Abstract
We look at the effects of physical activity (PA) recommendation policies by considering a social multiplier model in which individuals differ in their concern for PA. The government can either observe this concern (and implement the First Best) or not (and implement a uniform policy). Whichever the type of policy implemented, while the welfare of individuals the most concerned with PA increases in the social multiplier, the welfare of those the least concerned may decrease in it. For a sufficiently high social multiplier, both government interventions improve the welfare of those most concerned with PA but worsen the welfare of the least concerned individuals if they are not too many. However, compared to the First Best, a uniform recommendation improves the welfare of those most concerned with PA more than it reduces the welfare of those least concerned.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
An LF-equilibrium consists of a pair which solves equations [2A], [2B] and
. Solving this system leads to:

Note that . Therefore, according to Assumption 1
, for all
. Consequently, to establish that
it is sufficient to show that
and
. The positivity of
is obvious. Having
is equivalent to
. Therefore, according to Assumption 1,
is the LF-equilibrium.
After computations, we obtain . As
and
,
and, consequently,
and
increase in
. We also have
. Then,
and
are convex functions of
. □
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 2
According to eq. [3] we have . This value is lower than 1 since, according to Assumption 1,
. Therefore,
when
, and
otherwise.
After computations, and
. As
,
and
are positive and
is increasing and convex in
.
Additionally, has the sign of
. Since for all
we have
and
,
is positive and, consequently,
is more convex than
and
.
Finally note that and, according to Proposition 1,
. Therefore, since
,
for all
and there exists a unique
such that
if and only if
. □
Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 3
According to eq. [] (
or B) we have
. Substituting this into eq. [1] allows us to obtain
. Consequently, we have
and
. Both expressions are positive since
and
are positive. Therefore,
and
are increasing and convex functions of
.
Substituting eq. [3] into eq. [1] allows us to obtain . Then, we have
and
. Since
and
are positive,
and
have the sign of
. As
and
we have
. Consequently,
is an increasing and convex function of
.
We now contrast with
. Using Propositions 1 and 2, we obtain
and
with
and
.
Then has the sign of
with
and
. Using the facts that
and
, a sufficient condition to show the positivity of
is to establish the positivity of
. Rearranging terms leads to
with
. Let
. Since
and
, we have
with
. As
,
and, therefore,
. Consequently,
meaning that
increases in
for
.
From eq. [1] we obtain . As
, we have
. Hence, we obtain
. Given the definition of
(see Proposition 2),
. From eq. [1] it follows that
. Since, according to Proposition 1,
, then
. Consequently, since
increases in
for
, there exists a unique
such that
if
and
if
. □
Appendix D
Proof of Proposition 4
In Appendix C, we establish that is an increasing and convex function of
and that
and
have the sign of
, i.e., after computations, the sign of
. Then
and
have the sign of
with
. Consequently,
is a decreasing and concave function of
if
and an increasing and convex function of
if
.
According to eq. [1], . As
, we have
. Hence, we obtain:
Fact 1 – For all
,
when
.
When ,
increases in
for
while
decreases and, according to Fact 1, we have
when
. When
, complications arise since both
and
increase in
. According to Appendix C,
. Then, after computations and using Appendix A and B,
has the sign of
. The degree of this polynomial function is three and
. Moreover,
and
. As
,
and consequently
and
. The fact that
,
and
implies the existence and the uniqueness of root
between 0 and 1.9 Then,
if
and
if
. Consequently, we establish:
Fact 2 – When
,
decreases in
for
. When
, the function
decreases for
and increases for
.
Note that ,
and
. Then
. As
, we have
. Then, we establish:
Fact 3 – The function
is a decreasing function of p.
Given , the maximum of
is obtained when
, i.e.,
. Hence:
Fact 4 – For all
,
if
.
Using Fact 1 to Fact 4, it is straightforward to establish the assertion of our proposition using the (possible) existence of two thresholds and
such that:
If
, there exists a threshold
, such that
decreases in
for
, increases in
for
and:
If
, there exists a unique
such that
when
and
when
.
