individuals. Thirdness is a universal category, similar to firstness, but there is one big difference: it does not mean a simple and comprehensive possibility, but reveals this possibility from human thought and the law of the development of things.

All the signs can only be considered through three associated elements (different from Saussure’s dichotomy of signifier and signified): representatum, object, and interpretant. As Peirce writes:

… a sign or a representatum is the kind of thing that is used in a relationship or in some way to replace another. It is for an individual, that is, an equivalent sign created in an individual’s mind or perhaps a sign developed. I call the sign created the interpretant of the first sign. This sign is a substitute for something (its object). It is not a substitute for objects in all relationships, but through a reference object to the mind, which I sometimes call the foundation of representatum. (2.228)^[2] (Deledalle 1978:121)

The three elements of signs, considered from the three levels also represent the three levels. From the perspective of the sign itself, that is, as the representatum, a sign may be a simple quality (qualisign, such as the pure color red), an existing event and individual (sinsign, where sin means ‘unique,’ such as the symptom of a disease), or a universal law (legisign, such as a suggestion or a theory). From the perspective of the relationship of signs with the representatum, a sign may be an icon (relationship of similarity), an index (association or causal relationship), or a symbol (the established custom and convention according to an acceptable rationality). Finally, from the perspective of the interpretant creating meanings, if the sign is in the firstness, Peirce called it the rheme (which simply refers to a possible thing); if the sign is in the secondness, it is called the dicisign (a real existing sign connecting the subject and predicate); if the sign is in the thirdness, it is the argument (a law or a profound rationality). As Peirce wrote in his letter to Mrs. Wilhelm, the trichotomy of the three-level category can be understood by the traditional logical model: project, proposition and inference (“the changed semiotic system applying to the universal”) (8.337).

Peirce’s trichotomy of the three-level category can distinguish between 27 signs, mathematically speaking, from which he only recognized 10 sub-methods, which is related to the fundamental principle of the symbol category. A qualisign (a firstness) can only establish a relationship with an icon (a firstness), producing a rheme: for example, the feeling for red can only have a relationship with the purely iconic image of an object, and cannot express anything other than it (distinguish it from the index and the symbol). But a legisign (a thirdness), such as a word, can have a relationship with the index – for example, appointing and naming (secondness) – and can produce a rheme interpretant, such as the logical classification of predicates (a firstness).

These trichotomical and categorical features produce the uniqueness of Peirce’s thought, and the sophistication and the complexity of his semiotic system. We should also identify another auxiliary level: the dynamism or proceduralization of the system. Peirce explained: “Simply put, a sign is all the other things used to refer to an object (its interpretant), and the former itself reflects its own object in the same way, then the interpretant will become a sign, ad infinitum” (2.303). That which allows the production of a relatively stable sign with the possibility of communication is a customized or conventionalized object. But, this custom can always be replaced by a new interpretant and run in the same way. This dynamic system is the basis on which Peirce studies the basic nature of mind and the human experience.

It is this trichotomical structure and dynamism that allows us to consider the rigor of Peirce’s semiotic system in historical research or social research, regardless of which kind of signs should be used; however, the application of this theory in much academic research is limited to a one-sided approach. In most cases, such as the study of art history, people are satisfied with only one classification in the trichotomy; when related to the relationship between a sign and its object, they only distinguish between icons, indexes, and symbols. But Peirce stressed that only when we have a comprehensive consideration of the three levels can we truly understand a sign. It is a combination of the natures of a thing (iconic, indexing and symboling, or convention), the characteristics of a sign’s representamen (sensation, singularity, and rationality), and the types revealing interpretants (rheme, dicent, argument).

3 Commercial signs and Peirce’s semiotic system

So is it possible for commercial signs to follow Peirce’s theory and to situate them on three levels of signs simultaneously, not just one level? First of all, we must follow Peirce’s clear logical thinking to examine this sign in order to have a comprehensive observation and understanding of it. Then, according to the particularity of our research object, we are bound to exit Peirce’s theoretical system, because we need to examine the background factors (historical and social), which are exactly what this philosophy does not take into account.

We propose to define commercial signs in the following way: a signboard can first be defined as “a single declarative index.” Proving the choice of these three categories can also make us more clearly understand the complex classification introduced by Peirce.

