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Self-Control Preferences and Status-Quo Bias

  • Guy Barokas EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: June 11, 2021

Abstract

In a setting of choice with an observable status quo, we model an agent who struggles with temptation by exercising (costly) self-control, and who views the status quo as a commitment opportunity that allows him to avoid the self-control costs incurred when making an active choice. Our model is rational in that the agent always maximizes the same ex-post utility function; hence, when the standard indirect utility property holds, the model reduces to classic rational choice model. However, when we allow for costly self-control, our theory provides a rationale for three well-documented phenomena that cannot be captured by the standard model: the status-quo bias, the compromise effect, and the satisficing choice procedure (when ignoring the information on the status quo). A notable feature of our theory is that while it relaxes the indirect utility property, it still allows for a complete identification of an agent’s preference relation over menus. This is found to be important in many practical situations.

JEL Classification: D03; D11; D60

Corresponding author: Guy Barokas, Economics, Ruppin Academic Center, Emek Hefer 40250, Israel, E-mail:

Acknowledgments

The author thanks an anonymous referee and Burak Ünveren for many helpful suggestions and Faruk Gul and Chris Tyson for comments on an earlier version (Barokas, 2016).

Appendix A: Formal Proofs

Proof of Theorem 1

The “if part” is obvious and explained in the main text. For the “only if part,” let ́ be a binary relation on X defined by x ́ y if x = c({y}, x). We will show that ́ is complete and transitive. Assume yc({x}, y), then, since x = c({x}, x), we have by E-WARP that yc({y}, x), and we find that x = c({y}, x), and ́ is complete. For transitivity, take x, y, and z such that x = c({y}, x), y = c({z}, y) but xc({z}, x). Then, y = c({z}, y) but xc({z}, x) imply by E-WARP that xc({y}, x) – a contradiction. We now show that ́ rationalizes c is the desired sense. First, assume that s = c(A, s). Then, s ́ x for all xA, for otherwise sc({x}, s) for some xA, and by x = c({x}, x), we have a contradiction to E-WARP. We have left to show that y = c(A, x) implies (i) y ́ x , and (ii) y ́ z for all zA. y = c(A, x) implies xc(A, x), and by E-WARP, xc({y}, x) and y ́ x . z ́ y implies z = c({z}, y) and if zA, we have by E-WARP that yc(A, x) – a contradiction. This completes the proof. □

The following lemma provides a crucial step in our main results.

Lemma 1

Let χ be the set of all nonempty, finite subsets of X and let c : χ × XX be a choice function that satisfies E-WARPS. Then, there exists a preference relation ≿ on χ satisfying DFC such that x = c(A, x) if and only if {x} ≿ A.

Proof

Define ≿ by AB if [x = c(A, x) ⇒ x = c(B, x)], and note that ≿ is complete, as x = c(A, x) and xc(B, x) imply, by E-WARPS, that if y = c(B, y), then y = c(A, y). Clearly, ≿ is also transitive, as if ABD, then x = c(A, x) ⇒ x = c(B, x) and x = c(B, x) ⇒ x = c(D, x), hence, we have, x = c(A, x) ⇒ x = c(D, x).

We now show that for the constructed ≿, x = c(A, x) if and only if {x} ≿ A. The fact that {x} ≿ A implies x = c(A, x) follows directly from x = c({x}, x). For the other direction, assume for the sake of contradiction that x = c(A, x), but there exists yX such that yc(A, y) and y = c({x}, y), then we have a contradiction to E-WARPS.

We have left to show that ≿ satisfies DFC. Assume not, then xc(A, x) for all xA. That is, for any xA, there is yA such that y = c(A, x). By E-WARPS, we then have that y = c({y}, x), and by completeness of ≿, {y} ≻ {x}. This means that for any xA, there is yA such that {y} ≻ {x}. But this is impossible, as Aχ is finite and ≿ is transitive. □

Proof of Theorem 2

The “if part:” to see that RSP implies E-WARPS, note that x = c(A, s) for some sX implies by RSP either {x} ≿ {y} for all yA, which by DFC implies {x} ≿ A or that {s} = {x} ≿ A, hence, {x} ≿ A holds in any case. In addition, yc(A, y) imply that A ≻ {y}, thus, we find that {x} ≻ {y}. Now, for and s′ ∈ X such that B ∪ {s′} ∋ x and y = c(B, s′), we have s′ ≠ y, then {y} ≿ {x} – a contradiction. If, on the other hand, s′ = y, then we have {y} ≿ B, and each of B = {x} and xc(B, x) implies again {y} ≿ {x}. This completes the “if part”.