If
,
for all
.
If
,
decreases in
and
.
The threshold is defined, according to Fact 1 to Fact 4, from the value of p such that
. This value is given by
with
and
. Then, after computations,
is the root of
with
,
,
and
. Since
,
,
and
, we have
,
and
. Then,
has a unique root and this latter is positive. Consequently, if
then this root corresponds to
and if
then
.
By construction, the threshold exists only when
and it corresponds to the unique value
such that
with
which has been defined to prove Fact 2. □
Appendix E
Proof of Corollary 1
According to Appendix D, and, consequently,
is on the branch of the function
which increases in
. Then, as
decreases in p (Fact 3 of Appendix D), the threshold
increases in p. Moreover, it is straightforward to establish that
.
Remark that ,
,
and
. As
, we have
. Then, it is straightforward to show that
is a decreasing function of p. Consequently, as
, for all
there exists a threshold
such that
decreases in p if (and only if)
. Then, because
there exists a unique p such that
, for a given
. Consequently,
is a monotonic function of p. As
, the threshold
decreases in p.
To summarize, the threshold increases in p and
while
decreases in p and
. Then, there exists a unique threshold
such that
is larger (resp: lower) than
if and only if p is lower (resp: larger) than
. Using
and Propositions 3 and 4, the assertion of Corollary 1 is straightforward. □
Appendix F
Proof of Proposition 5
To determine the FB-equilibrium, the government chooses and
so that
is maximum given
. We first analyze the case of interior solutions (Step 1) and then consider the possibility of corner solutions (Step 2).
Step 1 – The case of interior solutions
and
.
When FB-equilibrium has interior solutions , the government solves:

After simplifications, the two FOC are given by:
![[6]](/document/doi/10.1515/bejeap-2012-0075/asset/graphic/bejeap-2012-0075_eq23.png)
![[7]](/document/doi/10.1515/bejeap-2012-0075/asset/graphic/bejeap-2012-0075_eq24.png)
Rearranging terms we obtain:

and

The value V decreases (and is concave) when varies from 0 to 1. As
and
, there exists a unique
such that V is positive if and only if
. As
, we have
. Thus,
is positive and decreases in
. As
, there exists a unique
such that
if and only if
. Let
, then it is straightforward that
.
Similarly, it is obvious that is positive and increases in
. As
, there exists a unique
such that
if and only if
.
After computations, with
. As
and
,
increases in
.
Moreover, we have with
. As
and
are positive,
is positive and
is an increasing and convex function of
when
. Note that
and
.
We follow by contrasting with
and
. Note that
has the sign of
, i.e., the sign of
. As
,
is positive, i.e.,
.
Moreover, has the sign of
, i.e., the sign of
. As
and
we obtain after computations
with
. Then, the discriminant
of the polynomial function
is such that
. Consequently, the lowest root of
is
. As
and
, we have
for all
and, consequently,
.
Note that with
. Therefore
increases in
. Moreover, as
and
are positive, and
is negative,
is a convex function of
if
. Remark that
and
. As the numerator of
is larger than the one of
whereas the denominator of
is lower than the one of
, we have
.
Finally, has the sign of
, i.e., the sign of
. As
and
we obtain after computations
with
. Then, the discriminant
of the polynomial function
is such that
. Consequently, the lowest root of
is
. As
and
, we have
for all
and, consequently,
.
As regards the comparison between and
, when
,
has the sign of
, i.e., the sign of
. Then,
decreases in
. Consequently,
if and only if
. After computations:

The positivity of this quantity implies that arises for a
larger than 1. Hence,
and
for all
.
Step 2 – The case of corner solutions
and
.
When ,
and the value
which defines
solves:

Then, the FOC is and:

which is lower than 1 if and only if .
After computations and
. Then,
is an increasing and convex function of
.
Comparing with
, we conclude that
has the sign of
, i.e., the sign of
. As
we obtain
with
. As the discriminant
of
is
, the polynomial function
has two positive roots and the product of these roots is given by
. As
,
and
, the two roots of
are larger than 1 and
is positive for all
. Consequently,
.
