Startseite A Rehabilitation of the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility: An Ordinal Marginal Utility Approach
Artikel
Lizenziert
Nicht lizenziert Erfordert eine Authentifizierung

A Rehabilitation of the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility: An Ordinal Marginal Utility Approach

  • Chung-Cheng Lin EMAIL logo und Shi-Shu Peng
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 19. Juli 2021

Abstract

The model in which an individual maximizes his ordinal or cardinal total utility has long been the paradigm of individual choice theory. However, the two mainstream utility theories, the ordinal and cardinal total utility theories, have caused a dilemma, i.e. one has to sacrifice one of the following two: the good property of utility ordinality, or common-sense notions such as the law of diminishing marginal utility. Ordinal theory keeps the former but gives up the latter, while cardinal theory keeps the latter but sacrifices the former. We propose an ordinal marginal utility approach aiming to solve this dilemma by changing the very first assumption regarding individual choice.

JEL Classifications: D01; D11

Corresponding author: Chung-Cheng Lin, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, 115, Taiwan; and Department of Public Finance, National Chengchi University, Taipei, 116, Taiwan, E-mail:

Appendix A

In what follows, we will mathematically illustrate why ordinal total utility theory cannot interpret common-sense notions such as the law of diminishing marginal utility, while cardinal total utility theory can. The key is “the sign of the second derivative of a total utility function”.

In ordinal total utility theory, an ordinal total utility function is unique up to any positive monotonic transformations. This indicates that if we use a total utility function U x , m to depict the preference of a consumer’s ranking over various combinations of x , m in which x denotes the quantity of good X consumed and m denotes the amount of cash held, another total utility function V x , m will be able to depict the same preference, shown as:

(A1) V x , m = F U x , m ; F > 0 , F 0 ,

in which F′ > 0 and F″ ⋛ 0 capture the properties of a positive monotonic transformation. Equation (A1) then leads to the following relationships:

(A2) V i = F U i , V i j = F U i j + F U i U j ; i , j = x , m .

Observing Eq. (A2), one can easily find that:

(A3) sign V i j sign U i j ; i , j = x , m .

That is, the signs of the second or cross derivatives of any two ordinal total utility functions that represent the same preference are not guaranteed to always be the same. This causes a serious problem: we cannot embed any economic meaning in the signs of the second or cross derivatives of a total utility function at all. For example, we cannot use ordinal total utility theory to interpret the law of diminishing marginal utility, since the law is meant to state that the sign of the second derivative of the total utility is negative, which is not guaranteed in ordinal total utility theory.

In cardinal total utility theory, a cardinal utility function is unique up to any positive linear transformations. This indicates that if we use a total utility function U x , m to depict the preference of a consumer’s ranking over various combinations of x , m and over any transitions between two combinations, another total utility function V x , m will be able to depict the same preference, shown as:

(A4) V x , m = F U x , m ; F > 0 , F = 0 .

Equation (A4) then results in the following relationships:

(A5) V i = F U i , V i j = F U i j ; i , j = x , m .

Observing Eq. (A5), one can easily find that:

(A6) sign V i j = sign U i j ; i , j = x , m .

That is, the signs of the second or cross derivatives of any two cardinal total utility functions that represent the same preference are guaranteed to always be the same. This prevents cardinal total utility theory from having the aforementioned serious problem facing ordinal total utility theory, and hence economic meaning can be embedded in the signs of the second or cross derivatives of a total utility function. Common-sense concepts such as the law of diminishing marginal utility will then be able to be used in cardinal total utility theory, which may sound like great news. However, the utility in this theory becomes measurable, since the positive linear transformations keep the strength of a preference in addition to its order.

Appendix B

In some transactions, a consumer has to make his best decision from multiple optimal solutions including interior and corner ones. One simple example is spending time in a zoo. Since it is costly to travel to a zoo, a consumer might prefer attending a zoo for a few hours over not attending, and then over attending for only a few minutes or an hour. This is similar to the case in which a consumer has to make his best decision from choosing among multiple (stable) solutions, say, in the scenario of two-part tariff, as illustrated below.

Assume that in order to purchase good X, this consumer needs to pay a one-time fee B (assuming B > 0) in advance, and hence his budget constraint becomes m = MpxB when he decides the amount of good X purchased. In this case, the actual average price facing him for purchasing good X should be p ̄ = p + B / x . His marginal gain function is still g x with g x < 0, a downward sloping line. However, his marginal loss function will become l m = M p x B ; p ̄ = p + B / x with l m < 0 and l p ̄ > 0 , a U-shaped curve, as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: 
Consumer equilibrium with multiple solutions.
Figure 4:

Consumer equilibrium with multiple solutions.