For the “only if part”, let ≿ be as defined in Lemma 1. Then, we only need to show that if x = c(A, s) and xs, then {x} ≿ {y} for all yA, or equivalently that for any y = c(B, s) ≠ s, we have {y} ≿ {x} for all xB. This follows by the contrapositive of condition (i) in E-WARPS, which implies that y = c(B, s′) ≠ s′ and xBs′ imply [x = c(A, x) ⇒ y = c(A, y)], and by taking A = {x}, we find y = c({x}, y) (i.e. {y} ≿ {x}). This completes the proof. □

Proof of Corollary 2

The facts that x = c({y}, x) if and only if {x} ≿ {y} and that c(A, x) ≠ x = c(B, x) for some xX implies AB follow directly from the Proof of Theorem 2. We have, thus, left to show that if x = c(A, x) ⇔ x = c(B, x), then there exists a preference relation ̃ such that B ̃ A . Assume that x = c(A, x) ⇔ x = c(B, x), and let B 1 { D χ \ σ D B } \ B and B 2 { { x } { x } B } B where ≿ is as defined in Lemma 1. Now, define ̃ \ ( D , E ) D B 1 and E B 2 . We show that the constructed ̃ rationalizes c in the desired sense. First note that because ≿ is complete and transitive, ̃ is complete and transitive by construction. Second, note that {x} ≿ A implies { x } ̃ A for all xX and Aχ. It thus follows from the fact that ≿ satisfies DFC, that ̃ satisfies DFC. Third, because ≿ rationalizes c in the desired sense, ̃ rationalizes c for any menu Dχ such ¬(DB). Now, assume that x = c(D, x) and D B or { x } B , then {x} ≿ D and { x } ̃ D . Thus, assume that xc(D, x) for some DB, then D ≻ {x} and, hence, D ̃ { x } . Similarly, x = c(D, s) and {x} ∼ B implies x ∈ max D and, hence, x max ̃ D . Finally, xc(D, s), xD, and {x} ∼ B implies {y} ≻ {x} for some yD, and, hence { y } ̃ { x } . This completes the proof. □

The following lemma will aid the proof of Theorem 3.

Lemma 2

Let χ be the set of all nonempty, compact subsets of X and let c : χ × XX be a choice function that satisfies E-WARPS(a) and CA. Then, there exists a preference relation ≿ on χ satisfying DFC such that x = c(A, x) if and only if {x} ≿ A.

Proof

Given Lemma 1, it remains to show that ≿ defined by AB if [x = c(A, x) ⇒ x = c(B, x)] satisfies DFC (note that the only part in the proof of Lemma 1, where we use the fitness of χ is when proving that DFC holds). First note that CA implies that ≿ is continuous on σ (i.e. the sets {x∣{x} ≿ {y}} and {x∣{y} ≿ {x}} are closed for all yX): take two convergent sequences x n and y n such that {x n } ≿ {y n } for all n, that is, x n = c({y n }, x n ) for all n. Then, by CA, we have lim x n = c(lim{y n }, lim x n ); hence, lim{x n } ≿ lim{y n }. Thus, the restriction of ≿ to σ (denoted ́ ) is complete, transitive and continuous and because Aχ is compact, ́ attains a maximum on A. The rest of the proof follows as in that of Lemma 1. □

Proof of Theorem 3

The “if part:” assume that c satisfies RSP, with ≿ that is continuous on σ × χ. Then, E-WARPS holds as in Theorem 2. To see that CA holds, note that x n = c(A n , x n ) for each n implies by RSP that {x n } ≿ A n for all n, and by the continuity of ≿ on σ × χ, lim{x n } ≿ lim A n , hence lim x n = c(lim A n , lim x n ).

For the “only if part”, first note that by Lemma 2 a binary relation ́ on X defined by x ́ y if and only if x = c({y}, x) is continuous on X. And since X is a compact set, ́ has a continuous utility representation u ́ : X R .

