Abstract
Aristotle provides two different explanations for there being three distinct and (so I will argue) genuine kinds of friendship: friendship based on virtue, on pleasure, and on utility. In the Eudemian Ethics, he conceives their unity as a focal meaning unity, whereas, in the Nicomachean Ethics, resemblance is the key notion for unifying the three cases of friendship. In this paper, I propose an interpretation for this conceptual change, attempting to show why resemblance is a better tool than focal meaning to account for these three genuine kinds, and how Aristotle can maintain a hierarchy among them within a unity based on resemblance.
© 2014 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Does present-day symmetry underlie the cosmology of Plato’s Timaeus
- Is Plato a Coherentist? The Theory of Knowledge in Republic V–VII
- Aristotle (on fever) in Problemata I
- The Conceptual Unity of Friendship in the Eudemian and the Nicomachean Ethics
- Mental images in Porphyry’s commentary on Ptolemy’s Harmonics
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Does present-day symmetry underlie the cosmology of Plato’s Timaeus
- Is Plato a Coherentist? The Theory of Knowledge in Republic V–VII
- Aristotle (on fever) in Problemata I
- The Conceptual Unity of Friendship in the Eudemian and the Nicomachean Ethics
- Mental images in Porphyry’s commentary on Ptolemy’s Harmonics