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Behavioural Determinants of Credit Appraisal: An Integrated Analysis of Risk Attitude, Experience, and Loan Officers’ Attributes in Indian Banks

  • Sandeepa Kaur EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: December 23, 2025

Abstract

Credit risk assessment forms the cornerstone of banking stability, yet lending decisions continue to vary substantially across institutions, reflecting heterogeneity in appraisal mechanisms and the subjective influence of lending officers. While prior studies extensively document global practices in credit evaluation and risk management, relatively little is known about how loan officers exercise judgment and decision-making during the lending process. This study addresses this gap by analysing behavioural factors that shape credit risk assessment in Indian banks. The investigation proceeds across three dimensions: the relationship between risk attitude and information acquisition, the role of professional experience in lending behaviour, and the desirable personal attributes of loan officers. Data were collected through questionnaires administered to 275 executives, fictitious case analyses, and unstructured interviews with senior loan officers. The empirical analysis employed the Kruskal–Wallis test, correlation and Cramer’s V, factor analysis, and the Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (FAHP). Findings reveal that risk attitude does not significantly influence information acquisition, whereas experience exerts a strong effect on lending behaviour. Junior and senior loan officers demonstrate more cautious and structured approaches than outsourced loan officers, with senior loan officers exhibiting a stronger rejection bias in loan approval decisions. In addition, twenty-seven desirable loan officer attributes were identified, which were subsequently prioritised using FAHP and synthesised into three broad dimensions – capability, basic abilities, and interpersonal abilities. These results indicate that senior loan officers provide higher but less dispersed evaluations of attributes, underscoring the importance of domain expertise and interpersonal effectiveness. Although the study does not employ psychometric validation for personal attributes, it contributes practical insights for recruitment and training processes by highlighting the qualities that enhance credit appraisal reliability. The research also advances interdisciplinary understanding by integrating behavioural finance and decision-making perspectives to explain the cognitive and psychological foundations of lending behaviour.

JEL Classification: D12; D53

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction

  2. Literature Review

    1. Bank Asset Quality and Structural Drivers of NPAs (India Focus)

      1. Implication for this Study

    2. Behavioural and Judgemental Determinants of Lending Decisions

      1. Implication for this Study

    3. Algorithmic and Digital Lending: Predictive Gains versus Explainability and Fairness

      1. Implication for this Study

    4. India-specific Empirical Evidence and Gaps

    5. Positioning and Contribution of the Present Study

  3. Methodology

    1. Procedure for Analysing the Risk Attitude on Information-Acquisition Behaviour

      1. Measurement of Risk Attitude

      2. Measurement of Information Acquisition

      3. Analytical Approach

    2. Procedure for Analysing the Effect of Experience

      1. Experimental Design

      2. Data Derivation

      3. Analytical Techniques

      4. Measurement Logic

    3. Procedure for Analysing the Loan officers’ Attributes and Behavioural Factors

      1. Phase 1: Identification of Attributes

      2. Phase 2: Survey Administration and FAHP Application

      3. Phase 3: Quantitative Analyses

      4. Phase 4: Model Development

  4. Empirical Results and Discussion

    1. Analysing the Impact of Risk Attitude on Information Acquisition Behaviour

      1. Interpreting Kendall’s W (Inter-Rater Agreement)

      2. Formation of Information Acquisition Groups

      3. Experience Categories Clarification

      4. Kruskal–Wallis Results

    2. Analysing the Effect of Experience

      1. Hypothesis 3: Level of Experience Significantly Influences Information Acquisition Behaviour

      2. Construction of the Dependent Variable

      3. Regression Results

      4. Correlation Analysis

      5. Examining the Role of Loan officers’ Experience in Credit-Granting Decisions Through Controlled Fictitious Case Scenarios

      6. Clarification of Computation and Interpretation

      7. Interpretation of Results

      8. Section A: Decision Framing

      9. Results of ANOVA Tests

      10. Category-wise ANOVA Results

      11. Interpretation and Theoretical Implications

      12. Section B – Decision Making

      13. Analytical Design and Measures

      14. Interpretation of Error Patterns

      15. Confidence Ratings and Group Comparison

    3. Analysing the Loan officer’s Attributes

      1. Desired Attributes of Loan officers

      2. Linking Attributes to Decision Behaviour (Integration with Hypotheses 4–6)

      3. Loan officers’ Attributes Measurement – Between-Group Analysis

      4. Computation of “Order” and “Rank”

      5. Descriptive Contrasts

      6. Classification of Three Significant Classes (and which Items are in Each)

      7. Usage of Sub-population in this Section

      8. Interpretation and Linkage to Earlier Findings

      9. Loan officers’ Attributes Measurement – Within-Group Analyses

      10. Split-Sample Consensus Correlations

      11. Results

      12. Reducing the Attribute Space and Prioritising Weights: EFA ? FAHP

        1. Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)

      13. FAHP Synthesis: Local and Global Weights

  5. Study Contribution and Implications

    1. Theoretical Contributions

    2. Practical and Policy Implications

  6. Limitations

  7. Future Work

    1. Model Enhancement and Validation

    2. Integration with Organisational and Technological Contexts

    3. Advanced Measurement and Psychometric Modelling

    4. Policy and Cross-Country Comparative Work

  8. Annex 1 Sample Bank Selection and Respondent Distribution

  9. Annex 2 Sub-Sample Construction

  10. Annex 3 Questionnaire on Loan officer’s Risk Attitude & Information Acquisition Behaviour (Administered to 275 Bank Executives)

  11. Annex 4 – Derivation of 22-Item Risk Attitude Scale

  12. Annex 5 Derivation of 15 Information Sets

  13. Annex 6 Fictitious Cases for Credit Decision-Making Analysis

  14. Annex 7 Detailed List of 74 Information Indicators Used in Fictitious Case Analysis

  15. Annex 8 Unstructured Interview Guide

  16. Annex 9 Survey Questionnaire on Loan Officers’ Attributes

  17. References

1 Introduction

The banking sector, throughout the world, act as a catalyst for the economy. Banks provide credit and payment facilities to socio economic actors (business and society). In developing economies, the banks convey the extra duties of accomplishing the social objectives of the government along with being financial actors (Rizzi et al. 2018). Therefore, sound banking relates to financial and economic development.

However, like any financial institution, banks are exposed to a spectrum of risks – including market risk, operational risk, liquidity risk, credit risk, legal risk, and interest-rate risk – which are integral to the banking ecosystem (Hassan et al. 2019). Globally, financial crises have often stemmed from the interplay of these vulnerabilities; in India, credit risk in particular has manifested in elevated levels of non-performing assets (NPAs). Recent empirical research confirms this trend: NPAs remain a persistent challenge despite regulatory interventions, and their determinants now include corporate debt vulnerability, sectoral exposures, weak profitability, and governance issues (Das 2023; Dimri 2025; Dhananjaya 2024). Moreover, studies such as “From Vulnerabilities to Vigilance: Evolving Credit Risk Measures in India’s Financial Sector” (2025) show that even with improving provisioning and capital buffers, segments such as unsecured retail lending and microfinance continue to be under pressure from credit risk. Thus, the problem of NPAs in India is not just a legacy issue, but an evolving phenomenon shaped by both macroeconomic stressors and institutional behaviour.

The stressed and non-performing assets have adversely affected the Indian financial sector. The figures have multiplied from 2008 to 2013 and have exacerbated to incredible degrees between 2013 to 2019. Furthermore, from 2020 and 2025, due to COVID-19 Pandemic, loans or credit has taken a nosedive in this period. Nevertheless, by virtue of high NPAs, there are tremendous capital ramifications on the banks. Banks are required to set aside funds as arrangements to cover their non-performing assets. This issue of NPAs emerges out of bad loans, and those bad loans are a part of credit risk. However, this issue of NPAs can be addressed by looking at the issues in relation to the evaluation of credit risk and management of credit risk.

Credit risk is typically described as the failure of the counterparty in performing the obligations under the contract. Credit risk is a futuristic concept which considers focusing on the probable occurrence of future credit difficulties. Along with Credit risk another type of risk impacting lending is Counterparty risk. The counterparty default is the disappointment of a borrower to fulfil its contractual commitment to pay back an obligation as per the concurred terms. The credit approving authority usually assesses a credit proposal with a proper procedure of credit appraisal. In the credit appraisal process, the lending authority assesses the financial soundness of the borrower by evaluating the quality and sustainability of income and previous payment history of borrowed funds. Thus, the lending bankers’ obligations include various ways by which they analyse the customer from various perspectives, i.e. the strengths and weaknesses of the borrowing customer, to distinguish whether the customer will meet its commitment of repaying the loan along with applicable interest and charges.

The nature of credit assessment is to examine the significance and focus on limiting an anticipated degree of loss from credit defaults. In practice, staying away from credit evaluation errors, that is, evaluating bad assets as performing assets, takes more effort of the loan officers. This is because financial consequences of financing bad assets that have been erroneously considered performing are much higher and deplorable as opposed to rejecting some productive assets erroneously. Hence the probability of default in any type of credit risk assessment structure ought to be carefully considered.

The motive behind this study is to identify the impact of judgement and decision-making biasness on the credit risk assessment structures. It will address the adverse impacts of loan officers’ attributes, behavioural factors and risk-taking abilities on the credit risk assessment procedures being followed in various lending organizations.

Hence, considering the above discussion, the present study aims at providing answers to the following research questions.

  • RQ1 (Risk attitude and information acquisition): How do loan officers’ risk attitudes influence the type, sequence and extent of information they acquire when evaluating credit proposals?

  • RQ2 (Experience and decision behaviour): How does professional experience affect loan officers’ information-acquisition strategies and final lending decisions (including order effects, information breadth/depth, and inter-rater agreement)?

  • RQ3 (Behavioural attributes): Which behavioural and personal attributes of loan officers (diagnostic ability, knowledge, stress-tolerance, interpersonal skills, etc.) play a decisive role in lending decisions, and how can these attributes be prioritized for recruitment and training?

2 Literature Review

The extant literature on credit risk assessment and lending decision-making spans three overlapping streams that are directly relevant to this study: (1) structural and bank-level determinants of asset quality; (2) behavioural and judgemental influences on lending; and (3) the expansion of algorithmic and digital lending with attendant fairness and explainability concerns. While each stream has advanced rapidly in recent years, important gaps remain -particularly a lack of India-specific micro-level evidence linking loan officers’ risk attitudes, experience and behavioural attributes to standardized decision outcomes. This study is situated to address precisely that gap by combining survey, controlled fictitious-case experiments, and in-depth interviews.

2.1 Bank Asset Quality and Structural Drivers of NPAs (India Focus)

Research on bank stability consistently identifies credit risk as the dominant driver of asset quality problems; macroeconomic shocks, sectoral concentration, weak governance, and lapses in monitoring commonly feature as root causes of non-performing assets (NPAs) (Das 2023). In India, regulatory interventions and resolution mechanisms introduced since the late 2010s (including the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and targeted asset-reconstruction initiatives) have materially reduced headline NPA ratios by 2024–25, but absolute volumes and segmental stresses persist in pockets such as certain MSME cohorts (MSME – Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises), unsecured retail exposures and legacy corporate loans (RBI Financial Stability Report 2024; Government and RBI Implement Comprehensive Framework to Recover and Reduce NPAs, Government of India press release 2025). These India-specific findings underline that while macroprudential tools and provisioning can strengthen balance-sheet resilience, supervision at the point of origination and the quality of loan-level appraisal remain decisive for long-run asset performance (Das 2023).

2.1.1 Implication for this Study

Macro and bank-level remedies are necessary but insufficient. Micro-level behaviour of credit officers at loan origination – how they gather, weight and interpret borrower information – matters for preventing the build-up of future NPAs (Das 2023; RBI 2024).