We can easily see the U-shaped marginal loss function from its slope d l / d x = p l m ( B / x 2 ) l p ̄ . The former term −pl m is always positive, since l m < 0. The latter term ( B / x 2 ) l p ̄ is always negative, since l p ̄ > 0 . The sign of dl/dx, however, depends on the relative size of the two terms. When x → 0, the latter term dominates and thus dl/dx → −∞. When x rises, the latter term will first dominate and so dl/dx is still negative, but eventually when x is large enough, dl/dx will become zero and then positive. This graphically implies that l m = M p x B ; p ̄ = p + B / x is a U-shaped curve.

The optimal condition for the interior solution is still g x * = l m = M p x * B ; p ̄ = p + B / x * . Considering the corner solutions as well, there will be a total of three solutions, assuming for simplicity that this consumer has enough income to purchase the highest amount of good X among the optimal solutions (i.e. x 3 * = x ̂ below) so that one possible corner solution of x* = (MB)/p is excluded. In Figure 4, these three optimal solutions are x 1 * = 0 , x 2 * = x ̃ , and x 3 * = x ̂ .

Let us discuss the stability of these three solutions. The solution x 1 * = 0 is stable since the marginal loss outweighs marginal gain if purchasing more of good X. The solution x 2 * = x ̃ (corresponding to point e ̃ ) is unstable, since he will find himself better off purchasing more or fewer of good X. The solution x 3 * = x ̂ is stable (point e ̂ in Figure 4), since he finds himself worse off regardless of purchasing more or fewer of good X.

How does this consumer make his best decision between the two stable optimal solutions x 1 * = 0 and x 3 * = x ̂ ? The general principle for making this ultimate decision depends on which one of these multiple stable solutions gives him the greatest consumer surplus, which can be derived from his demand curve. In this case, he will choose x 3 * = x ̂ (assuming that the consumer surplus is positive after paying the one-time fee B) rather than x 1 * = 0 (which generates zero consumer surplus, assuming he need not pay the one-time fee B), so his best decision (denoted as x*) is x * = x 3 * = x ̂ .

References

Allen, R. G. D. 1935. “A Note on the Determinateness of the Utility Function.” The Review of Economic Studies 2: 155–8. https://doi.org/10.2307/2967563.Suche in Google Scholar

Alt, F. 1936. “Über die Meßbarkeit des Nutzens.” Journal of Economics 7 (2): 161–9. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01316465.Suche in Google Scholar

Basu, K. 1982. “Determinateness of the Utility Function: Revisiting a Controversy of the Thirties.” The Review of Economic Studies 49 (2): 307–11. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297277.Suche in Google Scholar

Bernardelli, H. 1934. “Notes on the Determinateness of the Utility Function: II.” The Review of Economic Studies 2 (1): 69–75. https://doi.org/10.2307/2967553.Suche in Google Scholar

Bernardelli, H. 1938. “The End of the Marginal Utility Theory?” Economica 5 (18): 192–212. https://doi.org/10.2307/2549021.Suche in Google Scholar

Bernardelli, H. 1952. “A Rehabilitation of the Classical Theory of Marginal Utility.” Economica 19 (75): 254–68. https://doi.org/10.2307/2550656.Suche in Google Scholar

Dittmer, T. 2005. “Diminishing Marginal Utility in Economics Textbooks.” The Journal of Economic Education 36 (4): 391–9. https://doi.org/10.3200/jece.36.4.391-399.Suche in Google Scholar

Gupta, A., B. Su, and Z. Walter. 2004. “An Empirical Study of Consumer Switching from Traditional to Electronic Channels: A Purchase-Decision Process Perspective.” International Journal of Electronic Commerce 8 (3): 131–61. https://doi.org/10.1080/10864415.2004.11044302.Suche in Google Scholar

Häubl, G., and V. Trifts. 2000. “Consumer Decision Making in Online Shopping Environments: The Effects of Interactive Decision Aids.” Marketing Science 19 (1): 4–21. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.19.1.4.15178.Suche in Google Scholar

High, J., and H. Bloch. 1989. “On the History of Ordinal Utility Theory: 1900–1932.” History of Political Economy 21 (2): 351–65. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-21-2-351.Suche in Google Scholar

