Abstract
In a setting of choice with an observable status quo, we model an agent who struggles with temptation by exercising (costly) self-control, and who views the status quo as a commitment opportunity that allows him to avoid the self-control costs incurred when making an active choice. Our model is rational in that the agent always maximizes the same ex-post utility function; hence, when the standard indirect utility property holds, the model reduces to classic rational choice model. However, when we allow for costly self-control, our theory provides a rationale for three well-documented phenomena that cannot be captured by the standard model: the status-quo bias, the compromise effect, and the satisficing choice procedure (when ignoring the information on the status quo). A notable feature of our theory is that while it relaxes the indirect utility property, it still allows for a complete identification of an agent’s preference relation over menus. This is found to be important in many practical situations.
Acknowledgments
The author thanks an anonymous referee and Burak Ünveren for many helpful suggestions and Faruk Gul and Chris Tyson for comments on an earlier version (Barokas, 2016).
Proof of Theorem 1
The “if part” is obvious and explained in the main text. For the “only if part,” let
The following lemma provides a crucial step in our main results.
Lemma 1
Let χ be the set of all nonempty, finite subsets of X and let c : χ × X → X be a choice function that satisfies E-WARPS. Then, there exists a preference relation ≿ on χ satisfying DFC such that x = c(A, x) if and only if {x} ≿ A.
Proof
Define ≿ by A ≿ B if [x = c(A, x) ⇒ x = c(B, x)], and note that ≿ is complete, as x = c(A, x) and x ≠ c(B, x) imply, by E-WARPS, that if y = c(B, y), then y = c(A, y). Clearly, ≿ is also transitive, as if A ≿ B ≿ D, then x = c(A, x) ⇒ x = c(B, x) and x = c(B, x) ⇒ x = c(D, x), hence, we have, x = c(A, x) ⇒ x = c(D, x).
We now show that for the constructed ≿, x = c(A, x) if and only if {x} ≿ A. The fact that {x} ≿ A implies x = c(A, x) follows directly from x = c({x}, x). For the other direction, assume for the sake of contradiction that x = c(A, x), but there exists y ∈ X such that y ≠ c(A, y) and y = c({x}, y), then we have a contradiction to E-WARPS.
We have left to show that ≿ satisfies DFC. Assume not, then x ≠ c(A, x) for all x ∈ A. That is, for any x ∈ A, there is y ∈ A such that y = c(A, x). By E-WARPS, we then have that y = c({y}, x), and by completeness of ≿, {y} ≻ {x}. This means that for any x ∈ A, there is y ∈ A such that {y} ≻ {x}. But this is impossible, as A ∈ χ is finite and ≿ is transitive. □
Proof of Theorem 2
The “if part:” to see that RSP implies E-WARPS, note that x = c(A, s) for some s ∈ X implies by RSP either {x} ≿ {y} for all y ∈ A, which by DFC implies {x} ≿ A or that {s} = {x} ≿ A, hence, {x} ≿ A holds in any case. In addition, y ≠ c(A, y) imply that A ≻ {y}, thus, we find that {x} ≻ {y}. Now, for and s′ ∈ X such that B ∪ {s′} ∋ x and y = c(B, s′), we have s′ ≠ y, then {y} ≿ {x} – a contradiction. If, on the other hand, s′ = y, then we have {y} ≿ B, and each of B = {x} and x ≠ c(B, x) implies again {y} ≿ {x}. This completes the “if part”.
For the “only if part”, let ≿ be as defined in Lemma 1. Then, we only need to show that if x = c(A, s) and x ≠ s, then {x} ≿ {y} for all y ∈ A, or equivalently that for any y = c(B, s) ≠ s, we have {y} ≿ {x} for all x ∈ B. This follows by the contrapositive of condition (i) in E-WARPS, which implies that y = c(B, s′) ≠ s′ and x ∈ B ∪ s′ imply [x = c(A, x) ⇒ y = c(A, y)], and by taking A = {x}, we find y = c({x}, y) (i.e. {y} ≿ {x}). This completes the proof. □
Proof of Corollary 2
The facts that x = c({y}, x) if and only if {x} ≿ {y} and that c(A, x) ≠ x = c(B, x) for some x ∈ X implies A ≻ B follow directly from the Proof of Theorem 2. We have, thus, left to show that if x = c(A, x) ⇔ x = c(B, x), then there exists a preference relation
The following lemma will aid the proof of Theorem 3.