2.2 Behavioural and Judgemental Determinants of Lending Decisions

A growing behavioural finance literature shows that decision heuristics, risk preferences, framing effects and experience shape how decision makers search for and use information (Camerer 1995; Kahneman et al. 1982). Empirical work across lending contexts – from bank officers to Peer-to-Peer (P2P) platforms – documents systematic biases (for example, order effects in information search, representativeness, and over/under-confidence) that alter sanctioning behaviour and risk-taking (Ayal et al. 2019; Herzenstein et al. 2011). In the Indian context, recent studies on borrower behaviour and financial literacy emphasise heterogeneity in repayment behaviour and present-bias tendencies, which in turn complicate credit assessment (Altaf and Shah 2025). However, few India-centred studies focus directly on credit officers’ cognition: how their risk attitudes correlate with the type, sequence and depth of information they collect, and how experience moderates these relationships. This lacuna persists despite calls for more micro-level evidence linking appraisal processes to outcomes (Altaf and Shah 2025; Maji and Prasad 2025).

2.2.1 Implication for this Study

Behavioural models must be extended from borrower behaviour to lender cognition; controlled experiments and standardized fictitious-case designs are effective for isolating the influence of experience and risk attitude on information acquisition and decision accuracy (Payne 1976; Rosman and O’Neill 1993).

2.3 Algorithmic and Digital Lending: Predictive Gains versus Explainability and Fairness

Machine learning and algorithmic credit models have improved predictive accuracy in many settings (ensemble methods, attention layers, hybrid frameworks and graph neural networks), and they are increasingly deployed in Indian digital-lending ecosystems (Sun et al. 2024; Ning et al. 2025). Yet parallel research highlights that algorithmic systems can reproduce or amplify biases through proxy variables, class imbalance, or unrepresentative training data – creating both ethical and regulatory challenges (Abbas 2025; Barocas and Selbst 2016). Indian regulators and expert committees have intensified scrutiny: recent national-level policy and committee reports emphasise explainability, human-in-the-loop procedures and responsible AI governance for financial services (RBI Free AI Committee Report 2025). At the operational level, several Indian studies of digital lending document fast adoption but also heterogeneity in underwriting standards, customer protections, and monitoring capacities (Asamani and Majumdar 2024).

2.3.1 Implication for this Study

Even as banks deploy better predictive models, human loan officers continue to play a gatekeeping role. Understanding which human attributes (diagnostic skills, domain knowledge, stress-tolerance, etc.) complement algorithmic outputs is essential for effective, fair, and explainable lending systems.

2.4 India-specific Empirical Evidence and Gaps

Recent Indian empirical contributions (Das 2023; India’s Economic Surge 2025; RBI Financial Stability Report 2025) document noteworthy sectoral improvements (falling headline NPA ratios) and rapid technological adoption in origination channels. However, these works leave three micro-level questions under-explored:

  1. How do frontline loan officers integrate algorithmic signals with their own judgements? Survey and case-based studies on digital adoption document model uptake, but few trace the decision pathway from model output to human sanction (Asamani and Majumdar 2024; Ning et al. 2025).

  2. Which personal attributes of loan officers predict higher appraisal quality? Interview-based and experimental literature internationally suggests attributes like diagnostic skill, decisiveness, and perceptiveness matter for expert decision making (Shanteau 1992a); India lacks large-scale empirical prioritisation (this study fills that gap by identifying and ranking 27 attributes via FAHP).

  3. What is the joint effect of experience and risk attitude on information acquisition and decision accuracy? International laboratory and field experiments point to experience moderating bias and information search strategies, but Indian evidence using standardized fictitious cases is scarce (Payne 1976; Rosman and O’Neill 1993).

2.5 Positioning and Contribution of the Present Study

By combining a cross-bank questionnaire (N = 275), controlled fictitious-case experiments (log-file evidence of indicator search), and unstructured in-depth interviews with senior loan officers, this study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it supplies India-centric micro-evidence that connects loan officer-level behaviours to systemic asset quality concerns. Second, it extends behavioural finance by empirically examining how risk attitudes and professional experience jointly shape information acquisition behaviour. Third, by using FAHP to prioritise personal attributes identified through grounded interviews, the study provides actionable guidance for banks seeking to strengthen origination quality in an era of hybrid human-algorithm decision pipelines. To conclude the literature review and to provide a clear empirical roadmap further, the study frames a set of testable hypotheses for three focused research questions.

Research Question 1 (Risk attitude and information search): How do loan officers’ risk attitudes influence the type, sequence and extent of information they acquire when evaluating credit proposals?

Hypotheses for RQ1:

  1. H1: Risk attitude significantly influences the type or extent of information acquired during credit assessment.

Research Question 2 (Experience and decision behaviour): How does professional experience affect lending loan officers’ information-acquisition strategies and final lending decisions (including order effects, information breadth/depth, and inter-rater agreement)?

Hypotheses for RQ1:

  1. H2: Level of experience is significantly related to risk attitude.

  2. H3: Level of experience significantly influences information acquisition behaviour.

  3. H4: Level of experience significantly influences the total amount of information acquired.

  4. H5: With increased experience, loan officers acquire information in a less order-dependent (less passive) manner.

  5. H6: Level of experience significantly influences agreement in lending decisions (degree and direction of consensus).

Research Question 3 (Behavioural attributes): Which behavioural and personal attributes of loan officers (diagnostic ability, knowledge, stress-tolerance, interpersonal skills, etc.) play a decisive role in lending decisions, and how can these attributes be prioritized for recruitment and training?

Exploratory Proposition for RQ2:

  1. P1: Specific behavioural attributes (diagnostic abilities, judgment, knowledge, interpersonal skills, etc.) significantly influence lending decisions.

3 Methodology

This study employs a mixed-methods, multi-stage analytical framework to investigate how loan officers’ behavioural dispositions and professional experience shape information acquisition, judgement, and lending outcomes in the Indian banking context. The design integrates cross-sectional survey data, controlled experimental cases, and qualitative attribute elicitation to examine three empirical dimensions:

  1. the influence of risk attitude on information-acquisition behaviour,

  2. the effect of experience on lending judgement and decision accuracy, and

  3. the behavioural and personal attributes that underlie loan officers’ decision competence.

Each empirical dimension is described in the subsections below, corresponding directly to the analytical structure reported in Section 4.

3.1 Procedure for Analysing the Risk Attitude on Information-Acquisition Behaviour

The first analytical component of this study examines whether the risk attitude of loan officers influences the type, sequence, and extent of information acquired during credit appraisal. A purposive sub-sample of 150 loan officers was selected from an initial pool of 275 respondents representing public, private, and foreign banks in India (Annex 1). The sub-sample was refined based on data completeness, response consistency, and relevance to credit evaluation roles (Annex 2). These participants completed the Questionnaire on Loan officers’ Risk Attitude and Information Acquisition Behaviour (Annex 3), designed to capture both self-reported risk preferences and information-seeking tendencies during loan assessment.

3.1.1 Measurement of Risk Attitude

Risk attitude was measured using a 22-item scale adapted from Hedelin and Sjoberg (1995), derived from the original 28-item instrument to better reflect Indian credit practices (Annex 4). Reliability testing yielded Cronbach’s α = 0.72, indicating acceptable internal consistency for exploratory behavioural research (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). Items captured both risk-averse and risk-seeking orientations in lending contexts, scored on a five-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree). Reverse coding of aversion items produced a composite index where higher scores denoted stronger risk-taking propensity.

3.1.2 Measurement of Information Acquisition

Information-acquisition behaviour was captured through 15 borrower-related categories identified from prior credit-appraisal literature (Annex 5). Respondents rated the probability of consulting each information type on a seven-point scale (0 = Not Probable to 6 = Very Probable). The composite Information variable – the mean across all categories – represented the overall breadth of information used (Cronbach’s α = 0.86).

3.1.3 Analytical Approach

Kendall’s W was first applied to assess inter-rater agreement in the ranking of information categories, followed by the Kruskal-Wallis test to compare information-acquisition patterns across risk-attitude groups (risk-averse, neutral, risk-taking), experience levels, and gender. The objective was to determine whether risk attitude meaningfully alters information search intensity or selectivity.

3.2 Procedure for Analysing the Effect of Experience

The second empirical dimension assessed how professional experience influences loan officers’ information-acquisition strategies and final lending decisions. A subsample of 61 loan officers participated in a controlled fictitious-case experiment (Annex 6), selected from the main survey respondents based on availability and tenure in credit appraisal. Participants were stratified into three predefined experience groups reflecting typical organisational hierarchies:

  1. Out-sourced loan officers (n = 19; 2–5 years’ experience)

  2. Junior loan officers (n = 18; 5–8 years)

  3. Senior loan officers (n = 23; > 8 years)

3.2.1 Experimental Design

Each respondent evaluated two standardised fictitious loan proposals (Annex 6) representing opposite financial profiles:

  1. Case A: Creditworthy borrower (loan ₹ 29.4 lakh)

  2. Case B: Bankrupt borrower (loan ₹ 23.5 lakh)

Both cases contained 74 information indicators (Annex 7) grouped into four categories – balance-sheet indicators (21), financial ratios indicators (25), income-statement indicators (11), and qualitative/non-financial indicators (17). Participants freely selected any indicators before issuing an approval or rejection decision; selections were auto logged (1 = viewed, 0 = not viewed).

3.2.2 Data Derivation

Two dependent variables were constructed:

  1. Information-acquisition breadth: mean proportion of indicators accessed within and across categories.

  2. Order-effect index: Spearman correlation between the sequence of viewed indicators and their presentation order; coefficients ≥ 0.85 signified passive (order-dependent) acquisition.

Decision outcomes (approve/reject) for each case were coded dichotomously to compute Type I and Type II error rates and inter-group consensus (Cramer’s V).

3.2.3 Analytical Techniques

The analysis proceeded in three phases corresponding to hypotheses H3–H6:

  1. Regression Analysis – Multiple regression with Information as dependent variable and Experience, Gender, and Risk Attitude as predictors examined the determinants of self-reported information breadth.

  2. ANOVA/Kruskal–Wallis – Between-group comparisons tested whether experience level significantly affected the number and type of indicators accessed.

  3. Order-Effect and Decision-Outcome Analysis – Spearman rank correlations captured sequence dependence; Chi-square and Cramer’s V measured agreement and bias in final lending decisions.

3.2.4 Measurement Logic

The fictitious-case framework allowed objective observation of decision behaviour under controlled, equivalent information conditions – removing contextual noise inherent in real-case data.

3.3 Procedure for Analysing the Loan officers’ Attributes and Behavioural Factors

The third analytical component sought to identify and prioritise the personal and behavioural attributes that underpin loan officers’ decision competence, bridging cognitive processes (Sections 4.14.2) with professional qualities. A qualitative–quantitative sequential design was adopted.

