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Going Along or Going Independent? A Dynamic Analysis of Nonprofit Alliances

  • Jiawei Chen EMAIL logo und Michael Sacks
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 16. Februar 2018

Abstract

This paper investigates strategic alliances in the nonprofit sector in the form of franchising. Using a dynamic model of local public goods with endogenous affiliation and splitting, we show that local organizations may choose to affiliate with the national organization for faster capital accumulation. Temporary alliance occurs when a local organization strategically affiliates with the national organization only to break away after accumulating enough capital. Alliance is more likely to arise and persist when the local chapter is smaller, when the local chapter’s mission is closer to the national organization’s, when the national organization is more efficient in production, and when the local chapter is more patient. Moreover, regulation that requires the local chapter to be affiliated with the national organization would be welfare reducing when the local chapter is large, when the local and national missions differ substantially, and when production at the national organization is inefficient.

JEL Classification: D71; H41; L24; L31.

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Published Online: 2018-2-16

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Heruntergeladen am 27.9.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/bejeap-2017-0009/html
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