Step 3 – Characterization and properties of the FB-equilibrium.
Using Steps 1 and 2, it is straightforward to obtain that the FB-equilibrium is given by:

In Step 1, we have established that and
are both increasing and convex functions of
. In Step 2, we have established that
is an increasing and convex function of
. Combining Steps 1 and 2, we have also established that
,
,
,
and
. □
Appendix G
Proof of Proposition 6
We separately study the welfare of each type of individual.
Step 1 – Characterization of type A individuals’ welfare at the FB-equilibrium.
We first focus on the welfare of type A individuals when . Merging eqs. [6] and [7] in Appendix F gives
. Then, according to eq. [7] and using the fact that
we obtain
. Thus, the utility
becomes:

Then, with
. We obtain
with
. Then,
. As
and
we have
, with
. Then
. This implies
. As
,
increases in
.
Moreover with
. Then
with
. As
, we have
. Then,
is positive. As
,
is a convex functionof
.
We now focus on type A individuals’ welfare when . As
, then
, with
. Thus,
. As
is a positive, increasing and convex function of
, it is straightforward to establish that
is an increasing and convex function of
.
Step 2 – Characterization of type B individuals’ welfare at the FB-equilibrium.
We now focus on type B individuals’ welfare when . Merging eqs. [6] and [7] in Appendix F gives
. Then, according to eq. [6] and using the fact that
, we obtain
. Then, the utility
becomes:

Then, with
. After computations,
. As
, we obtain after simplifying
. Therefore,
and, by continuity,
is an increasing function for sufficiently low values of
.
We now focus on type B individuals’ welfare when . Using the fact that
with
we obtain, after computations,
with
. Thus,
. As
and
we obtain, after computations,
. Moreover, it is straightforward that
. Then,
and
and, by continuity,
is an increasing function for sufficiently low values of p but a decreasing one for sufficiently high values of p.
We now compare with
for type A individuals. It is straightforward to establish that
. Moreover, according to Proposition 3,
. Then
. Similarly,
whereas
. As
we have
. By continuity, we have established that
when
is sufficiently low, whereas
for sufficiently large values of
.
We finally compare with
for type B individuals. It is straightforward to establish that
. Moreover, according to Proposition 4,
. Hence,
. By definition of the First Best, we have for all
,
. As
, we necessarily have
. By continuity we have established that
when
is sufficiently low or sufficiently large. □
Acknowledgment
We are grateful to David Bardey and Pierre Pestieau for their comments and suggestions. We thank participants at the “First workshop IDEI/SCOR/TSE of Long Term Care” (Toulouse, January 6, 2011), and at the “CESifo Workshop on the Economics of Long Term Care” (Venice, July 18–19, 2012) for their discussions. We also thank two referees of this journal for their constructive comments. E. Thibault thanks the Chair Fondation du Risque/SCOR “Marché du risque et création de valeurs” for its financial support.