First of all, on the nature of signboards, their fundamental feature is that they are qualisigns or sinsigns, because a signboard is neither like a qualisign, which is the representation of the firstness reflecting itself, nor like a legisign, which is the representation of the thirdness combined with many uncertain logical entities. It is first and foremost a unique sign, and exists in a certain time and space. Secondly, its relationship with the object is indicating and indexing. The basic function of a signboard is to specify the existence of a store or a commercial place: “This is a restaurant, and that’s a grocery store.” Its iconic function (object-to-picture similarity) and its symbolic function (such as placing it in a series of special cultural customs) belong to the secondness. A signboard is, after all, an index of a designated place in a commercial place. Finally, the interpretant produced through the signboard in the mind of the observer is a dicent, that is, a statement sign. So the interpretation of a signboard should be related to two entities: one is the visual information the signboard represents, and the other is the commercial place related to it. Its interpretant is not epigenetic (reduced to a subject and not connecting with actual predicates) nor is it that of an argument (as a complex and intuitive argument combined with three or more themes). Under the influence of its commercial function, a signboard is actually an ‘A is the B’ model to tell a thing (or, as often called, “complete narrative”), such as a hotel in Paris called “Silver Tower,” where the text “Silver Tower” is the interpretation of “the most famous hotel in Paris.”

If this hypothesis is tenable, we may say that signboards are a near-perfect case of secondness in the three categories which make up signs: representamen, object, and the interpretant. However, this definition is only a basic starting point. In fact, when we examine a signboard, in Beijing or in Paris, we face an extremely complex system that shows interpretations at different levels. Here we take Beijing’s “Firing Phoenix” music bar as an example for study. The first problem is to determine what is revealed, and what is not revealed by signboards. In our case, it is usually the overall effect of the external walls of the bar that draws the attention of passers-by. So, it is necessary to give a description of the various components of the bar.

Figure 1

Firing Phoenix Music Bar

The walls of the bars are surrounded by yellow and red wooden vertical bars, forming the tone of the store, and separating the other signs. We can distinguish between four sections: 1) the upper part of the wall is a musical staff, starting with a lowercase letter ‘f’ and shaped as a bird. It represents the initial syllable of the bar’s name (Phoenix), representing its referent, and the sound in the staff; 2) the left part of the wall – excepting the number 32, which represents the address – mainly includes the Chinese name of the bar, its phonetic spelling (phenghuang) and English translation (phoenix); 3) the right part of the wall is about the function of the bar, written in Chinese (音乐酒吧) and English (Music Bar), respectively; 4) on the right side of the wall, the tilted bottle and wine glass means pouring wine out of a bottle (as shown in Figure 2 below).

Figure 2

Diagram of the Firing Phoenix Music Bar

One problem is that Peirce did not propose a strict, independent semiotic classification which would allow us to put the signs we’ve encountered in life into each grid according to certain norms. He merely emphasized the semiosis of signs themselves. This dynamic communication procedure can be deconstructed through the analytical method of firstness, secondness, and thirdness (or the meta-category). Also, the different levels can be connected through different categories.

Therefore, it is necessary to examine the other factors that make up the signboard of this bar, or even to reorganize the interaction between them. The first problem is the finiteness of the research object of our study. Unlike other cases, such as hanging signboards, or a personalized sign fixed on a bare wall, the signs we are now facing have an “indexing” function, which is responsible for elements of a different nature. If the indexing to which we refer is to associate an arbitrary sign with a place with commercial features, perhaps people will ask, “Can this function not be borne by all signboards independently?” Let us suppose a passer-by had not looked up at the signboard before seeing a guest drinking at a table through the glass window. The guest as such is also a sign that indicates the commercial feature of this place. The store’s signboard does not exclude this indexing function, but, it clearly indicates this feature.

The significance of Peirce’s thought lies in the development of the “mind-sign” in light of the universal experience of the whole human being which the sign has revealed, not the special sector (which is the research object of “regional” semiotics). The “mind-sign” can be applied to a field beyond the simple state of consciousness of human beings, such as in nature or in the field of machinery. Such a “universal” semiotics, connecting the various types of the three categories in the universe, should help to break the limitations of historical or social research. This will allow us to further consider what priority should be given to such thought, and not always limit ourselves to the visual dimension of signs. We have already discussed Elkins’ comments on the application of Peirce’s theory to art historians. Elkins recognized the problem: according to the nature of the picture they are studying, these experts simply use the concept of Peirce and ignore various non-visible levels.