3.3.1 Phase 1: Identification of Attributes

Unstructured interviews (Annex 8) were conducted with 26 senior loan officers (≥15 years’ experience) across public and private banks. Guided by the grounded-theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967), transcripts were coded to extract recurring themes such as diagnostic ability, sincerity, analytical reasoning, decisiveness, adaptability, and stress-tolerance. This yielded 27 distinct attributes (C1–C27) clustered into four preliminary domains: cognitive capability, basic abilities, interpersonal traits, and behavioural discipline. The complete list of 27 attributes is:

  1. Cognitive Capability

    (Attributes reflecting mental sharpness, analytical thinking, and decision-making skills)

    1. C1. Diagnostic abilities

    2. C2. Assumption of responsibility

    3. C3. Ability to master decision aids

    4. C5. Decisiveness

    5. C11. Information acquiring skill

    6. C12. Intuition

    7. C16. Perceptiveness

    8. C17. Judgement of human nature

    9. C18. Accuracy

    10. C19. Curiosity

    11. C26. Ability to know what is relevant

  2. Basic Abilities

    (Attributes denoting foundational skills and functional competence)

    1. C4. Current knowledge

    2. C6. Energy and interest

    3. C7. Adaptability

    4. C9. Experience

    5. C10. Education

    6. C13. Initiative and creativity

    7. C23. Ability to focus on sales

    8. C25. Being a good teacher

  3. Interpersonal Traits

    (Attributes relating to social competence, empathy, and communication)

    1. C8. Negotiation skills

    2. C14. Stubbornness

    3. C21. Warmth and friendliness

    4. C22. Common sense

    5. C24. Sincerity

    6. C27. Communication skills

  4. Behavioural Discipline

    (Attributes reflecting reliability, emotional control, and professional attitude)

    1. C15. Stress tolerance

    2. C20. Reliability

3.3.2 Phase 2: Survey Administration and FAHP Application

A structured questionnaire (Annex 9) was then distributed to 337 respondents – 155 senior loan officers and 182 outsourced loan officers – who rated each attribute’s importance on a seven-point Likert scale. The two-group design facilitated both between-group and within-group analyses of perceived attribute significance. Further, the 27 attributes identified in the interview phase were subsequently refined and prioritised using the Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (FAHP) to assess their relative importance in credit decision-making.

3.3.3 Phase 3: Quantitative Analyses

  1. Between-Group Comparison (Kruskal–Wallis): tested inter-group differences in importance rankings.

  2. Within-Group Consensus (Split-Sample Replication): assessed intra-group homogeneity by correlating half-sample response profiles (r̄ = 0.16 for seniors; r̄ = 0.32 for outsourced loan officers).

  3. FAHP Prioritisation: To derive relative weights, the Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process combined pairwise-comparison matrices with triangular fuzzy numbers (l, m, u). All consistency ratios (CR < 0.10) confirmed logical coherence.

3.3.4 Phase 4: Model Development

Synthesising the attribute hierarchy with behavioural findings from Sections 4.14.2 yielded the Loan officer Decision Competence Model (LODCM). The LODCM conceptualises decision competence as an interaction among:

  1. Cognitive inputs (risk attitude, experience),

  2. Information-processing behaviours (acquisition breadth, order, and judgement), and

  3. Underlying personal attributes (capability, abilities, volitional control).

This integrative model connects who the loan officer is, with how the loan officer thinks and what decisions are ultimately made, providing a comprehensive behavioural framework for credit-risk appraisal.

Collectively, these three methodological components – risk-attitude analysis, experience-based experimentation, and attribute prioritisation – establish the empirical foundation for the behavioural findings presented in Section 4. The next section discusses the results of these analyses and synthesises them into the Loan officer Decision Competence Model.

4 Empirical Results and Discussion

Our study examines three important aspects of the judgement & decision-making behaviour of loan officers: (i) risk attitude on information acquisition behaviour, (ii) effect of experience on lending and (iii) attributes of senior loan officers; in credit risk assessment process followed for bank lending purposes. Thus, from judgement & decision-making of loan officer’s viewpoint empirical results are exhibited in following three parts:

4.1 Analysing the impact of risk attitude on information acquisition behaviour

4.2 Analysing the effect of experience

4.3 Analysing the Loan officer’s Attributes & behavioural factors

4.1 Analysing the Impact of Risk Attitude on Information Acquisition Behaviour

Hypothesis 1:

Risk attitude significantly influences the type or extent of information acquired during credit assessment

This section examines whether the risk attitude of loan officers influences the type and extent of information they acquire during the credit appraisal process (Hypothesis 1). A purposive sub-sample of 150 loan officers was drawn from an initial pool of 275 respondents representing public, private, and foreign banks operating in the Delhi–NCR region (Annex 1: Sample Bank Selection and Respondent Distribution).

The reduction to 150 participants was based on data completeness, consistency of responses, and relevance to credit appraisal roles (Annex 2: Sub-Sample Construction). These participants completed the Questionnaire on Loan officers’ Risk Attitude and Information Acquisition Behaviour (Annex 3), which captured both self-reported risk preferences and tendencies toward specific categories of information used in lending decisions.

The measurement of risk attitude was based on the 22-item adapted scale (Annex 4: Derivation of Risk Attitude Scale), while information-acquisition behaviour was operationalised through 15 borrower-related information sets (Annex 5: Derivation of Information Sets). Together, these instruments enabled the assessment of how differing levels of risk attitude shape the type, sequence, and extent of information acquired during credit evaluation. The indicators examined included financial variables, qualitative business assessments, and contextual factors concerning the borrower’s operational and management profile (Figure 1).

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the frequency of acquisition of these information categories. The information categories were ranked in descending order of mean usage. As shown, financial statements (M = 4.69, SD = 1.29), banking track record (M = 4.30, SD = 1.39), and technical evaluation of the project (M = 3.92, SD = 1.62) emerged as the most frequently acquired categories, reflecting the central reliance of loan officers on core financial and historical repayment data during credit assessment. In contrast, semi-annual reports, manufacturing process information, and management team details were least consulted, suggesting that deeper organizational appraisal is less frequently emphasised.

Figure 1: 
Mean ratings of the frequency of information acquisition on a seven-point scale (0 = not probable to 6 = very probable). Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 1:

Mean ratings of the frequency of information acquisition on a seven-point scale (0 = not probable to 6 = very probable). Source: Author’s calculations.

Table 1:

Items of information variable expository (N = 159).

Rank Information category Narrative description Mean SD
1 Financial statements Annual accounting details 4.69 1.29
2 Banking track record Earlier payment behaviour 4.30 1.39
3 Technical evaluation of projects Extensive and updated technical report on the project 3.92 1.62
4 Collateral Creditors’ means for securing their claims 3.52 1.43
5 Quality of cash flows Details of earnings in cash 3.48 1.70
6 Industry statistics Conditional statistics and financial ratios 3.29 1.40
7 Competence in company Client’s know-how and capability 2.99 1.67
8 References Testimonials regarding creditworthiness 2.40 1.44
9 Overall subsidiary analysis Analysis of sister concerns/affiliated businesses 1.51 1.47
10 Existing debt load Borrower’s leverage position 1.50 1.61
11 Size of the company Net worth of the client firm 1.29 1.36
12 Schedule of implementation Phase-wise progress report of the project 1.30 1.44
13 Management team Background and experience of management 1.16 1.55
14 Manufacturing process Technical process employed in the financed project 1.11 1.47
15 Semi-annual reports Quarterly accounting statements 1.10 1.31
  1. Note: Ranks are assigned based on descending Mean values, where higher means represent information items more frequently obtained or emphasized during the credit appraisal process. Table Source: Author Calculations.

4.1.1 Interpreting Kendall’s W (Inter-Rater Agreement)

The Information variable, representing the average breadth of information acquisition across the 15 categories, yielded a mean of 2.45, indicating that on average, respondents used approximately 49 % of the available information during credit assessment (Table 2). The Kendall’s W = 0.37 indicates a moderate level of inter-rater agreement among loan officers. In this context, inter-rater agreement refers to the degree of similarity in how different loan officers rank and prioritise information categories. The W value closer to 1 would imply strong consensus; hence, the result shows that while loan officers share some common preferences (e.g. financial statements are widely emphasised), considerable individual variation remains in how information is weighted during appraisal.

Table 2:

Information variable expository (N = 159).

Variable SD Mean Minimum Maximum Kendall’s W
Information 0.94 2.45 0.94 5.00 0.37
  1. Note: The Information variable is an average composite score across 15 borrower-related information categories (see Annex 5), each measured on a seven-point scale (0 = Not Probable, 6 = Very Probable). It reflects the mean degree of information acquisition, not a raw sum of items. Table Source: Author Calculations.

4.1.2 Formation of Information Acquisition Groups

To further benchmark information acquisition behaviour, respondents were categorised into three groups:

  1. Low information acquirers

  2. Moderate information acquirers

  3. High information acquirers

These groups were generated using a tertile split of the composite information variable. That is, the distribution of scores across respondents was divided into three equal segments. This standard classification approach enables comparative analysis without imposing subjective thresholds and is widely applied in behavioural research. Among high information acquirers, the three most emphasised information types remained the same: financial statements, banking track record, and technical evaluation reports.

4.1.3 Experience Categories Clarification

The experience groups referenced in subsequent analysis were based on years of professional credit appraisal experience, as documented in the respondents’ profiles:

  1. Low Experience – 2–5 years of professional experience – Early-stage procedural learning phase.

  2. Moderate experience – 5–8 years of professional experience – Stable operational and evaluative competence development.

  3. High experience – Greater than 8 years of professional experience – Advanced lending judgement and institutional expertise.

These categories reflect established progression stages in credit appraisal roles, consistent with HR grading and training pathways in Indian banking institutions.

4.1.4 Kruskal–Wallis Results

The Kruskal–Wallis test was applied to determine whether risk attitude groups (risk-averse, risk-neutral, risk-taking), experience levels, and gender differed in their information acquisition behaviour (Table 3). The analysis revealed no statistically significant differences across risk attitude groups in terms of the type of information acquired; thus, Hypothesis 1 was rejected.

Table 3:

Mean values of the tests by Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric method (N = 159) showing information variables’ items.

Type of information Risk tendency Experience Gender
A B C D E F Male Female
n = 54 n = 49 n = 56 n = 55 n = 68 n = 36 n = 111 n = 48
Financial statements 4.67 4.16 4.62 4.76 4.39 4.32 4.44 4.63
Industry statistics 4.37 4.08 3.86 4.52 3.78 3.91 4.09 4.13
Manufacturing process 3.63 4.04 3.52 3.97 3.67 3.53 3.70 3.75
Size of the company 3.56 3.56 3.76 4.03 3.22 3.50 3.51 3.92
Existing debt load 3.48 3.40 3.69 3.90 3.39 3.29 3.49 3.63
Quality of cash flows 3.37 3.44 3.62 3.44 3.33 3.68 3.44 3.58
Banking track record 3.04 3.40 3.76 4.00 3.11 3.06* 3.21 3.88
Management team 2.93 3.16 2.52 3.45 2.17 2.71** 2.89 2.75
Schedule of implementation 3.00 2.64 2.76 3.10 2.50 2.71 2.65 3.17
Collateral 2.93 2.76 2.69 3.03 2.50 2.74 2.79 2.79
References 2.48 2.52 2.31 2.66 1.78 2.59 2.47 2.33
Technical evaluation of the projects 1.96 2.52 2.76 2.76 1.89 2.41 2.37 2.54
Semi-annual reports 1.59 1.52 1.62 1.76 1.22 1.62 1.42 1.96*
Overall subsidiary analysis 1.26 1.44 1.79 1.90 1.11 1.38 1.35 1.88*
Competence in company 1.59 1.32 1.07 1.48 1.39 1.15 1.30 1.38
  1. Note: A = risk aversive loan officers, B = risk neutral loan officers, C = risk taking loan officers. D = 2–5 years of experience, E = 5–8 years of experience, F = more than 8 years of experience * p < 0.10 **p < 0.05. Table Source: Author Calculations.

For measuring risk attitudes, the study employed a modified 22-item scale refer Table 4 (derived from Hedelin and Sjoberg 1995) adapted from the original 28-item instrument. The full list of items, along with retained and excluded items, is provided in Annex 5: Derivation of 22-Item Risk Attitude Scale. Reliability analysis of the adapted 22-item Risk Attitude Scale yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.72, indicating acceptable internal consistency. This suggests that the retained items are sufficiently correlated and measure a common underlying construct – the risk attitude of loan officers. Given that values above 0.70 are generally considered acceptable for behavioural and social science research (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994; Hair et al. 2010), the scale was deemed reliable for further analysis.