Hudík, M. 2014. “Reference-Dependence and Marginal Utility: Alt, Samuelson, and Bernardelli.” History of Political Economy 46 (4): 677–93. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-2815611.Suche in Google Scholar

Kahneman, D., and A. Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” Econometrica 47 (2): 263–92. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185.Suche in Google Scholar

Kahneman, D., and A. Tversky. 1984. “Choices, Values, and Frames.” American Psychologist 39 (4): 341–50. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066x.39.4.341.Suche in Google Scholar

Kahneman, D., J. L. Knetsch, and R. Thaler. 2004. “Experimental Tests of Endowment Effect and Coase Theorem.” In Advances in Behavioral Economics, edited by Camerer, C.F., G. Loewenstein, and M. Rabin, 55–74. Princeton: Princeton University Press.10.1515/9781400829118-005Suche in Google Scholar

Lancaster, K. 1953. “A Refutation of Mr. Bernardelli.” Economica 20 (79): 259–62. https://doi.org/10.2307/2551297.Suche in Google Scholar

Lange, O. 1934a. “The Determinateness of the Utility Function.” The Review of Economic Studies 1: 218–25. https://doi.org/10.2307/2967485.Suche in Google Scholar

Lange, O. 1934b. “Notes on the Determinateness of the Utility Function: III.” The Review of Economic Studies 2: 75–7. https://doi.org/10.2307/2967554.Suche in Google Scholar

Lin, C. C., and S. S. Peng. 2019. “The Role of Diminishing Marginal Utility in the Ordinal and Cardinal Utility Theories.” Australian Economic Papers 58 (3): 233–46. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8454.12151.Suche in Google Scholar

McCulloch, J. H. 1977. “The Austrian Theory of the Marginal Use and of Ordinal Marginal Utility.” Journal of Economics 37 (3–4): 249–80. https://doi.org/10.3386/w0170.Suche in Google Scholar

Moscati, I. 2013. “How Cardinal Utility Entered Economic Analysis: 1909–1944.” The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 20 (6): 906–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672567.2013.825001.Suche in Google Scholar

Phelps Brown, H. E. 1934. “Notes on the Determinateness of the Utility Function: I.” The Review of Economic Studies 2 (1): 66–9. https://doi.org/10.2307/2967552.Suche in Google Scholar

Rothbard, M. N. 1956. “Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics.” In On Freedom and Free Enterprise: The Economics of Free Enterprise, edited by M. Sennholz. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand. (Reprinted in Rothbard, M. N. 1997. The Logic of Action One: Method, Money, and the Austrian School, 211-255. London: Edward Elgar. Mises.org’s online edition copyright.).Suche in Google Scholar

Samuelson, P. A. 1938. “The Numerical Representation of Ordered Classifications and the Concept of Utility.” The Review of Economic Studies 6: 65–70. https://doi.org/10.2307/2967540.Suche in Google Scholar

Samuelson, P. A. 1939. “The End of Marginal Utility: A Note on Dr. Bernardelli’s Article.” Economica 20 (79): 86–7. https://doi.org/10.2307/2549080.Suche in Google Scholar

Samuelson, P. A. 1974. “Complementarity: An Essay on the 40th Anniversary of the Hicks-Allen Revolution in Demand Theory.” Journal of Economic Literature 12 (4): 1255–89.Suche in Google Scholar

Silberberg, E. 1978. The Structure of Economics: A Mathematical Analysis. New York: McGraw-Hill.Suche in Google Scholar

Thaler, R. 1980. “Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 1 (1): 39–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(80)90051-7.Suche in Google Scholar

Thaler, R. 1999. “Mental Account Matters.” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 12 (3): 183–206. https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1099-0771(199909)12:3<183::aid-bdm318>3.0.co;2-f.10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(199909)12:3<183::AID-BDM318>3.0.CO;2-FSuche in Google Scholar

Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman. 1981. “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice.” Science 211 (4481): 453–8. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7455683.Suche in Google Scholar

Tzeng, J. N., C. C. Lin, and S. S. Peng. 2020. “Mathematical Proof of the Ordinal Marginal Preference Theory.” Working Paper. Also available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3684336.10.2139/ssrn.3684336Suche in Google Scholar

Willig, R. D. 1976. “Consumer’s Surplus without Apology.” American Economic Review 66 (4): 589–97.Suche in Google Scholar

Received: 2020-10-07
Accepted: 2021-06-29
Published Online: 2021-07-19

© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Heruntergeladen am 23.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/bejte-2020-0158/html?lang=de
Button zum nach oben scrollen