Socrates, the ‘What is F-ness?’ Question, and the Priority of Definition
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Justin Clark
Abstract
In the so-called ‘dialogues of definition,’ Socrates appears to endorse the ‘priority of definition.’ This principle states that an agent cannot know anything about F-ness (its instances, examples, properties, etc.) without knowing what F-ness is (the definition of F-ness). Not only is this principle implausible, it is also difficult to square with Socrates’ method. In employing his method, Socrates appeals to truths about the instances and properties of F-ness, even while pursuing definitional knowledge; meanwhile, he holds that one cannot know those truths without already knowing the definition. Thus, there is a tension between Socrates’ principle and his method. Commentators have tried to resolve this problem in various ways, though typically without a careful examination of his ‘What is F-ness?’ question. I argue that Socrates employs the ‘What is F-ness?’ question as a way of introducing two distinct types of investigation into F-ness (conceptual and causal). With this established, the relationship between Socrates’ principle and his method comes to light, and the tension is resolved.
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Articles in the same Issue
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- The Practical Syllogism and Practical Cognition in Aristotle
- Aristotle on How Efficient Causation Works
- Does Aristotle’s ‘Being Is Not a Genus’ Argument Entail Ontological Pluralism?
- The Role of Animal in Abū Bakr al-Rāzī’s Theory of the Perfection of the Soul
- Heidegger and Gadamer on Hegel’s Greek Conception of Being and Time in an Unpublished 1925/26 Seminar
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- Book Reviews
- Della Rocca, Michael, The Parmenidean Ascent. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2020, xxiii + 344 pp.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Titelseiten
- Articles
- Socrates, the ‘What is F-ness?’ Question, and the Priority of Definition
- The Practical Syllogism and Practical Cognition in Aristotle
- Aristotle on How Efficient Causation Works
- Does Aristotle’s ‘Being Is Not a Genus’ Argument Entail Ontological Pluralism?
- The Role of Animal in Abū Bakr al-Rāzī’s Theory of the Perfection of the Soul
- Heidegger and Gadamer on Hegel’s Greek Conception of Being and Time in an Unpublished 1925/26 Seminar
- Infini-Rien: Ist Pascals Wettargument formallogisch ungültig?
- Book Reviews
- Della Rocca, Michael, The Parmenidean Ascent. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2020, xxiii + 344 pp.
- Ludwig, Bernd, Aufklärung über die Sittlichkeit. Zu Kants Grundlegung einer Metaphysik der Sitten. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann Rote Reihe 2020, 226 pp.