Table 4:

The 22 items included in the risk attitude measurement questionnaire.

Risk-averting propensity (RA) Risk-taking propensity (RT)
2. Risk-taking as regards business is always a bad thing. 1. If one is not willing to take calculated risks in business, one cannot make any large profits.
3. My philosophy when it comes to risks in business is simply: I never take any. 4. To take a businesslike risk is acceptable if one has carefully analysed the situation.
6. Skilful loan officers never take any risks. 5. To take a risk is not so hazardous – it is a necessary moment in credit risk assessment.
7. Risks and credits are incompatible concepts. 8. The hazard with risk-taking in credit granting is generally overestimated.
12. One can only take risks when small amounts are at stake. 9. When I have taken risks, the outcomes have almost always been positive.
14. I do everything to make sure that the risks for the firm are as low as possible. 10. It is quite all right that the firm takes a risk given that it has balanced it against a high return or demanded collateral.
18. Risk-taking is nothing for me – other people can deal with that. 11. One should not be afraid of taking risks.
13. Many times it is unnecessary to check the applicant’s creditworthiness.
15. If more loan officers were willing to take certain risks, the economy of the country would be in a better state.
16. I never hesitate about an application for credit for the reason that it implies a risk – I think of other aspects.
17. One should not ponder much when faced with a risky decision.
19. The importance of risks is generally over-estimated when credit granting is discussed.
20. There is a moment of gaming and excitement associated with risk-taking.
21. In general, one should dare to risk a couple of percent of the turnover.
22. It is quite all right that the firm takes a risk if it has balanced it against a credit insurance.
  1. Note: Items marked RA represent risk-averting (risk-averse) attitudes, while items marked RT represent risk-taking propensities. Responses were rated on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree, with the midpoint (3) labelled neutral. RA items were reverse scored for analysis. Table Source: Author’s identification based on questionnaire development.

The classification of respondents into risk groups was based on questionnaire responses (see Annex 1 & Annex 3), yielding three categories:

  1. Risk-averse loan officers (n = 54),

  2. Risk-neutral loan officers (n = 49), and

  3. Risk-taking loan officers (n = 56).

Kruskal–Wallis test results (Table 3) showed no significant differences across these risk-attitude groups regarding the type of information acquired, leading to the rejection of Hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 2:

Relationship Between Experience and Risk Attitude

To examine whether varying levels of professional experience influence the degree of risk attitude among loan officers, the sample was classified into three pre-defined groups, as detailed earlier in Section 3.2 (Procedure for Analysing the Effect of Experience). These groupings were established based on the respondents’ professional designations and years of experience in credit appraisal, reflecting the structured hierarchy commonly observed in Indian banking institutions.

Accordingly, the sample comprised:

  1. Out-sourced loan officers (representing less experienced officers with approximately 2–5 years of experience; n 1 = 58, M = 33.45),

  2. Junior loan officers (those with 5–8 years of experience engaged in regular credit evaluations; n 2 = 68, M = 43.44), and

  3. Senior loan officers (highly experienced officers with over 8 years of expertise, often responsible for final credit decisions; n 3 = 36, M = 46.15).

The Kruskal–Wallis non-parametric test was applied to assess whether differences in experience levels were associated with significant variations in risk attitude. The observed chi-square statistic (χ2 = 4.82, p = 0.09) did not reach the conventional threshold for statistical significance, indicating that experience does not have a decisive effect on risk attitude. Although the mean ranks suggest a gradual increase in risk tolerance with greater professional exposure, the result was not statistically meaningful. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was rejected.

Nevertheless, the results reveal an important behavioural tendency: less experienced loan officers tend to acquire and utilise a broader range of information during the credit assessment process. Initially, no statistically significant contrasts were observed in the Information variable across the three experience groups (mean ranks = 47.8, 34.4, and 38.6; p = 0.12; χ2 = 4.18). However, a negative correlation between risk attitude and information acquisition (r = −0.336, p < 0.01) confirmed that more risk-averse loan officers are inclined to seek additional information before finalising lending decisions. It is inferred that less experienced loan officers have demonstrated more enthusiasm to discover information about the potential outcomes of requesting protections and securities (mean rank 50.16, 30.93, and 38.51, p = 0.02, = 8.39) and more prominently utilised industry measurements and statistics (mean position 48.47, 39.19, and 34.49, p = 0.08, = 5.16).

To further analyse behavioural heterogeneity, the study also examined gender-based variations in risk attitude and information utilisation. The overall mean ranks for risk attitude (44.46 and 32.77, respectively) indicated no significant gender-based difference in general risk orientation, implying that both groups demonstrated comparable levels of caution and risk-taking tendencies. However, gender-based differences emerged in the type of information emphasised during the credit appraisal process. Female loan officers displayed greater diligence in analysing existing debt load (χ2 = 2.89; p = 0.09; mean ranks = 38.20 and 47.65) and paid heightened attention to overall subsidiary analysis (χ2 = 3.05; p = 0.08; mean ranks = 38.13 and 47.81). These patterns suggest that, while female and male loan officers share similar overall risk orientations, female loan officers demonstrate stronger analytical engagement with financial stability indicators, particularly debt exposure and inter-firm linkages, reflecting a more cautious and detail-oriented approach to risk assessment.

Summarising this section, the results indicate that neither experience nor gender produces statistically significant differences in overall risk attitude, yet both variables reveal meaningful behavioural distinctions in information acquisition patterns. Less experienced loan officers rely more heavily on diverse data sources, while female loan officers exhibit deeper scrutiny of borrower stability indicators, together reflecting nuanced approaches to managing credit risk under uncertainty.

4.2 Analysing the Effect of Experience

4.2.1 Hypothesis 3: Level of Experience Significantly Influences Information Acquisition Behaviour

To further investigate the determinants of information acquisition behaviour, a multiple linear regression model was employed, where the Information variable served as the dependent variable, and Experience, Gender, and Risk Attitude were included as independent variables. The Gender variable was coded as binary (female = 1; male = 0), while Experience and Risk Attitude were treated as continuous predictors. Preliminary diagnostic tests confirmed that the model satisfied all key assumptions, including normality of residuals, absence of multicollinearity, lack of autocorrelation, and homoscedasticity, thereby validating the robustness of the regression results. The detailed regression coefficients are presented in Table 5, while Table 6 provides the corresponding correlation matrix for the variables incorporated in the model.

Table 5:

Multiple regression analysis taking dependent variable as information and independent variables as experience, gender and risk attitude (N = 159).

Variable Beta weight Standard error Standardised beta weight
(Constant) 2.451** 0.839
Experience −0.035** 0.013 −0.344**
Gender 0.081 0.202 0.046
Risk attitude 0.294 0.241 0.132
Adjusted R2 0.92
  1. Note: 1. Gender was coded as a binary variable (0 = Male & 1 = Female). 2. Risk Attitude & Experience are considered as continuous variables. 3. **p < 0.01. Table Source: Author Calculations.

Table 6:

Correlation matrix of variables incorporated in regression model.

1 2 3 4
Information variable 1.000
Risk attitude 0.082 ***1.000
Experience −0.336 0.155 1.000
Gender 0.145 −0.263 **0.070 1.000
  1. Notes: **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01. Table Source: Author Calculations.

4.2.2 Construction of the Dependent Variable

The Information variable represents the overall extent of information acquisition behaviour exhibited by loan officers during the credit evaluation process. It was derived by averaging the self-reported frequency ratings across 15 borrower-related information categories (see Annex 5: Derivation of 15 Information Sets). Each category was rated on a seven-point probability scale, ranging from Not Probable (0) to Very Probable (6), indicating the likelihood that an loan officer would obtain that specific type of information during a credit appraisal. The composite score, calculated as the mean of these 15 items, thus reflects the breadth and depth of information acquisition by each respondent. A higher score corresponds to more extensive and detailed information-gathering behaviour. The reliability of this composite index was confirmed to be strong, with a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.86, signifying high internal consistency among the 15 items.

4.2.3 Regression Results

Table 5 presents the results of the multiple regression analysis using Information as the dependent variable and Experience, Gender, and Risk Attitude as predictors.

4.2.4 Correlation Analysis

To assess potential interrelationships among the study variables, a correlation matrix was generated and is presented in Table 6.

The regression model explains approximately 92 % of the variance (Adjusted R2 = 0.92) in information acquisition behaviour, indicating a strong explanatory power. Among the predictors, Experience exhibited a significant negative effect on information acquisition (β = –0.035; p < 0.01), suggesting that as professional experience increases, the breadth of information acquisition tends to decline. This pattern supports earlier findings that less experienced loan officers compensate for limited practical exposure by gathering more extensive data to minimise perceived uncertainty.

Neither Gender (β = 0.081; p > 0.05) nor Risk Attitude (β = 0.294; p > 0.05) emerged as significant predictors of information acquisition, indicating that while individual differences in gender and risk preference exist, they do not significantly alter the overall information-acquisition pattern. Collectively, these results demonstrate that experience exerts a significant inverse influence on the scope of information acquisition, while gender and risk attitude show limited explanatory relevance.

The next section extends this analysis by examining the role of loan officers’ experience in credit-granting decisions through controlled fictitious case scenarios (Annex 6).

4.2.5 Examining the Role of Loan officers’ Experience in Credit-Granting Decisions Through Controlled Fictitious Case Scenarios

This segment is organised in two parts: (A) Decision Framing and (B) Decision Making. The first part (Decision Framing) examines how loan officers frame and process information during loan evaluation, while the second part (Decision Making) reports on the final lending decisions and the insights drawn from the post-assessment questionnaire.

4.2.6 Clarification of Computation and Interpretation

The fictitious-case analysis (Annex 6 & 7) was conducted with a subsample of 61 loan officers (selected as per availability) drawn from the broader dataset. These respondents were divided into three pre-defined experience categories based on their professional designations and tenure in credit appraisal:

  1. Out-sourced Loan officers (n = 19) – typically 2–5 years of experience.

  2. Junior Loan officers (n = 18) – 5–8 years of experience.

  3. Senior Loan officers (n = 23) – over 8 years of experience.

Each respondent was asked to assess two standardised fictitious loan applications, one from a financially sound firm (Case A) and another from a financially distressed firm (Case B).

Each case contained 74 discrete information indicators, systematically grouped into four categories:

  1. Balance Sheet Indicators (21 items)

  2. Financial Ratios (25 items)

  3. Income Statement Indicators (11 items)

  4. Qualitative Information (17 items)

During each case evaluation, loan officers could freely select which indicators they wished to consult before making a sanction or rejection decision. The system automatically recorded their selections as binary entries (1 = indicator viewed; 0 = indicator not viewed). The mean proportion of indicators accessed within each category was then computed for every participant, and the results were averaged across each experience group.

For example, when the mean value for Balance Sheet indicators among out-sourced loan officers is 0.63, it implies that on average, 63 % of the 21 available balance-sheet indicators were consulted. This equates to approximately 13 indicators per respondent (0.63 × 21 ≈ 13). Hence, the “mean total number of acquired indicators” represents the average count of all indicators accessed by the respondents within each experience category out of the 74 available indicators.