References
Alesina, A., E.Glaeser, and B.Sacerdote. 2005. “Work and Leisure in the U.S. and Europe: Why So Different?” NBER Working Papers No. 11278.10.3386/w11278Suche in Google Scholar
Babcock, P., and J.Hartman. 2010. “Networks and Workouts: Treatment Status Specific Peer Effects in a Randomized Field Experiment.” NBER Working Paper No. 16581.10.3386/w16581Suche in Google Scholar
Bardey, D., and P.De Donder. 2012. “Genetic Testing with Primary Prevention and Moral Hazard.” CEPR Discussion Papers No. 8977.10.2139/ssrn.2104301Suche in Google Scholar
Barnett, A., B.Smith, S. R.Lord, M.Williams, and A.Baumand. 2003. “Community-Based Group Exercise Improves Balance and Reduces Falls in at-Risk Older People: A Randomized Controlled Trial.” Age and Ageing32:407–14.10.1093/ageing/32.4.407Suche in Google Scholar
Benjamin, K., N.Edwards, J.Ploeg, and F.Legault. 2013. “Barriers to Physical Activity and Restorative Care for Residents in Long-Term Care: A Review of the Literature.” Journal of Aging and Physical Activity, forthcoming.10.1123/japa.2012-0139Suche in Google Scholar
Bertrand, M., E.Luttmer, and S.Mullainathan. 2000. “Network Effects and Welfare Cultures.” Quarterly Journal of Economics115:1019–56.10.1162/003355300554971Suche in Google Scholar
Blain, H., A.Vuillemin, A.Blain, and C.Jeandel. 2000. “Médecine Préventive Chez Les Personnes Agées. Les Effets Préventifs De L’activité Physique Chez Les Personnes Agées.” Presse Médicale29:1240–8.Suche in Google Scholar
Carrell, S. E., M.Hoekstra, and J. E.West. 2011. “Is Poor Fitness Contagious? Evidence from Randomly Assigned Friends.” Journal of Public Economics95:657–63.10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.12.005Suche in Google Scholar
Colcombe, S., and A. F.Kramer. 2003. “Fitness Effects on the Cognitive Function of Older Adults: A Meta-Analytic Study.” Psychological Science14:125–30.10.1111/1467-9280.t01-1-01430Suche in Google Scholar
Cremer, H., F.Gahvari, and J. M.Lozachmeur. 2010. “Tagging and Income Taxation: Theory and an Application.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy2:31–50.10.1257/pol.2.1.31Suche in Google Scholar
Eder, D., and S.Parker. 1987. “The Cultural Production and Reproduction of Gender: The Effect of Extracurricular Activities on Peer-Group Culture.” Sociology of Education60:200–13.10.2307/2112276Suche in Google Scholar
Efrat, M. W.2009. “The Relationship between Peer and/or Friends? Influence and Physical Activity among Elementary School Children: A Review.” Californian Journal of Health Promotion7:48–61.10.32398/cjhp.v7iSI.2000Suche in Google Scholar
Gallagher, K. M., and J. A.Updegraff. 2012. “Health Message Framing Effects on Attitudes, Intentions, and Behavior: A Meta-Analytic Review.” Annals of Behavioral Medicine43:101–16.10.1007/s12160-011-9308-7Suche in Google Scholar
Glaeser, E., B.Sacerdote, and J.Scheinkman. 1996. “Crime and Social Interactions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics111:507–48.10.2307/2946686Suche in Google Scholar
Hallal, P. C., L. B.Andersen, F. C.Bull, R.Guthold, W.Haskell, and U.Ekelund. 2012. “Global Physical Activity Levels: Surveillance Progress, Pitfalls, and Prospects.” Lancet380:247–57.10.1016/S0140-6736(12)60646-1Suche in Google Scholar
Heath, G. W., D. C.Parra, O. L.Sarmiento, L. B.Andersen, N.Owen, S.Goenka, F.Montes, and R. C.Brownson. 2012. “Evidence-Based Intervention in Physical Activity: Lessons From Around the World.” Lancet380:272–81.10.1016/S0140-6736(12)60816-2Suche in Google Scholar
Hirvensalo, M., and T.Lintunen. 2011. “Life-Course Perspective for Physical Activity and Sports Participation.” European Review of Aging and Physical Activity8:13–22.10.1007/s11556-010-0076-3Suche in Google Scholar
Katz, M., and C.Shapiro. 1985. “Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility.” American Economic Review75:424–40.Suche in Google Scholar
Keysor, J. J.2003. “Does Late-Life Physical Activity or Exercise Prevent or Minimize Disablement? A Critical Review of the Scientific Evidence.” American Journal of Preventive Medicine25:129–36.10.1016/S0749-3797(03)00176-4Suche in Google Scholar
