Fehr on Altruism, Emotion, and Norms
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Jon Elster
Abstract
I discuss recent work by Ernst Fehr and his collaborators on cooperation and reciprocity. (i) Their work demonstrates conclusively the reality and importance of non-self-interested motivations. (ii) It allows for a useful distinction between trust and blind trust. (iii) It points to a category of quasi-moral norms, distinct both from social norms and moral norms. (iv) It demonstrates how social interactions can generate irrational belief formation. (v) It shows the potential of punishment for sustaining social norms and for overcoming the second-order free rider problem as well as obstacles to group selection. (vi) It offers a provocative experimental basis for the ‘warm-glow’ explanation of altruistic behavior. I conclude by suggesting some experiments that might allow for further developments of the theory.
© 2005 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Editorial
- Human Altruism – Proximate Patterns and Evolutionary Origins
- Behavioral Game Theory and Contemporary Economic Theory
- Altruists with Green Beards
- Altruists with Green Beards: Still Kicking?
- Strong Reciprocity and the Comparative Method
- The Evolutionary Foundations of Strong Reciprocity
- The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation
- On the Original Contract: Evolutionary Game Theory and Human Evolution
- Social Relations Instead of Altruistic Punishment
- ‘Nostrism’: Social Identities in Experimental Games
- Altruism and the Indispensability of Motives
- Fehr on Altruism, Emotion, and Norms
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Editorial
- Human Altruism – Proximate Patterns and Evolutionary Origins
- Behavioral Game Theory and Contemporary Economic Theory
- Altruists with Green Beards
- Altruists with Green Beards: Still Kicking?
- Strong Reciprocity and the Comparative Method
- The Evolutionary Foundations of Strong Reciprocity
- The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation
- On the Original Contract: Evolutionary Game Theory and Human Evolution
- Social Relations Instead of Altruistic Punishment
- ‘Nostrism’: Social Identities in Experimental Games
- Altruism and the Indispensability of Motives
- Fehr on Altruism, Emotion, and Norms