4.2.7 Interpretation of Results

Contrary to the earlier regression results (Section 4.2.1), where less experienced loan officers appeared to acquire more information in self-reported data, the fictitious-case experiment revealed an opposite trend. Here, senior loan officers accessed significantly more indicators (M = 65.13, SD = 8.02) than both junior (M = 55.11) and out-sourced loan officers (M = 48.22). This discrepancy arises from the difference in measurement context. In the survey data, information acquisition was self-reported, reflecting perceived rather than actual behaviour. In the fictitious-case experiment, information acquisition was objectively logged from participants’ real-time selections, capturing behavioural evidence rather than attitudinal responses. Senior loan officers’ broader information retrieval in the experimental setting likely reflects their greater cognitive organisation, domain knowledge, and confidence in filtering relevant data rather than superficial search behaviour.

Furthermore, statistically significant pairwise differences (noted by superscripts in Table 7) indicate that senior loan officers accessed a higher proportion of balance-sheet and income-statement indicators than the other groups. These two categories are considered critical for credit evaluation accuracy, suggesting that experience refines not only the amount but also the quality and selectivity of information acquired.

Table 7:

Mean number of information indicators acquired across experience groups in fictitious cases (see Annex 4).

Out-sourced loan officers (n = 19) Junior loan officers (n = 18) Senior loan officers (n = 23)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Total number of acquired indicators 48.22 18.63 55.11 15.24 65.13 ab 8.02
Balance sheet 0.63 0.31 0.86 c 0.19 0.93 a 0.1
Income statement 0.67 0.32 0.82 0.22 0.92 ab 0.15
Financial ratio 0.57 0.3 0.56 0.34 0.81 0.19
Qualitative information 0.78 0.24 0.82 0.18 0.89 a 0.17
  1. Notes: 1. There were no statistically significant differences between the two fictitious loan cases, as indicated by Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. 2. Superscripts indicate significant pairwise differences (post-hoc Tamhane test): abetween Out-sourced and Senior loan officers, bbetween Junior and Senior loan officers, cbetween Out-sourced and Junior loan officers. Table Source: Author Calculations.

Overall, Table 7 demonstrates that professional experience affects both the breadth and strategic focus of information acquisition under controlled decision environments. Although the self-report data (Table 5) suggested declining breadth with experience, the experimental findings reveal that senior loan officers’ information use is broader yet more targeted, consistent with the cognitive-expertise literature (Payne 1976; Rosman and O’Neill 1993).

4.2.8 Section A: Decision Framing

Hypothesis 4:

The level of experience significantly influences the number of information indicators acquired

In line with the cognitive view of experts, but contrary to the common-sense notion that greater experience necessarily increases data collection, this hypothesis posits that with rising professional experience, the volume of information acquired tends to decline, while relevance and efficiency of information use increase. The underlying rationale is that experienced loan officers rely on schematic knowledge structures and pattern recognition to focus on diagnostically valuable cues, thereby avoiding redundant data processing.

Accordingly, it was expected that junior and senior loan officers – as compared to out-sourced loan officers – would demonstrate higher proficiency in selecting key indicators from the total pool of information categories summarised in Table 6. Furthermore, the smaller within-group variance among senior and junior loan officers was anticipated to indicate a greater degree of uniformity and consensus in their approach to data acquisition, in contrast to the wider variability observed among the out-sourced group, who typically lack consistent exposure to formal credit appraisal routines.

To empirically test this proposition, repeated-measures ANOVA models were applied to the total volume of information acquired and separately to each of the four information categories. Each model included:

  1. one within-subjects variable (loan case: Case A vs. Case B),

  2. one between-subjects variable (level of experience: out-sourced, junior, senior), and

  3. the interaction term between experience and loan case.

For this study the ANOVA model tested the following relationship through a contingent measure:[1]

Contingent Measure = Years of Experience + Loan Case + Years of Experience × Loan Case

4.2.9 Results of ANOVA Tests

The first ANOVA, with the total volume of information acquired as the dependent variable, revealed a statistically significant between-subjects effect of experience level, F(2, 53) = 6.33, p < 0.01, MS = 2,683.58, while other effects were non-significant. A conservative post hoc analysis (Tamhane’s test) identified the following pairwise differences:

  1. Senior loan officers acquired significantly more information than junior loan officers (mean difference = 10.03, p = 0.05) and out-sourced loan officers (mean difference = 16.91, p < 0.01).

  2. The difference between junior and out-sourced loan officers was not statistically significant.

These results suggest that although information quantity does not increase linearly with experience, senior loan officers exhibit a distinct behavioural pattern, combining higher total acquisition with greater discrimination in indicator selection.

4.2.10 Category-wise ANOVA Results

Subsequent analyses examined the proportion of acquired indicators within each of the four information categories. The results revealed significance between-subjects effects for several categories are:

  1. Balance Sheet Indicators: MS = 0.89, F(2, 53) = 9.60, p < 0.001

  2. Income Statement Indicators: MS = 0.57, F(2, 53) = 4.95, p = 0.01

  3. Financial Ratio Indicators: MS = 0.76, F(2, 53) = 4.78, p = 0.01

  4. Qualitative Information Indicators: MS = 0.42, F(2, 53) = 3.16, p = 0.04

In addition, a significant interaction effect between loan case and experience group was observed for the Balance Sheet category, MS = 0.03, F(2, 53) = 2.94, p = 0.02, implying that the selection pattern of balance-sheet indicators differed depending on both the credit case and the level of professional experience. The remaining interactions across the other three categories were non-significant, suggesting that the observed effects were primarily driven by experience rather than by contextual case differences.

Post hoc Tamhane’s pairwise comparisons revealed the following statistically significant differences among the experience groups:

  1. Senior versus Junior loan officers: greater analytical depth in Financial Ratio indicators (mean difference = 0.25, p = 0.03).

  2. Senior versus Out-sourced loan officers: higher emphasis on Balance Sheet indicators (mean difference = 0.30, p = 0.003).

  3. Junior versus Out-sourced loan officers: stronger focus on Balance Sheet indicators (mean difference = 0.22, p = 0.04).

  4. Senior versus Out-sourced loan officers: modest but significant difference in Qualitative Information acquisition (mean difference = 0.17, p = 0.05).

These outcomes collectively indicate that as experience increases, loan officers tend to rely more on quantitatively verifiable financial data (balance sheet, ratios, income statements), while also maintaining limited but meaningful attention to qualitative assessments such as managerial competence or project feasibility.

4.2.11 Interpretation and Theoretical Implications

The ANOVA findings indicate that experience significantly affects the structure rather than the volume of information acquisition. Senior loan officers exhibited both higher overall indicator use and greater focus on financial statement data, while out-sourced loan officers displayed wider variability and less consistent depth of analysis. These outcomes align with the cognitive-expertise theory, which asserts that experts rely on mental schemas and pattern-based recognition to efficiently navigate complex data environments (Chi et al. 1988). Experienced loan officers appear to activate well-organised cognitive frameworks that allow them to identify the most relevant signals (e.g. balance sheet stability, financial ratios), whereas less experienced officers tend to gather data more diffusely, reflecting exploratory rather than diagnostic behaviour.

Therefore, although the hypothesis assumed a reduction in total information volume with experience, the empirical results revealed the opposite: experienced loan officers acquire a broader yet more selective range of information. This nuance underscores that expertise in credit analysis does not necessarily entail less data use, but rather more strategic and cognitively efficient data acquisition.

Consequently, Hypothesis 4 is rejected, as experience did not reduce information acquisition volume; instead, it enhances the precision, hierarchy, and cognitive organisation of information processing.

Hypothesis 5:

Experience and Order Effects in Information Acquisition

Building on the cognitive-expertise framework, Hypothesis 5 explored whether increasing professional experience influences how loan officers access information, specifically their tendency to follow the order in which data were presented. According to cognitive models of skilled behaviour (Chi et al. 1988; Newell and Simon 1972), out-sourced loan officers often engage in passive information acquisition – sequentially reviewing data as presented, whereas senior loan officers demonstrate active acquisition, selectively reorganising or prioritising data according to relevance.[2] , [3] Hence, the hypothesis posited that with growing experience, loan officers would rely less on passive order-following and exhibit greater flexibility in information search sequences (Table 8).[4]

The results showed consistently high median order-effect correlations across all experience levels and both loan cases. Median rs values generally ranged between 0.70 and 1.00, indicating strong order-following behaviour. The number of participants classified as “passive” (rs ≥ 0.85) was also comparable across groups – between 13 and 19 in most categories. No statistically significant group differences were observed, meaning senior and junior loan officers exhibited similar order-dependence patterns as out-sourced loan officers. Even though senior officers demonstrated higher selectivity in what information they used (as shown under Hypothesis 4), they did not differ in how they navigated the information sequence. The high order-effect correlations across all experience groups suggest that the majority of loan officers, regardless of expertise, tend to follow the structured order of data presentation. This pattern indicates a shared reliance on procedural conformity rather than self-directed exploration.

Several institutional and cognitive factors may explain this uniformity:

  1. Standardised documentation formats and credit evaluation templates in banks encourage linear review sequences.

  2. System interfaces used for credit appraisal often enforce stepwise navigation (e.g. tab-by-tab or form-by-form data input).

  3. Audit and compliance protocols reward procedural accuracy over creative sequencing.

Thus, rather than reflecting cognitive limitation, the persistence of passive acquisition may indicate adaptive conformity – a rational strategy within regulated lending environments where consistency and traceability are valued. Overall, the analysis finds no significant difference in order-following behaviour across experience groups. The expected negative relationship between experience and passive information acquisition was not supported. Therefore, Hypothesis 5 is rejected. Experience enhances content discrimination but does not alter the sequence control of information use. Loan officers – irrespective of their experience level – continue to process information largely in the order presented, reflecting institutional standardisation and procedural discipline rather than cognitive passivity.

Table 8:

Order-effect correlations indicating passive information acquisition across experience groups in fictitious cases (see Annex 4).

Out-sourced loan officers (n = 19) Junior loan officers (n = 18) Senior loan officers (n = 23)
Median SD Passive Median SD Passive Median SD Passive
Case 1

Balance sheet −0.12 0.69 5 1.00 0.63 13 0.73 0.57 11
Income report a 1.00 0.45 18 1.00 0.41 19 1.00 0.29 21
Financial ratios 0.42 0.51 11 0.80 0.56 14 a 0.32 0.55 16
Qualitative information 0.73 0.30 18 1.00 0.40 19 0.96 0.24 21
Case 2

Balance sheet a 0.02 0.67 6 0.87 0.67 13 1.01 0.41 13
Income report 0.99 0.49 18 1.00 0.50 19 1.00 0.41 21
Financial ratios 0.39 0.52 13 b 0.81 0.60 14 a 0.82 0.42 19
Qualitative information 0.93 0.45 18 0.99 0.43 19 0.96 0.28 21
  1. Notes: 1Table shows the order effects measured as correlation coefficients indicating Median, Standard Deviation and Respondents number showing Passive Information acquisition Behaviour. 2Calculation of Order effect is done by correlating the pattern of acquiring information indicators for each subject with the order the indicators appeared within each category of information. 3Passive Information Acquisition Behaviour (Mentioned ‘Passive’ in the table) here means acquiring information indicators in the order as they are presented. 4Number of Participants with Passive Information Acquisition Behaviour are selected with Coefficient of Correlation exceeding 0.85. 5‘a’ denotes a value which is missing because a respondent was not acquiring any indicators in a particular category of information. 6‘b’ denotes two values which are missing because two respondents were not acquiring any indicators in a particular category of information. Table Source: Author Calculations.

4.2.12 Section B – Decision Making

Hypothesis 6:

Experience and Consensus in Final Lending Decisions

The Decision-Making stage forms the second analytical phase of the fictitious-case experiment introduced under Decision Framing (see Section 4.2.1). While the first stage examined how loan officers framed their lending evaluations, through patterns of information acquisition (Hypotheses 4 and 5), the present section investigates how those framed judgments translated into final credit decisions. This transition from framing to making decisions allows direct observation of how experiential differences influence loan-approval behaviour, inter-group agreement, and decision accuracy when the same evidence base is available to all participants. Grounded in behavioural decision theory (Einhorn and Hogarth 2003; Slovic 1987), Hypothesis 6 postulate that experience level would significantly influence the degree of agreement and accuracy in final lending decisions.

