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Managerial Delegation, Product R&D and Subsidies on R&D Investment Costs

  • Chung-Hui Chou ORCID logo EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 17. November 2022

Abstract

This paper studies owners’ optimal designs of incentive schemes in a market with managerial firms competing in prices as well as in product research and development (R&D) investment in which owners use a linear combination of gross profits which are defined to be sales revenue minus production costs, sales revenue and R&D costs to evaluate managers’ performances. The main contribution of our research is showing that owners not only deflate R&D costs to induce managers to invest more in product R&D but also place different weights on production costs and R&D costs optimally. If product R&D is highly efficient, managerial delegation improves consumers’ surplus at cost of firms’ profits which is sharply contrasting to the standard conclusion of sales delegation under price competition. Moreover, managerial delegation may achieve Pareto efficiency if product R&D is mildly inefficient. Finally, we find that copyright protection benefits consumers’ surplus but could reduce social welfare.

JEL Classification: D43; L15; L20; O31; O32; O34

Corresponding author: Chung-Hui Chou, Department of Finance, I-Shou University, Kaohsiung City 84001, Taiwan, E-mail:

Appendix A: The Proof of Satisfaction of Second-Order Conditions

From (6a) and (6b),

2 m 1 p 1 * , p 2 * p 1 2 = 2 m 2 p 1 * , p 2 * p 2 2 = 1 < 0 .

From (9),

2 m 1 x 1 * , x 2 * x 1 2 = 2 m 2 x 1 * , x 2 * x 2 2 = ( 1 s ) 2 9 θ 1 * c 9 < 0 .

From (14a) and (14b),

2 π 1 λ 1 * , λ 2 * , θ 1 * , θ 2 * λ 1 2 = 2 π 2 λ 1 * , λ 2 * , θ 1 * , θ 2 * λ 2 2 = 9 1 s 2 ( 36 c 2 16 c 1 s 2 + ( 1 s ) 4 ] 64 c 3 c + 1 s 2 2 < 0 .

2 π 1 λ 1 * , λ 2 * , θ 1 * , θ 2 * θ 1 2 = 2 π 2 λ 1 * , λ 2 * , θ 1 * , θ 2 * θ 2 2 = c 8 c + 3 1 s 2 4 3 c + 1 s 2 2 < 0 .

2 π 1 λ 1 * , λ 2 * , θ 1 * , θ 2 * λ 1 2 2 π 2 λ 1 * , λ 2 * , θ 1 * , θ 2 * θ 2 2 2 π 1 λ 1 * , λ 2 * , θ 1 * , θ 2 * θ 1 λ 1 2 π 1 λ 1 * , λ 2 * , θ 1 * , θ 2 * θ 1 λ 1 = 9 1 s 2 8 c + 3 1 s 2 64 1 s 2 3 c 2 > 0 .

Hence, if c > 3 ( 1 s ) 2 8 , then second-order conditions are satisfied.

This completes the proof.□

Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1

From Table 1,

  1. λ m * 1 = 1 ( 1 s ) 2 2 c < 0 if  c < ( 1 s ) 2 2 > 0 if  c > ( 1 s ) 2 2 p m * p o * = 2 c ( 1 s ) 2 2 c < 0 if  c < ( 1 s ) 2 2 > 0 if  c > ( 1 s ) 2 2 .

  2. x m * = ( 1 s ) 2 c > x o * = ( 1 s ) 3 c .

This completes the proof.□

Appendix C: The Derivations of Consumers’ Surplus and Social Welfare

  1. Firms are operated by managers

    c s m * = 2 0 1 2 u 0 + q m * p m * t d t = u 0 9 4 + 1 s c ,

    π m * = 1 3 ( 1 s ) 2 8 c .

    Hence,

    w m * = c s m * + 2 π m * = u 0 + ( 1 s ) ( 4 3 c 3 c s ) 4 c 1 4 .

  2. Firms are operated by owners

    c s o * = 2 0 1 2 u 0 + q o * p o * t d t = u 0 5 4 + ( 1 s ) ( 1 + s ) 3 c ,

    π o * = 1 2 ( 1 s ) 2 18 c .

    Hence,

    w o * = c s o * + 2 π o * = u 0 + 2 ( 1 s ) ( 1 + 2 s ) 9 c 1 4 .

This completes the proof.□

Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 2

From Table 1,

  1. π m * π o * = 36 c 23 ( 1 s ) 2 72 c < 0 if  c < 23 ( 1 s ) 2 36 > 0 if  c > 23 ( 1 s ) 2 36 .

    23 ( 1 s ) 2 36 3 1 s 2 8 = 23 + s 1 s 72 > 0 .

    Hence, 23 ( 1 s ) 2 36 > 3 ( 1 s ) 2 8 .

  2. c s m * c s o * = 2 s 1 s 3 c 3 c < 0 if  c < 2 s 1 s 3 > 0 if  c > 2 s 1 s 3 .

  3. w m * w o * = 1 s ( 27 c s 16 s 27 c + 28 ) 36 c > 0 if  c < 4 ( 7 4 s ) 27 ( 1 s ) < 0 if  c > 4 ( 7 4 s ) 27 ( 1 s )

    4 ( 7 4 s ) 27 ( 1 s ) 2 s 1 s 3 = 5 3 s 2 + 7 s 3 s 2 27 ( 1 s ) > 0 .

    2 s 1 s 3 3 1 s 2 8 = 7 + s 1 s 24 > 0 .

    Hence, 4 ( 7 4 s ) 27 ( 1 s ) > 2 s 1 s 3 > 3 ( 1 s ) 2 8 .

This completes the proof.□

Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 3

  1. From (19b) and Table 2,

    d q o * d s = 2 s 3 c < 0 .

    d c s o * d s = 2 s 3 c < 0 .

  2. From Table 2,

    d w o * d s = 2 ( 1 4 s ) 9 c > 0 if  s < 1 4 < 0 if  s > 1 4 .

This completes the proof.□

Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 4

  1. From (17b) and Table 2,

    d q m * d s = s c < 0 .

    d c s m * d s = 2 s 3 2 c < 0 .

  2. From Table 2,

    d w m * d s = 3 c ( 1 s ) 2 2 c < 0 if  c < 2 3 ( 1 s ) . > 0 if  c > 2 3 ( 1 s )

    2 3 ( 1 s ) 3 1 s 2 8 = 7 + 27 s 27 s 2 + 9 s 3 24 1 s > 0 .

    Hence, 2 3 ( 1 s ) > 3 1 s 2 8 .

This completes the proof.□

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Received: 2021-10-20
Revised: 2022-07-07
Accepted: 2022-10-07
Published Online: 2022-11-17

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