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The Challenges of the Modes of Agrippa

  • Joseph B. Bullock EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 23. Februar 2016
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Apeiron
Aus der Zeitschrift Apeiron Band 49 Heft 4

Abstract

The standard “gladiatorial” interpretation of the Modes of Agrippa has undergone several recent attacks. Scholars have criticized it because it seems to portray the skeptic as a dogmatist about logical support and because it does not treat all five Modes as part of the system. Although some have attempted to patch up the standard interpretation to address these issues, I raise a further problem: The gladiatorial interpretation cannot make sense of the skeptic using the Modes on herself, to suspend her own judgment. In light of these problems, I propose a fresh interpretation: The Agrippan Modes should be understood, not as arguments (or argument forms), but as types of dialectical challenge that the skeptic can use in an endless inquiry into any dogmatic position.

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Published Online: 2016-2-23
Published in Print: 2016-10-1

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Heruntergeladen am 23.10.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/apeiron-2015-0077/pdf?lang=de
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