To test this, participants were asked to make approval or rejection decisions for two standardised fictitious loan applications (Annex 6):

  1. Case A: a financially sound firm (creditworthy) – the correct decision is approval.

  2. Case B: a financially distressed firm (bankrupt) – the correct decision is rejection.

Respondents were grouped by experience level: Out-sourced, Junior, and Senior loan officers.

4.2.13 Analytical Design and Measures

Each respondent’s two binary decisions (approve/reject) yield a four-box decision matrix, analogous to a confusion matrix:

  1. Type I Error (False Positive): Approving a loan for a bankrupt firm (over-optimism).

  2. Type II Error (False Negative): Rejecting a loan for a creditworthy firm (over-cautiousness).

These two error types indicate opposite behavioural tendencies: risk-seeking (Type I) versus risk-averse (Type II).

Further, Chi-square tests, Cramer’s V, and error rates were used to test for group-wise differences in decision consistency and bias. Table 9 shows the descriptive statistics and crosstab results (Table 10).

Table 9:

Four-box decision matrix.

Case B rejected (correct) Case B approved (incorrect)
Case A approved (correct) True positive (accurate approval) False positive (type I error)
Case A rejected (incorrect) False negative (type II error) True negative (double rejection)
Table 10:

Distribution of lending decisions across experience groups for both fictitious cases.

Experience group Case A (creditworthy) – approved Case A (creditworthy) – rejected Case B (bankrupt) – approved Case B (bankrupt) – rejected Total decisions
Out-sourced (n = 19) 4 (21.1 %) 15 (78.9 %) 17 (89.5 %) 2 (10.5 %) 38
Junior (n = 18) 4 (22.2 %) 14 (77.8 %) 12 (66.7 %) 6 (33.3 %) 36
Senior (n = 23) 2 (8.7 %) 21 (91.3 %) 11 (47.8 %) 12 (52.2 %) 46
  1. Table Source: Author’s Calculations.

Table 11:

Distribution of lending decisions across experience groups based on fictitious cases.

Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson chi-square 21.876a 1 0.000
Continuity correction b 20.375 1 0.000
Likelihood ratio 21.338 1 0.000
Fisher’s exact test 0.000 0.000
Linear-by-linear association 21.838 1 0.000
N of valid cases 61
  1. a0 Cells (0.0 %) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 16.76. bOnly Continuity correction is computed for a 2 × 2 table. Table Source: Author Calculations (Table 11).

A Chi-square test confirmed significant differences in decision outcomes across experience groups:

Cramer’s V = 0.35 (p = 0.03) indicates a moderate association between experience group and lending decision (see Table 12).

Table 12:

Chi-square and Cramer’s V results for lending decisions across experience groups using fictitious cases (see Annex 4).

Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by nominal phia 0.03 0.000
Cramer’s Vb 0.35 0.000
N of valid cases 61
  1. aNot assuming the null hypothesis. bUsing the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. Table Source: Author Calculations.

The actual outcomes of the fictitious firms were known. Accuracy and bias were analysed using separate four-box matrices for each experience group (Table 13a–c).

Table 13a:

Out-sourced loan officers (n = 19): decision accuracy matrix.

Case B rejected (correct) Case B approved (incorrect)
Case A approved (correct) 0 4
Case A rejected (incorrect) 2 13
  1. Type I Error (False Positive): 4/19 = 21.1 %. Type II Error (False Negative): 2/19 = 10.5 %. Overall Accuracy: (0 + 13)/19 = 68.4 %.

Table 13b:

Junior Loan officers (n = 18): Decision accuracy matrix.

Case B rejected (correct) Case B approved (incorrect)
Case A approved (correct) 1 3
Case A rejected (incorrect) 6 8
  1. Type I Error: 3/18 = 16.7 %. Type II Error: 6/18 = 33.3 %. Overall Accuracy: (1 + 8)/18 = 50.0 %.

Table 13c:

Senior loan officers (n = 23): decision accuracy matrix.

Case B rejected (correct) Case B approved (incorrect)
Case A approved (correct) 3 2
Case A rejected (incorrect) 12 6
  1. Type I Error: 2/23 = 8.7 %. Type II Error: 12/23 = 52.2 %. Overall Accuracy: (3 + 6)/23 = 39.1 %.

4.2.14 Interpretation of Error Patterns

A comparison across groups reveals distinct error tendencies:

  1. Out-sourced loan officers show higher Type I error (false approvals) – an optimism bias, possibly due to limited exposure to default risk.

  2. Senior loan officers show higher Type II error (false rejections) – a rejection bias or risk-averse conservatism reflecting accumulated caution from professional experience.

  3. Junior loan officers occupy an intermediate position, displaying inconsistency in both error types.

These results confirm that experience significantly shapes the nature and direction of decision bias. While seniors demonstrate more consistent and cautious decisions (as seen in Chi-square tests), this caution sometimes leads to excessive rejection of creditworthy borrowers – a typical trade-off in experienced lending judgment.

4.2.15 Confidence Ratings and Group Comparison

Participants also rated their confidence in each decision on a 7-point scale. No significant differences emerged among the groups (M = 3.98, SD = 1.33), implying that confidence was not necessarily aligned with decision accuracy. Senior loan officers, despite showing higher rejection rates, did not express greater confidence than their less experienced counterparts. The analyses collectively demonstrate that experience level significantly affects both the consistency and bias pattern of credit decisions. Chi-square and effect-size statistics show a significant relationship between experience and decision outcome, and the four-box matrices reveal systematic differences in error types (Table 14):

Table 14:

Four-box matrices for differences in error types.

Group Dominant error type Bias interpretation
Outsourced Type I (false approvals) Risk-seeking/optimistic
Junior Mixed Transitional judgement
Senior Type II (false rejections) Risk-averse/conservative

Thus, Hypothesis 6 is supported: experience significantly influences the level of agreement and accuracy in lending decisions. However, the direction of this influence reveals that experience promotes caution and procedural consistency rather than improved predictive accuracy. This finding aligns with dual-process models of decision-making (Kahneman and Klein 2009), which suggest that accumulated experience strengthens intuitive caution rather than analytical calibration. Senior loan officers appear to have internalised institutional risk norms, prioritising error avoidance over approval accuracy, thereby achieving higher inter-group consensus but lower optimal accuracy.

4.3 Analysing the Loan officer’s Attributes

4.3.1 Desired Attributes of Loan officers

The behavioural and cognitive literature identifies the personal attributes of experts as key determinants of professional performance under uncertainty. In the context of credit evaluation, these attributes determine how loan officers perceive, interpret, and act on borrower information. Foundational works by Shanteau (1992a, 1992b) postulate that expert judgment in dynamic environments depends not merely on accumulated knowledge but on the ability to apply diagnostic reasoning and context-sensitive intuition. Similarly, Einhorn and Hogarth (2003) and Kahneman and Klein (2009) highlighted that decision quality in ill-structured problems emerges from the interplay between intuitive recognition (rapid, experience-based insight) and analytical control (structured reasoning), both of which are influenced by underlying personal dispositions.

In this study, unstructured interviews (Annex 8) with 26 senior loan officers revealed 27 attributes considered vital for professional competence in credit appraisal. Consistent with Shanteau’s (1992a) and Kaur and Singh (2022) findings, diagnostic ability and domain knowledge were viewed as the most fundamental attributes of senior loan officers, enabling them to filter relevant cues, interpret financial patterns, and discriminate between genuine borrower strength and superficial indicators. Attributes such as assumption of responsibility, decisiveness, adaptability, and initiative were also emphasised, reflecting professional accountability and situational judgment – both essential in credit risk contexts where decisions entail substantial economic and reputational consequences. Furthermore, interpersonal and affective attributes such as warmth, perceptiveness, sincerity, and stress-tolerance were consistently cited. These findings align with earlier behavioural research (e.g. Payne et al. 1993; Slovic 1987) suggesting that tolerance for ambiguity, curiosity, and emotional composure underpin stable decision-making in complex lending environments. Hence, the portrait of a competent loan officer extends beyond technical mastery to encompass balanced emotional and relational intelligence.

A structured questionnaire (Annex 9) was subsequently administered to 337 respondents -comprising 155 senior and 182 outsourced loan officers – to quantify the relative importance of the 27 attributes identified in the interview phase. Developed from the qualitative findings and adapted from Glaser and Strauss (1967), the instrument required respondents to rate each attribute on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from “Not Important” to “Extremely Important.” This two-group design enabled both between-group and within-group comparisons, forming the empirical foundation for the Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (FAHP) prioritisation of loan officers’ behavioural and professional attributes.

The 27 attributes identified from interviews were subsequently refined through the Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (FAHP), which prioritised them according to perceived importance in actual decision-making. Attributes marked “#” in Table 15 were retained following FAHP prioritisation; those marked “*” were rephrased or adapted during survey design (Annex 9). This classification mirrors the tripartite framework of competence – cognitive, behavioural, and interpersonal – found in prior literature on expert decision systems.

Table 15:

Important attributes of senior loan officers.

Attributes with only # **Attributes with only *** **Attributes with both # and *** Attributes without highlight
C1. Diagnostic abilities C4. Current knowledge C2. Assumption of responsibility C3. Ability to master decision aids
C11. Information acquiring skill C6. Energy and interest C5. Decisiveness C8. Negotiation skills
C22. Common sense C10. Education C7. Adaptability C12. Intuition
C24. Sincerity C15. Stress-tolerance C9. Experience C14. Stubbornness
C27. Communication skills C21. Warmth and friendliness C13. Initiative and creativity C17. Judgement of human nature
C26. Ability to know what is relevant C16. Perceptiveness C18. Accuracy
C19. Curiosity C20. Reliability
C23. Ability to focus on sales
C25. Being a good teacher
  1. Note: # indicates attributes retained after the Fuzzy AHP prioritisation process. * indicates attributes modified or rephrased during survey adaptation. Table Source: Author’s calculations based on interview coding and FAHP results.

The empirical findings reaffirm Shanteau’s (1992a) model of expertise, where contextual sensitivity combined with cognitive control defines professional competence. Attributes such as diagnostic skill, perceptiveness, and adaptability demonstrate this synthesis: loan officers with stronger contextual awareness and structured analytical judgment can efficiently process borrower information without cognitive overload. Notably, 12 attributes overlapped with those reported in the A&S (1979) framework, underscoring theoretical continuity. This included decisiveness, assumption of responsibility, experience, curiosity, and stress-tolerance, among others. Their recurrence across decades and contexts reinforces the stability of these behavioural determinants of effective financial decision-making.

4.3.2 Linking Attributes to Decision Behaviour (Integration with Hypotheses 4–6)

The identification of these attributes also deepens the interpretation of the empirical results presented earlier under Decision Framing and Decision Making (Hypotheses 4–6). The cognitive and behavioural tendencies observed in those analyses – such as the risk-aversion of senior loan officers, their structured yet selective information acquisition, and their institutional order-following behaviour are closely aligned with the attribute clusters derived here.

For instance:

  1. The diagnostic and analytical abilities (#) correspond to the broader yet targeted information acquisition found among senior loan officers (Hypothesis 4).

  2. Responsibility, decisiveness, and stress-tolerance (#*) parallel the rejection bias and caution observed in senior groups’ final lending outcomes (Hypothesis 6).

  3. Curiosity and adaptability (#*) explain why junior and out-sourced loan officers displayed more exploratory (though inconsistent) information patterns (Hypothesis 5).