Now, define ≿ as in Lemma 1, recall that (by Lemma 2) ≿ satisfies DFC, that {x} ≿ A if and only if x = c(A, x), and note that ≿ is continuous on σ × χ. Take two convergent sequences x n and A n such that {x n } ≿ A n for all n, that is, x n = c(A n , x n ) for all n. Then, by CA, lim x n = c(lim(A n , x n )); hence, lim{x n } ≿ lim A n . Note that this also means that {x∣{x} ≿ A} is closed set and since X is bounded, {x∣{x} ≿ A} is compact and u ́ , defined above, attains a minimum on this set. We can therefore assume without loss of generality that u ́ ( { x α } ) = 1 and u ́ ( { x α } ) = 0 .

Next, define u : χ R such that for all Aχ:

u ( A ) min { x } A u ́ ( x ) .

We show that u satisfies:

(5) For any  A χ ,  there exists  x X  such that  u ( { x } ) = u ( A ) .

By the W-Axiom, for any Aχ, u(A) ≔ β ≥ 0, and by DFC, β ≤ 1 also holds. By the continuity of u ́ on X, for any such 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, there exists xX such that u ́ ( { x } ) = β , and because u ( { x } ) = u ́ ( x ) for all xX, (5) holds. However, using (5), we can show that u represents ≿. Indeed, u(A) ≥ u(B) if and only if {x} ≿ {y} for {x} ∼ A and {y} ∼ B. Thus, by Theorem 2 the first part of the theorem is complete.[21]

For the second part, we only left to show that the constructed u is unique. Assume that c admits RSP both for the constructed u and for some v. Then, u(A) > u(B) implies c(B, x) ≠ x = c(A, x) for some xX, and v(A) > v(B) must hold. For the other direction, first note that since v rationalizes c, v represents a preference relation that admits DFC, and in addition, it satisfies that v({x}) ≥ v(A) if and only if x = c(A, x). Thus, by the argument above v also satisfies property (5). Now, assume that v(A) > v(B), then xc(A, x) for v({x}) = v(B) (i.e. x = c(B, x)), hence, u(A) > u(B). Thus, v = u and the proof is complete. □

Proof of Corollary 3

To see that (3) implies E-WARPS(a), assume the former, then x = c(A, x) and yc(A, y) implies {x} ≿ A ≻ {y} and y = c(B, y) implies {y} ≿ B, hence, {x} ≻ {y} ≿ B, and we have B ≠ {x} and x = c(B, x). Conversely, let ≿ be as defined in Lemma 1, and ́ defined by x ́ y for all x, yX. Now, the fact that s = c(A, s) if and only if {s} ≿ A follows by Lemma 1 (note that Lemma 1 uses only the “(a) part” of E-WARPS). Thus, A ≻ {s} implies c(A, s) ∈ A, and the result follows by m a x ́ A = A . □

Proof of Theorem 4

We first show that (iii) implies (i): assume that (4) holds, then xPy implies u ́ ( x ) θ ( A ) > u ́ ( y ) and hence u ́ ( x ) > u ́ ( y ) . Thus, xP T y, with P T being the transitive closure of P also implies u ́ ( x ) > u ́ ( y ) and hence yPx is impossible. We now show that (i) implies (ii): define R σ × χ by { x } R A if xC(A), and P χ × σ by A P { x } if xA\C(A). Let χ × χ R P and note that by definition, ⊳ is antisymmetric. Moreover, xAy implies xPy. Thus, if P contains no cycles, ⊳ cannot have cycles either. By a standard result ⊳ can then be extended to a complete, antisymmetric, and transitive preference relation ≿ on χ. Thus, ≿ has a utility representation u : χ R . It is easy now to verify that ≿ rationalizes C in the desired sense: xC(A) implies x R A , and thus, u({x}) ≥ u(A); and xA\C(A) implies A P x ; therefore, u(A) > u({x}) follows. The fact that (ii) implies (iii) is obvious and, hence, the proof of the theorem is complete. □

Appendix B: An Unconstrained Overwhelming Temptation

In this Appendix, we generalize Corollary 3 to allow the agent in the second stage to choose the status quo after it was rejected in the first stage. In other words, we provide axiomatization for the following model.

Definition 5

A choice function c admits unconstrained overwhelming temptation if there exist a preference relation ≿ on χ and a preference relation ́ on X, such that for all (A, s) ∈ χ × X:

c ( A , s ) = s                              if { s } A , x max ́ A       o t h e r w i s e

Before providing the relaxation of E-WARPS(a) that characterizes Definition 5, we note that the model E-WARPS(a) characterizes has the following revealed preference between alternatives:

x R y if x = c ( A , s ) for some  s X  and  [ y c ( A , y )  or  { y } = A ] .