How does this apply to the field of commercial signboards? We can extend the concept of signs (individual declarative indexes) to sound and even the sense of smell, not just limiting it to a visual problem. Those who have been to Japan may remember the famous home appliance shopping mall in Tokyo, Big Camera. The musical slogan “Big-big-big ca-me-ra!” repeating from the loudspeaker was constantly heard in the streets. Pedestrians could hear the store’s name from afar, without having seen it. The indexing function of this auditory signboard is clear. Even if an auditory signboard is used to supplement a visual signboard, we cannot discount it as a signboard. In this example, the name “BIG CAMERA” is written on the wall, but is only found after hearing the name. We can also take the Latin Quarter of Paris as an example. Along Rue Mouffetard, Greek restaurants were once popular, announcing their presence to passers-by neither through vision nor through hearing, but through smell. These restaurants opened their foyers so that the tempting aroma of “special” dishes (such as kebabs) filled the streets. Before confirming with their eyes, pedestrians were already aware of the restaurants. This is the smell index. For Chinese restaurants in Paris, things are different. They are mixed with signs to attract passers-by, but not related to other categories.

In any case, the Japanese mall and Parisian Greek restaurants are limited cases. We still conceptualize “signboard” as an object with visual attributes. This is not to say that the circuitous thinking of Peircean theory is nonsense; rather, it emphasizes the relative value of signs and allows us to recognize the differences in the various terms. It is not an instinct to understand the concept of signs from a visual point of view. It is only the result of an intuitive methodology.

Let us recall the various components of the Beijing music bar, “Firing Phoenix.” If we mechanically apply Peirce’s semiotics, it is easy to allocate these signs according to representamen or objects. In this way, the representamen, as the written signs of vocabulary, are legisigns with a rational law. The image of the bottle and the cup is a sinsign, and the red highlighting the Chinese bar name is a qualisign. Or from the point of view of the object, the image representing the object is an icon (with a similarity relationship), and the word “phoenix” is an index indicating a particular individual existence.

When we read Peirce’s article carefully, however, we realize that such a classification is arbitrary and does not take into account the general process of symbolic communication. Everything depends on the angle adopted. The word “phoenix,” when we only regard it as a building, can be considered a single index. When we consider it as Chinese mythology, it is a legisign with symbolic meaning.

One possible solution is that, in Peirce’s view, there is a necessary combination of these multiple dimensions, thus, if not combined with other elements of the secondness and thirdness, the declarative and symbolic legisigns (3-3-2 category) are only an abstract logic of thought. For example, the sentence “this bar is a music bar” leads to two categories: one is the category of index (indicating it refers to the object); the other is icon, the expression of the predicate as a mental image of a musical phenomenon.^[3] The expression “the music bar” is a common term (it is the thematic, symbolic, and rational sign in Peirce’s terms). But when the term is written in English and Chinese with neon red tubing, it becomes Peirce’s “iconic object” or “replica.” Like a special sinsign, it realizes the meaning of ordinary legisigns in a special environment. The replica becomes realistic, but it cannot make sense if it does not make universal rules become what Peirce called the “conventional result.”^[4] Such a combination makes up the three organic systems of signs.

We can also emphasize the structural characteristics of signboards. Strictly speaking, only when a signboard realizes the function of connecting a sign to a place it indicates (the name of the hotel and the hotel building) can it be regarded as a signboard. Suppose a collector hung the three Chinese characters “火凤凰” (Firing Phoenix) on the wall of his living room. They only reflect the text itself, losing the indicating relationship with the object. They become a pure icon, so that we can understand it as calligraphy art, or, based on the mythological significance of the phoenix, a symbol of rebirth and newborn things. Only when placed on the wall of a shop will this neon text regain value as a “single declarative index.” It is also important to note that it must be placed on the correct wall, not just any wall.

Peirce’s formalism gives us a clearer understanding of such a problem. It is impossible to distinguish right from wrong by differentiating between a project interpretant and a statement interpretant (or dicent); it is or not, that is all. It would be clear if we combine this distinction with the traditional project and proposition in logic. The term building in the proposition (dicent) The building is a music bar is neither true nor false; however, this “complete proposition” dicent can be said to be true or false. So if I borrow a signboard from a friend and hang it on the wall of the grocery store, there are three possible explanatants: neutral project (the collection), true dicent (the signboard “Firing Phoenix” hung in the music bar), or false dicent (the signboard “Firing Phoenix” hung in the grocery store). So, a signboard as dicent can affect the authenticity of meaning. This is not recognized when the same sign is placed in the firstness.

The structure or the definition of signboards determines that this kind of sign must have an inevitable connection (true or potential connection) with the location it indicates with commercial function. It is somewhat similar to Bosredon’s labels of pictures (Bosredon 1997). This sign-location connection reflects the secondness category, and is also a feature of signs. Peirce’s approach clarifies this.

The meaning of signboards should be examined from a broader field, that is, from the perspective of behavior around signs, which refers to the continuous process of generation, interpretation, and communication of signs. From this point of view, explanatants can better illustrate the richness of Peirce’s theory, but are also problematic.