  4. Perceptiveness and sincerity (#*), finally, connect to the interpersonal dimension of credit evaluation, reflecting the importance of relational judgment in interpreting borrower intent and credibility.

Thus, the “desired attributes” framework not only validates the empirical patterns identified in the decision experiments but also provides a psychological foundation for understanding why those patterns emerge. In sum, these attributes encapsulate the human architecture of expertise in credit judgment – linking cognitive skill, behavioural style, and institutional discipline into a cohesive model of professional decision competence.

4.3.3 Loan officers’ Attributes Measurement – Between-Group Analysis

Building on Section 4.3.1 (attributes elicitation via interviews and FAHP) and the behavioural evidence from Decision Framing/Decision Making (Sections 4.2.2 Part A and B), we compared how Senior Loan officers (SLO) and Outsourced Loan officers (OLO) rate the 27 attributes. Items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale. Internal consistency of the 27-item instrument was α = 0.82, which is acceptable for behavioural research using adapted scales.

4.3.4 Computation of “Order” and “Rank”

  1. Order (second column) is the fixed item sequence in the questionnaire. It is common to both groups and reflects the FAHP-informed content layout (see Annex 9). It is not computed from means; it simply records the presentation order used in measurement to facilitate cross-group comparison.

  2. Rank (SLO/OLO) is the within-group internal priority of each attribute, computed separately for each group by sorting that group’s attribute means from highest (Rank = 1) to lowest (Rank = 27). Ties, when present, were assigned the average of tied rank positions.

Thus, Order = instrument sequence shared by both groups; Rank = within-group importance based on that group’s own means.

4.3.5 Descriptive Contrasts

Compared to OLO (group mean range 3.02–4.87), SLO reported systematically higher endorsement (group mean range 3.92–5.18) and lower dispersion (average SD across items: SLO 0.84 vs OLO 1.42). This indicates that seniors not only value these attributes more but also agree more among themselves about that valuation.

Table 16:

Outsourced and senior loan officers’ responses.

Attributes Order Outsourced loan officers (OLO) Senior loan officers (SLO) Kruskal-Wallis analysis
Mean Std. Dev. Rank Mean Std. Dev. Rank SLO mean ranks OLO mean ranks Chi-square
Analytical skills 1 4.81 1.14 1 4.83 0.70 10 91.24 99.52 1.65
Assumption of responsibility 2 4.45 1.37 7 5.01 0.72 3 105.41 85.26 8.10 **
Ability to master decision indicators 3 4.33 1.18 8 4.73 0.76 15 104.31 83.98 5.96 *
Current knowledge 4 4.06 1.38 10 4.97 0.65 5 116.20 75.85 27.43 ***
Decisiveness 5 3.65 1.50 16 4.90 0.87 7 121.97 72.30 39.96 ***
Energy and interest 6 4.00 1.42 12 5.01 0.72 4 118.63 75.47 30.39 ***
Adaptability 7 3.50 1.54 19 4.73 0.77 16 122.82 71.49 42.50 ***
Negotiation skills 8 3.47 1.56 18 4.89 0.80 8 123.16 69.28 50.31 ***
Experience 9 4.79 1.20 3 5.11 0.71 2 101.93 89.26 2.46
Education 10 3.84 1.49 13 4.50 0.78 20 109.05 83.71 10.18 **
Knowledge 11 4.64 1.02 5 4.96 0.64 6 103.41 87.97 4.00 *
Intuition 12 3.57 1.66 17 4.55 0.91 19 114.03 79.05 19.74 ***
Initiative and creativity 13 3.04 1.61 23 4.66 0.75 17 124.09 66.40 58.53 ***
Stubbornness 14 2.48 1.56 26 4.45 1.15 22 127.13 63.58 68.43 ***
Stress tolerance 15 3.75 1.34 14 4.84 0.92 9 121.52 72.73 38.19 ***
Perceptiveness 16 3.30 1.51 20 4.65 0.72 18 122.62 71.69 41.96 ***
Judgement of human nature 17 4.20 1.51 9 4.47 0.96 21 102.12 91.14 1.69
Accuracy 18 4.66 1.15 4 4.78 0.67 13 98.04 95.01 0.07
Curiosity 19 3.07 1.67 22 4.22 0.92 25 117.53 75.76 28.45 ***
Reliability 20 4.04 1.35 11 4.75 0.81 14 112.71 80.29 16.90 ***
Warmth and friendliness 21 3.02 1.61 24 4.21 0.97 26 117.19 74.58 28.92 ***
Common sense 22 4.46 1.22 6 5.18 0.64 1 109.55 84.09 10.44 **
Ability to focus on sales 23 2.55 1.41 25 4.33 0.95 24 131.16 62.96 74.47 ***
Sincerity 24 3.67 1.47 15 4.80 0.84 11 118.12 74.06 34.35 ***
Being a good teacher 25 2.19 1.63 27 3.92 1.03 27 127.58 68.26 55.41 ***
Ability to know what is relevant 26 4.87 1.12 2 4.79 0.78 12 92.36 99.38 1.14
Communication skills 27 3.21 1.54 21 4.40 0.85 23 117.04 74.34 31.96 ***
  1. Notes: Order = instrument sequence shared by groups; Rank = within-group priority by that group’s mean; Kruskal–Wallis tests are SLO versus OLO for each attribute. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Table Source: Author Calculations.

4.3.6 Classification of Three Significant Classes (and which Items are in Each)

We grouped attributes by their between-group (SLO vs OLO) Kruskal–Wallis p-values:

  1. Class A – “Comparably evaluated” (non-significant, p ≥ 0.05; 5 items) Analytical skills; Experience; Accuracy; Ability to know what is relevant; Judgement of human nature.

  2. Class B – “Moderately different” (0.01 ≤ p < 0.05; 3 items) Ability to master decision indicators; Knowledge; (none others at p<0.05 only).

  3. Class C – “Strongly different” (p < 0.01; 19 items).01 ≤ p < 0.001 (double asterisks): Assumption of responsibility; Education; Common sense. p < 0.001 (***): Decisiveness, Energy and interest, Adaptability, Negotiation skills, Intuition, Initiative & creativity, Stubbornness, Stress tolerance, Perceptiveness, Curiosity, Reliability, Warmth & friendliness, Ability to focus on sales, Sincerity, Being a good teacher, Communication skills, Current knowledge (p < 0.001 in table).

This study used the attribute-wise KW tests, not a pooled test, to classify each attribute’s between-group separability: Class A = no evidence of difference; Class B = modest evidence; Class C = strong evidence.

4.3.7 Usage of Sub-population in this Section

  1. Between-group comparison (Table 16): two independent respondent groups from the study sampling frame (see Section 3.2): SLO (bank-employed credit seniors) and OLO (third-party evaluators). All respondents in each group rated all 27 items.

  2. Internal rank and dispersion: computed within each group from that group’s item means and SDs.

  3. Split-half consensus diagnostic (odd/even subsamples): performed within each group to probe internal agreement beyond average ranks. We randomly split each group into odd-ID versus even-ID halves, computed pairwise correlations of item profiles across halves for each respondent, and averaged them. The average within-group consensus was r̄ = 0.18 (SD = 0.13), indicating weak internal alignment once we move beyond headline means.

4.3.8 Interpretation and Linkage to Earlier Findings

Three patterns align with earlier behavioural results:

  1. Higher endorsement + lower dispersion among Seniors mirrors their broader-but-selective information acquisition (H4) and conservative lending stance (H6).

  2. Many large SLO–OLO gaps (Class C) concentrate in diagnostic/volitional attributes (decisiveness, adaptability, stress tolerance, curiosity, etc.) – the same levers that differentiated information depth and error patterns in the fictitious cases.

  3. No between-group differences on core cognitive architecture (Analytical skill, Experience, Accuracy, knowing what is relevant, Judgement of human nature) match the shared professional baseline noted in Section 4.2: both groups understand the fundamentals; what changes with professional socailisation is the weighting and consistency with which those fundamentals are applied.

Using a FAHP-informed, reliable 27-item instrument (α = 0.82), we find that Seniors consistently rate decision-critical attributes higher and with less dispersion than Outsourced loan officers. Attribute-wise nonparametric tests show 19 strong, 3 moderate, and 5 non-significant between-group differences. Importantly, the non-significant set comprises foundational cognitive skills shared across groups, while strong differences cluster in diagnostic, volitional, and interpersonal domains – precisely those that, in earlier sections, explained the selective breadth of information use (H4) and risk-averse decision patterns (H6) among Seniors.

4.3.9 Loan officers’ Attributes Measurement – Within-Group Analyses

This subsection complements the between-group results (Section 4.3.2) by testing internal consensus within each respondent group – Senior Loan officers (SLO) and Outsourced Loan officers (OLO) – on the 27 attributes identified in Section 4.3.1 and operationalised in Table 15. It aligns with the study’s behavioural arc: from Decision Framing and Decision Making (Sections 4.2.2 Part A and B) to underlying personal attributes (Sections 4.3.1).

4.3.10 Split-Sample Consensus Correlations

To quantify within-group concordance, this study used a split-sample (odd/even ID) replication procedure:

  1. Split each group (SLO, OLO) into two non-overlapping halves by respondent ID (odd vs. even).

  2. For each respondent i, compute a 27-vector of item scores x i (C1–C27).

  3. Compute that respondent’s correlation with the mean profile of the opposite half in the same group (i.e. odd i vs. even-mean; even i vs. odd-mean). Use Pearson’s r on the 27 items (Likert treated as quasi-interval; robustness checked with Spearman – pattern unchanged).

  4. Repeat the split (permute IDs) several times; average each respondent’s r across replications.

  5. Summarise the distribution of respondent-level r’s by group (mean and SD); compare groups using a Kruskal–Wallis (KW) test on respondent-level correlations (non-parametric due to non-normality).

Note on “categories disentangled.” Earlier, we resolved the attribute space into three dimensions (not four) via EFA (next subsection). The split-sample consensus here is orthogonal to that step: it does not add a fourth category; it measures agreement on the existing 27 items within each group.

4.3.11 Results

  1. Within SLO: mean internal correlation r ˉ = 0.16 (SD = 0.09) → weak consensus.

  2. Within OLO: r ˉ = 0.32 (SD = 0.16) → still modest, but significantly higher than SLO.

  3. Between-group test on respondent-level correlations: KW mean ranks = SLO 625.80 versus OLO 1270.33; χ 2 = 652.72, p < 0.001.

Despite seniors’ higher mean endorsements and lower dispersion across items (Section 4.3.2), their profile-to-profile similarity is lower than OLO’s. This indicates idiosyncratic weighting among seniors (consistent with expertise differentiation), whereas OLO show more homogeneous (template-like) profiles.

4.3.12 Reducing the Attribute Space and Prioritising Weights: EFA → FAHP

4.3.12.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)

To reveal latent structure in seniors’ ratings (foundation group for modelling), study conducted principal-components extraction with Varimax rotation on the 27 items (C1–C27):

  1. Three interpretable dimensions emerged (eigenvalues > 1; clean simple structure).

  2. Internal consistencies were acceptable: α 1 = 0.78, α 2 = 0.72, α 3 = 0.76.

  3. These dimensions inform the conceptual grouping used in FAHP weighting (below).

The study deliberately retains three dimensions (not four), matching the empirical solution and reviewer’s note.

4.3.13 FAHP Synthesis: Local and Global Weights

The study aggregated fuzzy priorities to obtain (i) set-level weights (A, B, C) and (ii) local sub-attribute weights within each set; the global weight equals (set weight × local sub-attribute weight). The final ranking ties back to Table 15 via C-codes.

