Abstract
This paper develops a model with overlapping generations to show that human capital formation can potentially attenuate factor price movements in response to fertility shocks if education spending per child is inversely related to the size of the generation subject to the fertility shock. The degree of attenuation depends on the effectiveness of education spending in producing human capital. We also find this attenuation effect concentrates generational consumption risk around the generation subject to the fertility shock. The combination of these two results suggest that there is an inverse relationship between the degree of factor price movements and lifetime consumption profiles in response to fertility shocks. Relatively larger generations will experience larger drops in lifetime consumption and relatively smaller generations will experience larger increases in lifetime consumption the less factor prices move in response to generational size. Thus, factor price smoothing does not necessarily translate into welfare smoothing across all generations.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank two anonymous referees for their thoughtful comments on the structure and the presentation of the paper. We especially appreciate the advice received on the writing of our abstract.
Declaration of Interest
None
Appendix
To express the original system of equations in stationary form we detrend each variable by the knowledge available to each generation in their youth. Starting with the education technology, divide both sides of eq. (14) by the amount of knowledge available at time
The superscript
To determine the stationary level of education spending per child divide both sides of eq. (17) by
The tax rate
The next step is to detrend the working generation’s decision problem. The children of period
For reference, the trend stationary variables for these equations are:
Given the constant returns to scale production function and competitive markets assumption, factor payments are stationary. To see this last result, rewrite eqs. (6) and (7) as follows:
Factor payments are now a function of the trend stationary human capital and trend stationary capital per worker,
Applying the same process to the social security payment, the social security tax rate, and the market clearing condition we have the following stationary equations.
We can now use the stationary system of equations above to determine the steady state for the economy. First, assume a constant policy set
This appendix solves the system of equations in Table 1 for policy rule 1. In this case, we set the policy variables
Start with the Euler equation in deviation form (the equation numbering in this appendix is the same as in the body of the paper):
Now, use eq. (29) to express the left-hand side of the Euler equation as follows:
Note that this equation imposes the policy restrictions under the first policy rule. Now eliminate the wage rate, (27)
Finally eliminate capital, (28) lagged one period
Now, use eq. (30) to express the right-hand side of the Euler equation as follows:
Eliminate the social security payment using eqs. (24) and (25), updated one period,
Eliminate factor payments using eqs. (27) and (28), updated one period, and collect like terms.
Finally, eliminate capital and collect like terms.
Use the Euler equation, equating both sides using the equations above, and solve for current period savings,
where
We now solve the system for our second state variable, human capital. First substitute eq. (23) into eq. (22).
Next, eliminate the effective wage rate and collect like terms.
Equations (48) and (49) result in a block recursive system of equations. To express this system in terms of a VAR model, substitute (49) into (48). This gives us eqs. (32) and (33) in the body of the paper. The partial elasticities (reduced form coefficients) of the system are provided in Table 2 and Table 3.
This appendix provides the proof for proposition 4. First, set
Next, conjecture a demographic shock
Given this set of assumptions, the sequence for each of the state variables can be found using eqs. (50) and (51).
Period 0
Period 1
Period 2
Period
Given the sequence for savings, the capital stock per worker sequence is as follows (See Table 1).
Period 0
Period 1
Period 2
Period
Given the capital stock per worker sequence and the sequence for human capital, the factor price sequences are as follows (See Table 1).
Period 0
Period 1
Period 2
Period
This last result demonstrates the complete factor price smoothing effect when
Period 0
Period 1
Period 2
Period 3
Period
Given the factor price sequences and the social security payment sequence, the consumption sequences are as follows (See Table 1).
Period 0
Period 1
Period 2
Period 3
Period
Thus, the consumption profile for each generation takes the following form:
Initial Old:
Initial Working Generation (Parents):
Children subject to Demographic Shock:
All Future Generations (
Thus, under policy rule 1, the demographic shock is borne by the generation subject to the shock when
This appendix solves the system of equations in Table 1 for policy rule 2. In this case, we set the policy variables
From eqs. (22) and (23) in the body of the paper, we have,
which demonstrates that the education component drops out of the model. To solve the system for the one remaining state variable, savings, we follow the same procedure as in B. First, start with the left-hand side of the Euler equation,
Eliminate the education tax rate (53) and collect like terms
Now eliminate the factor payment and collect like terms,
Finally, eliminate capital using the market clearing equation and collecting like terms,
Now solve for savings on the right-hand side of the Euler equation. Again, the solution process is equivalent to the one found in Appendix B (minus the education variable):
Equating both sides of Euler equation and solving for savings in period
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Supplemental Material
The online version of this article offers supplementary material (DOI:https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0134).
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Research Articles
- The Effects of Entry when Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly Coexist
- Managerial Delegation of Competing Vertical Chains with Vertical Externality
- Fiat Money as a Public Signal, Medium of Exchange, and Punishment
- Education Spending, Fertility Shocks and Generational Consumption Risk
- Should the Talk be Cheap in Contribution Games?
- College Assignment Problems Under Constrained Choice, Private Preferences, and Risk Aversion
- Competition with Nonexclusive Contracts: Tackling the Hold-Up Problem
- Endogenous Authority and Enforcement in Public Goods Games
- Disequilibrium Trade in a Large Market for an Indivisible Good
- Pretrial Beliefs and Verdict Accuracy: Costly Juror Effort and Free Riding
- Product R&D Coopetition and Firm Performance
- A Model of Inequality Aversion and Private Provision of Public Goods
- Managerial Accountability Under Yardstick Competition
- On the Equilibrium Uniqueness in Cournot Competition with Demand Uncertainty