Lemma 2
Let χ be the set of all nonempty, compact subsets of X and let c : χ × X → X be a choice function that satisfies E-WARPS(a) and CA. Then, there exists a preference relation ≿ on χ satisfying DFC such that x = c(A, x) if and only if {x} ≿ A.
Proof
Given Lemma 1, it remains to show that ≿ defined by A ≿ B if [x = c(A, x) ⇒ x = c(B, x)] satisfies DFC (note that the only part in the proof of Lemma 1, where we use the fitness of χ is when proving that DFC holds). First note that CA implies that ≿ is continuous on σ (i.e. the sets {x∣{x} ≿ {y}} and {x∣{y} ≿ {x}} are closed for all y ∈ X): take two convergent sequences x
n
and y
n
such that {x
n
} ≿ {y
n
} for all n, that is, x
n
= c({y
n
}, x
n
) for all n. Then, by CA, we have lim x
n
= c(lim{y
n
}, lim x
n
); hence, lim{x
n
} ≿ lim{y
n
}. Thus, the restriction of ≿ to σ (denoted
Proof of Theorem 3
The “if part:” assume that c satisfies RSP, with ≿ that is continuous on σ × χ. Then, E-WARPS holds as in Theorem 2. To see that CA holds, note that x n = c(A n , x n ) for each n implies by RSP that {x n } ≿ A n for all n, and by the continuity of ≿ on σ × χ, lim{x n } ≿ lim A n , hence lim x n = c(lim A n , lim x n ).
For the “only if part”, first note that by Lemma 2 a binary relation
Now, define ≿ as in Lemma 1, recall that (by Lemma 2) ≿ satisfies DFC, that {x} ≿ A if and only if x = c(A, x), and note that ≿ is continuous on σ × χ. Take two convergent sequences x
n
and A
n
such that {x
n
} ≿ A
n
for all n, that is, x
n
= c(A
n
, x
n
) for all n. Then, by CA, lim x
n
= c(lim(A
n
, x
n
)); hence, lim{x
n
} ≿ lim A
n
. Note that this also means that {x∣{x} ≿ A} is closed set and since X is bounded, {x∣{x} ≿ A} is compact and
Next, define
We show that u satisfies:
By the W-Axiom, for any A ∈ χ, u(A) ≔ β ≥ 0, and by DFC, β ≤ 1 also holds. By the continuity of
For the second part, we only left to show that the constructed u is unique. Assume that c admits RSP both for the constructed u and for some v. Then, u(A) > u(B) implies c(B, x) ≠ x = c(A, x) for some x ∈ X, and v(A) > v(B) must hold. For the other direction, first note that since v rationalizes c, v represents a preference relation that admits DFC, and in addition, it satisfies that v({x}) ≥ v(A) if and only if x = c(A, x). Thus, by the argument above v also satisfies property (5). Now, assume that v(A) > v(B), then x ≠ c(A, x) for v({x}) = v(B) (i.e. x = c(B, x)), hence, u(A) > u(B). Thus, v = u and the proof is complete. □
Proof of Corollary 3
To see that (3) implies E-WARPS(a), assume the former, then x = c(A, x) and y ≠ c(A, y) implies {x} ≿ A ≻ {y} and y = c(B, y) implies {y} ≿ B, hence, {x} ≻ {y} ≿ B, and we have B ≠ {x} and x = c(B, x). Conversely, let ≿ be as defined in Lemma 1, and
Proof of Theorem 4
We first show that (iii) implies (i): assume that (4) holds, then xPy implies
Appendix B: An Unconstrained Overwhelming Temptation
In this Appendix, we generalize Corollary 3 to allow the agent in the second stage to choose the status quo after it was rejected in the first stage. In other words, we provide axiomatization for the following model.