Kohl, H. W., C. L.Craig, E. V.Lambert, S.Inoue, J. R.Alkandari, G.Leetongin, and S.Kahlmeier. 2012. “The Pandemic of Physical Inactivity: Global Action for Public Health.” Lancet380:294–305.10.1016/S0140-6736(12)60898-8Suche in Google Scholar
Latimer, A. E., L. R.Brawley, and R. L.Bassett. 2010. “A Systematic Review of Three Approaches for Constructing Physical Activity Messages: What Messages Work and What Improvements Are Needed?” International Journal of Behavioral Nutrition and Physical Activity7:36.10.1186/1479-5868-7-36Suche in Google Scholar
Lee, I. M., E.Shiroma, F.Lobelo, P.Puska, S.Blair, and P.Katzmarzyk. 2012. “Effect of Physical Inactivity on Major Non-Communicable Diseases Worldwide: An Analysis of Burden of Disease and Life Expectancy.” Lancet380:219–29.10.1016/S0140-6736(12)61031-9Suche in Google Scholar
McAuley, E., S.Elavsky, G. J.Jerome, J. F.Konopack, and D. X.Marquez. 2005. “Physical Activity Related Well-Being in Older Adults: Social Cognitive Influences.” Psychology and Aging20:295–302.10.1037/0882-7974.20.2.295Suche in Google Scholar
OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development]. 2010. “Obesity and the Economics of Prevention: Fit Not Fat.” OECD Report by F. Sassi.Suche in Google Scholar
PAGAC [Physical Activity Guidelines Advisory Committee]. 2008. “Physical Activity Guidelines Advisory Committee Report.” Department of Health and Human Services.Suche in Google Scholar
Renaud, M., and L.Bherer. 2005. “L’impact De La Condition Physique Sur Le Vieillissement Cognitif.” Psychologie & Neuropsychiatrie Du Vieillissement3:199–206.Suche in Google Scholar
Robbins, L. B., M.Stommel, and L. M.Hamel. 2008. “Social Support for Physical Activity of Middle School Students.” Public Health Nursing25:451–60.10.1111/j.1525-1446.2008.00729.xSuche in Google Scholar
Sacerdote, B.2001. “Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Darmouth Roommates.” Quarterly Journal of Economics116:681–704.10.1162/00335530151144131Suche in Google Scholar
Saez, E., and E.Duflo. 2003. “The Role of Information and Social Interactions in Retirement Plan Decisions: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics118:815–42.10.1162/00335530360698432Suche in Google Scholar
Shephard, R.1991. “Physical Fitness: Exercise and Aging.” In: Principles and Practice of Geriatric Medicine, edited by M. S. J. Pathy. New York: John Wiley, 279–92.Suche in Google Scholar
Smith, A. L.2003. “Peer Relationships in Physical Activity Contexts: A Road Less Traveled in Youth Sport and Exercise Psychology Research.” Psychology of Sport and Exercise4:25–39.10.1016/S1469-0292(02)00015-8Suche in Google Scholar
Trogdon, J., J.Nonnemaker, and J.Pais. 2008. “Peer Effects in Adolescent Overweight.” Journal of Health Economics27:1388–99.10.1016/j.jhealeco.2008.05.003Suche in Google Scholar
Vogel, T., P. -H.Brechat, P. -M.Leprêtre, G.Kaltenbach, M.Berthel, and J.Lonsdorfer. 2009. “Health Benefits of Physical Activity in Older Patients: A Review.” International Journal of Clinical Practice63:303–20.10.1111/j.1742-1241.2008.01957.xSuche in Google Scholar
Voorhees, C. C., D.Murray, G.Welk, A.Birnbaum, K. M.Ribisl, C. C.Johnson, K. A.Pfeiffer, B.Saksvig, and J. B.Jobe. 2005. “The Role of Peer Social Network Factors and Physical Activity in Adolescent Girls.” American Journal of Health Behavior29:183–90.10.5993/AJHB.29.2.9Suche in Google Scholar
Warburton, D. E. R., C. W.Nicol, and S. D.Bredin. 2006. “Health Benefits of Physical Activity: The Evidence.” Canadian Medical Association Journal174:801–09.10.1503/cmaj.051351Suche in Google Scholar
Wechsler, H., R. S.Devereaux, M.Davis, and J.Collins. 2000. “Using the School Environment to Promote Physical Activity and Healthy Eating.” Preventive Medicine31:S121–37.10.1006/pmed.2000.0649Suche in Google Scholar
Wen, C. P., J. P. M.Wai, M. K.Tsai, Y. C.Yang, T. Y. D.Cheng, M.-C.Lee, H. T.Chan, C. K.Tsao, S. P.Tsai, and X.Wu. 2011. “Minimum Amount of Physical Activity for Reduced Mortality and Extended Life Expectancy: A Prospective Cohort Study.” Lancet378:1244–53.10.1016/S0140-6736(11)60749-6Suche in Google Scholar
WHO [World Health Organization]. 2010. “Global recommendations on physical activity for health”. Geneva: WHO Press. NLM Classification: QT 255.Suche in Google Scholar
- 1
This figure equates to as many deaths as tobacco causes globally.