In a certain sense, the notion of interpretant illustrates the value of Peirce’s pragmaticism relative to Saussure’s structuralism. According to Peirce, if the interpretation of one sign requires another connecting the meaning, then the sign should not be understood only in a theoretical or rational way. Peirce said that a sign (representamen) produces its interpretant. In general, the interpretant is not an abstract concept. The wind vane is an indexing qualisign that creates a “windy” concept in the observer’s mind or body. Peirce also attempts to clarify different categories of interpretant. The interpretant of a sign can be considered in two ways: as another sign, or as a habit.

Peirce distinguishes between immediate, dynamic, and final interpretant in one of his typologies. Immediate interpretant refers to the association which is usually called symbolic meaning in the correct interpretation of a symbol itself. Dynamic interpretant is the true effect of a symbol. Final interpretant is a self-representing means through the specific connection of a sign with its object. This concept is “not so obscure” (4.536). In another type, “Peirce distinguishes emotional interpretant, energetic interpretant, and logical interpretant. Emotional interpretant involves at least a sense of re-cognition; energetic interpretant seeks physical or mental power; logical interpretant is a custom” (Deledalle 1978: 221). It is natural that the three categories of interpretants represent the concepts of firstness, secondness, and thirdness, respectively.

Whatever the purpose of this attempt, the intent of Peirce’s pragmaticism is clear. The interpretant of a sign (that is, its meaning) is sometimes explained not by an abstract concept, but by the behaviors and the body. This is what Peirce called habit: the explanation chain temporarily interrupting an infinite possibility, and manifested in a state of behavior. In a sense, in Peirce’s view, the symbol is not to mean something, it is to act. For example, he says that the interpretant of an officer’s order is only the action that the soldier makes.

4 Enlightenment from Peirce

Compared with structuralism, Peirce’s approach allows us to understand the functions of signboards more clearly. A sign is not a simple combination of a word or an image with an abstract reference. Because the sign first produces the possibility of an act, the interpretant of the sign is a behavioral state. The dynamic explanations of such signs as bars, restaurants, or grocery stores are, in fact, at least ‘Please come here to have a drink,’ ‘Please come here to eat,’ ‘Please come here to shop.’ So, there is no doubt that Peirce’s thought provides a wide range of practical venues to study business signboards.

Although Peirce’s concepts are quite rich, his theory has weaknesses. Even if Peirce emphasizes the sociality of symbols – which are recognized by custom or convention – this “sociality” refers to universal society and does not take into account specific cultural and historical differences. In fact, Peirce is not interested in social and cultural division, but rather the overall human experience. This overall experience includes a universal society. Peirce’s pragmaticism, from this point of view, still has some limitations versus some explanations of structuralism. Claude Levi-Strauss has been criticized because, despite the fact that each individual or group interprets and develops an inheritance of myths according to their social background and interests, Levi-Strauss only focused on semantics and logical content when studying myths – without taking into account the specific conditions and differences that produced these myths. Levi-Strauss paid little attention to this comment because he was only interested in analyzing the forms of myths, which goes beyond the infinite variability of culture, emphasizing binary opposition (nature/culture, indigenous/outsiders, men/women, etc.) and a universal logical model. Levi-Strauss studied the same general human structure of mind in “primitive” society, and through the development of society, especially for those who had a special history. This is somewhat similar to Peirce’s inspiration: he brings together examples of behavior from everyday life and society. The society he talks about, however, is a universal and abstract society. What he refers to is the whole society, not a particular society.

Peirce emphasizes the interpretant of signs rather than the interpreter who made the rational effort. He intends to go beyond dichotomy (subject/object, spirit/material, etc.) to question previous theorists’ spiritualism. The function of signs should be studied in a broader sign procedure without the limitation of an interlocutor’s consciousness state.

This universal indexing is limited for scholars engaged in sociolinguistics and anthropological research. What they study is not a universal society, but a concrete group, such as the French in a given historical period, the Chinese in Paris today, etc. Peirce provided us with a valuable theoretical model, but from another point of view, one could say he only answered some basic questions.

Those who study sociology and history not only deal with anonymous explanatants, but also with special and interpretable groups. As discussed, interpretants of signs on the walls of the music bar vary based on the interpreter’s profession and economic status (craftsman, boss, or client), experience (Chinese in Paris, Chinese in Beijing), culture (Francophone, Chinese-literate). Thus, we must go beyond Peirce’s framework when needed and establish a special interpreter, in opposition to his universal interpretants. Experience in practical investigation (a source of Peirce’s thought) teaches us this. In the spirit of pragmaticism, applying Peirce’s thought should not mean a complete and blind obedience thereto.