Definition 5
A choice function c admits unconstrained overwhelming temptation if there exist a preference relation ≿ on χ and a preference relation
Before providing the relaxation of E-WARPS(a) that characterizes Definition 5, we note that the model E-WARPS(a) characterizes has the following revealed preference between alternatives:
The intuition underlying R is that if x = c(A, s) for some s ∈ X and y ≠ c(A, y), then {x} ≿ A ≻ y and, hence, {x} ≻ {y}. (Similarly, x = c({y}, s) implies {x} ≿ {y}.) Indeed, it is an easy exercise to show that E-WARPS(a) is equivalent to requiring that the binary relation R is an acyclic binary relation.[22]
However, given the model in Definition 5, x = c(A, s) for some s ∈ X need not imply {x} ≿ A because it may well be the case that x is chosen from A in the second stage. Instead, we have the following weaker revealed preference:
The intuition underlying R* is that if x is chosen from A and {x} ⊄ A, then either {x} = A or x must have been chosen in the first stage and, hence, {x} ≿ A and we obtain {x} ≻ {y} as before. (Similarly, x = c({y}, x) ⊄ A implies {x} ≿ {y}.) Indeed, as the next proposition shows, Definition 5 is equivalent to R* being acyclic.
Proposition 1
A choice function c admits unconstrained overwhelming temptation if and only if R* is acyclic.
Proof
As we showed, given Definition 5, xR*y implies {x} ≻ {y}. Thus, the acyclicty of R* follows by the transitivity of ≿ and the “only if part” is complete. For the other direction, let R be a binary relation on X × χ defined by x
R
A if x = c(A, x) ⊄ A, let P be a binary relation on χ × X defined by A
P
x if
Now, let
Appendix C: The Independence Between Our Models and the Classic Status-Quo Bias Model
The following is the classic status-quo bias model presented in Masatlioglu and Ok (2005).[24]
Definition 6
A choice function admits status-quo bias (SQB) if there exists a complete and transitive preference relation
Proposition 2
The (G-)RSP and SQB models are not nested.
Proof
Let X = {x, y, z} and note that x = c({x}, y) = c({x, y}, y) = c({x, y, z}, y) and s = c(A, s) for any (A, s) ≠ ({x}, y), ({x, y}, y), ({x, y, z}, y) is consistent with SQB for ▹ = {(x, y)} and
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© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Skepticism and Credulity: A Model and Applications to Political Spin, Belief Formation, and Decision Weights
- Expert Panels with Selective Investigation
- Self-Control Preferences and Status-Quo Bias
- Passive Cross-Holding in a Stackelberg Oligopoly
- A Rehabilitation of the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility: An Ordinal Marginal Utility Approach
- Workplace Heterogeneity and the Returns to Versatility
- Single- and Double-Elimination Tournaments under Psychological Momentum
- Cheap Talk with Multiple Experts and Uncertain Biases
- Legal Environment and Contractual Choice
- Politically Connected Firms and the Environment
- Injurers versus Victims: (A)Symmetric Reactions to Symmetric Risks
- Notes
- On an “Important Principle” of Arrow and Debreu
- A Note on the Existence of the Competitive Equilibrium in Grossman and Shapiro (1984)
- Endogenous Expectations Management with Network Effects: A Note
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Skepticism and Credulity: A Model and Applications to Political Spin, Belief Formation, and Decision Weights
- Expert Panels with Selective Investigation
- Self-Control Preferences and Status-Quo Bias
- Passive Cross-Holding in a Stackelberg Oligopoly
- A Rehabilitation of the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility: An Ordinal Marginal Utility Approach
- Workplace Heterogeneity and the Returns to Versatility
- Single- and Double-Elimination Tournaments under Psychological Momentum
- Cheap Talk with Multiple Experts and Uncertain Biases
- Legal Environment and Contractual Choice
- Politically Connected Firms and the Environment
- Injurers versus Victims: (A)Symmetric Reactions to Symmetric Risks
- Notes
- On an “Important Principle” of Arrow and Debreu
- A Note on the Existence of the Competitive Equilibrium in Grossman and Shapiro (1984)
- Endogenous Expectations Management with Network Effects: A Note