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Pricing and Selection of Second-Degree Price Discrimination Menus

  • Jose A. Carrasco EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 18. November 2025

Abstract

We study a second-degree price discrimination problem in which a monopolist must design a menu of pricing options for high and low valuation consumers, whom he cannot directly distinguish. The firm chooses between two canonical nonlinear pricing strategies: a price-quantity menu and a two-part tariff menu. We argue that, when designing each menu, the monopolist optimally balances gains from production against information rent costs. Crucially, information rents translate into fully variable costs under a price-quantity menu, but they introduce fixed costs under a two-part tariff menu. As a result, the menu choice effectively reduces to selecting a revenue structure choice involving a trade off between fixed and variable costs. We find that the monopolist strictly prefers the price-quantity menu, which avoids fixed costs. However, the efficient menu is the one that induces greater consumption by the low-valuation type, and thus might be in conflict with the monopolist’s preferred option. We fully characterize the conditions under which each menu is efficient and identify which pricing strategy benefits the firm, consumers, or both.

JEL Classification: D42; D6; L12

Corresponding author: Jose A. Carrasco, Escuela de Negocios, Universidad Adolfo Ibañez, 2640 Diagonal Las Torres, Santiago, Chile, E-mail: 

Jose Antonio thanks and acknowledges financial support from FONDECYT #1251698.


Funding source: FONDECYT ANID

Award Identifier / Grant number: 1251698

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Received: 2025-05-16
Accepted: 2025-10-13
Published Online: 2025-11-18

© 2025 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Heruntergeladen am 18.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/bejte-2025-0060/pdf?lang=de
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