The intuition underlying R is that if x = c(A, s) for some sX and yc(A, y), then {x} ≿ Ay and, hence, {x} ≻ {y}. (Similarly, x = c({y}, s) implies {x} ≿ {y}.) Indeed, it is an easy exercise to show that E-WARPS(a) is equivalent to requiring that the binary relation R is an acyclic binary relation.[22]

However, given the model in Definition 5, x = c(A, s) for some sX need not imply {x} ≿ A because it may well be the case that x is chosen from A in the second stage. Instead, we have the following weaker revealed preference:

x R * y if  x = c ( A , x ) A  and  [ y c ( A , y )  or  { y } = A ] .

The intuition underlying R* is that if x is chosen from A and {x} ⊄ A, then either {x} = A or x must have been chosen in the first stage and, hence, {x} ≿ A and we obtain {x} ≻ {y} as before. (Similarly, x = c({y}, x) ⊄ A implies {x} ≿ {y}.) Indeed, as the next proposition shows, Definition 5 is equivalent to R* being acyclic.

Proposition 1

A choice function c admits unconstrained overwhelming temptation if and only if R* is acyclic.

Proof

As we showed, given Definition 5, xR*y implies {x} ≻ {y}. Thus, the acyclicty of R* follows by the transitivity of ≿ and the “only if part” is complete. For the other direction, let R be a binary relation on X × χ defined by x R A if x = c(A, x) ⊄ A, let P be a binary relation on χ × X defined by A P x if x c ( A , x ) or A = { x } , and let R * be a binary relation on χ defined by A R * B if there exists xX such that A P x R B. Note that R * is consistent in the sense that for all A i , i = 0, …, n such that A i 1 R * A i for all i > 0 and ¬ ( A i R * A i 1 ) for some i > 0, we have ¬ ( A n R * A 0 ) , because A n R * A 0 creates, in this situation, an R*-cycle.[23] By Theorem 3 in Suzumura (1976), being consistent, R * can be extended to a preference relation ≿ on χ such that A R * B and ¬ ( B R * A ) imply AB.

Now, let ́ defined by x ́ y for all x, yX, and note that to show that the representation holds for the constructed ≿ and for ́ , we only need to show that (i) {y} ≿ A implies y = c(A, y), and (ii) A ≻ {y} ⊄ A implies yc(A, y). Assume yc(A, y), then by y = c({y}, y) ⊄ {y}, we have A R * { y } and ¬ ( { y } R * A ) , hence, A ≻ {y}. This shows that (i) holds. Similarly, y = c(A, y) ⊄ A implies { y } R * A , and {y} ≿ A. This completes the proof. □

Appendix C: The Independence Between Our Models and the Classic Status-Quo Bias Model

The following is the classic status-quo bias model presented in Masatlioglu and Ok (2005).[24]

Definition 6

A choice function admits status-quo bias (SQB) if there exists a complete and transitive preference relation ́ on X and a strict partial order ́ such that:[25]

c ( A , s ) = s                                      if x s  for no  x A , x max ( { x A x s } , ́ )      o t h e r w i s e .

Proposition 2

The (G-)RSP and SQB models are not nested.

Proof

Let X = {x, y, z} and note that x = c({x}, y) = c({x, y}, y) = c({x, y, z}, y) and s = c(A, s) for any (A, s) ≠ ({x}, y), ({x, y}, y), ({x, y, z}, y) is consistent with SQB for ▹ = {(x, y)} and ́ such that x ́ y ́ z but it is not G-RSP; as z = c({x, y, z}, z), yc({x, y, z}, y), and y = c({z}, y) violate E-WARPS(a). Now let X = {x, y, z} and c be an RSP choice function on X such that {x} ≻ {x, y} ≻ {y} ≻ {x, y, z} ≻ {x, z} ≻ {z}. Then, x = c({x}, y), and if c admits SQB, then xy must hold. However, we also have y = c({x, y, z}, y), which is a contradiction. Thus, we have shown that there are SQB choice functions that are not G-RSP, and there are RSP choice functions that are not SQB, and the proof follows by the fact that any RSP choice function is also G-RSP. □

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Received: 2020-08-31
Revised: 2021-04-22
Accepted: 2021-05-30
Published Online: 2021-06-11

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