- 2
See the survey of Blain et al. (2000), and the references therein.
- 3
For more on these campaigns check, respectively, http://www.letsmove.gov/get-active, http://www.mangerbouger.fr, http://www.findthirtyeveryday.com.au, and http://www.nhs.uk/Change4Life, all accessed on September 25, 2012. Similarly, there are uniform campaigns concerning nutrition, in general advising the intake of five portions of fruit and vegetables a day.
- 4
See among others, Warburton, Nicol, and Bredin (2006), regarding PA benefits in reducing the risk of several conditions, Barnett et al. (2003) for reduction in falls and disability, Keysor (2003) for improved independence, McAuley et al. (2005) for improved psychological well-being, and Colcombe and Kramer (2003), and the survey of Vogel et al. (2009) for maintenance of cognitive vitality. Yet note that PA is recommended to all ages since the risk of NCDs starts in childhood (see Warburton, Nicol, and Bredin 2006; PAGAC 2008; and WHO 2010; among others).
- 5
These variables
can alternatively be either a time or an amount of wealth devoted to PA.
- 6
is the
of Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2005, Section 5) when
,
and
.
- 7
Even though we focus on the social multiplier effects associated with PA practice, the present setup is sufficiently general to be used in the analyzes of other goods and services where social multiplier effects occur, such as education or the use of new technologies.
- 8
See for England http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/9777453/Obese-people-may-be-forced-to-exercise-or-lose-benefits.html, and for Japan http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/13/world/asi a/13fat.html both accessed on February 20, 2013.
- 9
Obviously,
and
guarantee the existence of a root
between 0 and 1. If
is not the unique root between 0 and 1, there generally exists three roots
,
, and
such that
and
,
,
. Then, as
,
have at least three roots: however this is impossible since
is a polynomial function of degree 2. Consequently
is unique.
©2014 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin / Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Editorial
- The Economics of Long-Term Care: An Introduction
- Advances
- The Economics of Long-Term Care
- Informal Care and Inter-vivos Transfers: Results from the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women
- Long-Term Care Insurance and Family Norms
- Long-Term Care, Altruism and Socialization
- Working Mums and Informal Care Givers: The Anticipation Effect
- Endogenous Altruism, Redistribution, and Long-Term Care
- Do Local Governments Respond to (Perverse) Financial Incentives in Long-Term Care Funding Schemes?
- Behavioral Biases and Long-Term Care Insurance: A Political Economy Approach
- Physical Activity and Policy Recommendations: A Social Multiplier Approach
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Editorial
- The Economics of Long-Term Care: An Introduction
- Advances
- The Economics of Long-Term Care
- Informal Care and Inter-vivos Transfers: Results from the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women
- Long-Term Care Insurance and Family Norms
- Long-Term Care, Altruism and Socialization
- Working Mums and Informal Care Givers: The Anticipation Effect
- Endogenous Altruism, Redistribution, and Long-Term Care
- Do Local Governments Respond to (Perverse) Financial Incentives in Long-Term Care Funding Schemes?
- Behavioral Biases and Long-Term Care Insurance: A Political Economy Approach
- Physical Activity and Policy Recommendations: A Social Multiplier Approach