Abstract
This paper differentiates between two readings of Aristotle’s argument that unity and being are not “genē” (UBANG for short). On the first reading – proposed by commentators such as Ackrill, Shields, Loux, and McDaniel – UBANG entails the proposition that there are no features that characterise all beings insofar as they are, referred to by its contemporary proponents, including McDaniel, as ‘ontological pluralism’. On the second reading – proposed here – UBANG does not entail this proposition. The paper argues that only on the second reading does Aristotle’s argument secure its conclusion, that the second reading is, in fact, the correct reading of UBANG, and that anyone who thinks that UBANG succeeds and entails ontological pluralism probably equivocates between two different senses of ‘genos’.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Titelseiten
- Articles
- Socrates, the ‘What is F-ness?’ Question, and the Priority of Definition
- The Practical Syllogism and Practical Cognition in Aristotle
- Aristotle on How Efficient Causation Works
- Does Aristotle’s ‘Being Is Not a Genus’ Argument Entail Ontological Pluralism?
- The Role of Animal in Abū Bakr al-Rāzī’s Theory of the Perfection of the Soul
- Heidegger and Gadamer on Hegel’s Greek Conception of Being and Time in an Unpublished 1925/26 Seminar
- Infini-Rien: Ist Pascals Wettargument formallogisch ungültig?
- Book Reviews
- Della Rocca, Michael, The Parmenidean Ascent. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2020, xxiii + 344 pp.
- Ludwig, Bernd, Aufklärung über die Sittlichkeit. Zu Kants Grundlegung einer Metaphysik der Sitten. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann Rote Reihe 2020, 226 pp.