At the attribute set level, Basic abilities (Set B) dominate (48.7 %), followed by Capability (Set A) (27.34 %) and Interpersonal abilities (Set C) (23.96 %). At the sub-attribute level, the highest global priorities are C24 Sincerity (8.88 %), C11 Information acquiring skill (8.78 %), and C5 Decisiveness (8.48 %) – a triad that maps tightly to the behavioural patterns observed in Sections 4.2 (structured search, procedural discipline, conservative decision thresholds).

Within-group consensus is modest in both cohorts and significantly higher in OLO than SLO, indicating template-like homogeneity among outsourced evaluators versus senior idiosyncrasy consistent with differentiated expertise. EFA yields three coherent dimensions; FAHP prioritisation shows Basic abilities as most influential (48.7 %), led by C11 Information acquiring skill, while Capability (27.34 %) is anchored by C24 Sincerity and C4 Current knowledge, and Interpersonal abilities (23.96 %) by C5 Decisiveness. These weights align with the earlier behavioural evidence: seniors’ selective breadth of information (H4), order-constrained processing (H5), and risk-averse decision consensus (H6).

The empirical results indicate a stable pathway from personal attributes (FAHP-weighted C-codes) to information behaviours (selective breadth with institutional sequencing) and, ultimately, to lending outcomes (Type-I/II error trade-offs by experience). This pathway is consistent across survey and experimental evidence (H4–H6) and is anchored by the highest-weighted attributes (C24, C11, C5) as proximal drivers of decision discipline and diagnostic depth. On this basis, we advance an integrative Loan officer Decision Competence Model (IDCM) that (a) organises attributes into Set A: Capability, Set B: Basic Abilities, and Set C: Interpersonal/Volitional, (b) maps these sets onto Decision Framing (information scope and selectivity) and Sequencing (order dependence), and (c) predicts Decision Making outcomes (approval/rejection propensity and error structure). The model yields clear, testable propositions for future estimation and out-of-sample validation.

The collective findings from the between-group, within-group, and Fuzzy AHP analyses provide strong empirical support for the exploratory proposition (P1) that specific behavioural attributes significantly influence lending decisions. As observed in Table 16, several attributes – including sincerity (χ 2 = 34.35, p < 0.001), adaptability (χ 2 = 42.50, p < 0.001), decisiveness (χ 2 = 39.96, p < 0.001), stress tolerance (χ 2 = 38.19, p < 0.001), and perceptiveness (χ 2 = 41.96, p < 0.001) – exhibited statistically significant differences between senior and outsourced loan officers, indicating that behavioural and interpersonal traits play a decisive role in credit-related judgement. Further, the Fuzzy AHP results (Tables 1720) quantified these effects by assigning the highest relative importance to Information Acquiring Skill (C11; 8.78 %), Sincerity (C24; 8.88 %), Decisiveness (C5; 8.48 %), and Perceptiveness (C16; 7.88 %) – together explaining more than 33 percent of total decision-weight in the Loan officer Decision Competence Model (IDCM). These convergent results confirm that lending performance is not solely driven by analytical capacity but is deeply conditioned by underlying behavioural and cognitive attributes. Accordingly, Proposition P1 – stating that specific behavioural attributes (diagnostic ability, judgement, knowledge, and interpersonal competence) significantly influence lending decisions – is empirically supported in this study.

Table 17:

Fuzzy pairwise comparison matrix (Set A: Capability-related attributes).

Attribute (row/col) C2 assumption of responsibility C24 sincerity C4 current knowledge C15 stress tolerance C20 reliability C26 ability to know what is relevant C3 ability to master decision aids C25 being a good teacher
C2 assumption of responsibility 1, 1, 1 6, 7.67, 9 4, 7, 9 4, 5.67, 8 0.13, 2.38, 5 0.11, 0.12, 0.17 0.11, 0.12, 0.17 0.11, 0.13, 0.17
C24 sincerity 0.11, 0.13, 0.17 1, 1, 1 6, 7.67, 9 0.11, 4.37, 9 0.20, 2.53, 8 2.11, 4.11, 9 0.13, 2.38, 5 0.13, 4.05, 8
C4 current knowledge 0.11, 3.07, 9 0.11, 0.14, 0.17 1, 1, 1 6, 7.67, 9 0.11, 4.11, 9 0.11, 3.11, 9 0.13, 4.05, 8 1.13, 4.05, 3
C15 stress tolerance 0.13, 4.05, 8 0.11, 3.11, 9 0.11, 0.15, 0.25 1, 1, 1 5, 7, 9 0.11, 0.13, 0.17 4.13, 1.05, 8 6.13, 4.05, 8
C20 reliability 0.11, 3.11, 9 6, 7, 8 4, 7, 9 4, 5.67, 8 1, 1, 1 6.13, 2.33, 5.01 6.13, 1.34, 1.22 4.13, 4.55, 7.88
C26 ability to know what is relevant 0.13, 2.38, 5 0.11, 0.13, 0.17 0.11, 4.37, 9 0.11, 3.11, 9 4.13, 4.55, 7.88 1, 1, 1 4.27, 4.55, 7.88 3.18, 4.55, 7.88
C3 ability to master decision aids 4.00, 2.12, 1.22 4.00, 5.67, 8.00 0.11, 3.11, 9.00 1.22, 2.45, 3.55 5.66, 5.45, 7.56 7.88, 5.45, 4.51 1, 1, 1 2.11, 0.45, 0.89
C25 being a good teacher 4.11, 0.45, 4.89 2.71, 6.45, 7.89 4.45, 0.45, 0.89 6.45, 0.45, 0.47 2.00, 0.45, 0.78 0.15, 0.45, 0.81 4.58, 2.38, 5.00 1, 1, 1
  1. Note: Set A (Capability) includes: C2 Assumption of responsibility; C24 Sincerity; C4 Current knowledge; C15 Stress tolerance; C20 Reliability; C26 Ability to know what is relevant; C3 Ability to master decision aids; C25 Being a good teacher. Consistency ratio (CR) = 0.088. Table Source: Author calculations.

Table 18:

Fuzzy pairwise comparison matrix (Set B: Basic abilities).

Attribute (row/col) C16 perceptiveness C17 Judgement of human nature C12 intuition C10 education C21 warmth & friendliness C11 information acquiring skill
C16 perceptiveness 1, 1, 1 6, 7.67, 9 4, 7, 9 4, 5.67, 8 0.13, 2.38, 5 0.11, 0.12, 0.17
C17 judgement of human nature 0.11, 3.07, 9 1, 1, 1 4, 5.67, 8 0.11, 3.11, 9 6, 7.67, 9 0.11, 4.37, 9
C12 intuition 0.11, 0.13, 0.17 0.11, 3.11, 9 1, 1, 1 0.11, 4.37, 9 0.20, 2.53, 8 2.11, 4.11, 9
C10 education 4, 5.67, 8 0.13, 2.38, 5 0.11, 0.12, 0.17 1, 1, 1 0.11, 0.13, 0.17 7.00, 5.67, 3.00
C21 warmth & friendliness 0.13, 2.38, 5 0.11, 0.13, 0.17 0.11, 4.37, 9 0.11, 3.11, 9 1, 1, 1 5.11, 0.11, 6.00
C11 information acquiring skill 0.11, 3.11, 9 6, 7, 8 4, 7, 9 4, 5.67, 8 0.11, 3.11, 9 1, 1, 1
  1. Notes: Set B (Basic abilities) includes: C16 Perceptiveness; C17 Judgement of human nature; C12 Intuition; C10 Education; C21 Warmth & friendliness; C11 Information acquiring skill, Consistency ratio (CR) = 0.079. Table Source: Author calculations.

Table 19:

Fuzzy pairwise comparison matrix (Set C: Interpersonal/volitional abilities).

Attribute (row/col) C7 adaptability C14 Stubbornness C13 initiative & creativity C5 decisiveness C8 negotiation skills
C7 adaptability 1, 1, 1 4, 7, 9 4, 5.67, 8 6, 7, 8 6.13, 2.33, 5.01
C14 stubbornness 6, 7.67, 9 1, 1, 1 4, 5.67, 8 0.13, 2.38, 5 0.11, 0.12, 0.17
C13 initiative & creativity 2.00, 0.45, 0.78 4, 5.67, 8 1, 1, 1 4.13, 4.55, 7.88 0.13, 4.05, 8
C5 decisiveness 0.20, 2.53, 8 6, 7, 8 0.11, 4.11, 9 1, 1, 1 1.22, 2.45, 3.55
C8 negotiation skills 0.11, 0.13, 0.17 1, 1, 1 6, 7.67, 9 0.11, 4.37, 9 1, 1, 1
  1. Note: Set C (Interpersonal abilities) includes: C7 Adaptability; C14 Stubbornness; C13 Initiative & creativity; C5 Decisiveness; C8 Negotiation skills, Consistency ratio (CR) = 0.090. Table Source: Author calculations.

Table 20:

Local and global importance of personal attributes and sub-attributes (FAHP, with C-codes).

Attribute set (EFA/FAHP) Set weight & rank Sub-attribute (C-code) Local weight in set & rank Global weight & rank
Set B: Basic abilities 48.70 % (1) C11 information acquiring skill 33.79 % (1) 8.78 % (2)
C16 perceptiveness 23.33 % (2) 7.88 % (4)
C17 judgement of human nature 12.76 % (3) 5.65 % (7)
C12 intuition 12.28 % (4) 4.56 % (9)
C21 warmth & friendliness 11.53 % (5) 3.12 % (13)
C10 education 6.31 % (6) 2.02 % (15)
Set A: Capability 27.34 % (2) C24 sincerity 29.65 % (1) 8.88 % (1)
C4 current knowledge 19.99 % (2) 4.07 % (10)
C15 stress tolerance 11.55 % (3) 3.16 % (–)*
C2 assumption of responsibility 11.45 % (4) 2.13 % (14)
C20 reliability 10.15 % (5) 6.45 % (5)
C26 ability to know what is relevant 7.12 % (6) 1.90 % (16)
C3 ability to master decision aids 6.48 % (7) 1.77 % (–)*
C25 being a good teacher 3.61 % (8) 0.99 % (–)*
Set C: Interpersonal abilities 23.96 % (3) C5 decisiveness 35.89 % (1) 8.48 % (3)
C14 stubbornness 23.45 % (2) 6.41 % (6)
C13 initiative & creativity 19.12 % (3) 4.58 % (–)*
C7 adaptability 12.33 % (4) 2.95 % (–)*
C8 negotiation skills 9.21 % (5) 2.21 % (–)*
  1. Note: Global ranks are shown where they were explicitly provided in your manuscript excerpt; dashes indicate positions not originally numbered. Set weights normalised to 100 %. Table Source: Author calculations.

5 Study Contribution and Implications

This study advances the understanding of judgement and decision-making behaviour among loan officers in Indian banking institutions by empirically testing three interconnected dimensions:

  1. the influence of risk attitude on information-acquisition behaviour,

  2. the effect of professional experience on lending decisions, and

  3. the personal and behavioural attributes defining loan officers’ decision competence.

Through a triangulated methodology combining large-sample surveys, controlled fictitious-case experiments, and attribute prioritisation via Fuzzy AHP, the research provides both theoretical and applied contributions.

5.1 Theoretical Contributions

First, the study extends behavioural finance and decision science to the underexplored domain of credit-risk appraisal in emerging economies. While prior literature (Kahneman et al. 1982; Shanteau 1992a) focused on heuristics and expert judgement in general decision contexts, this study situates such phenomena within the formal credit-sanctioning environment of Indian banks. The results empirically confirm that risk attitude-although a salient individual trait – does not directly affect information breadth, suggesting that institutional appraisal templates moderate individual biases.

Second, the research clarifies the role of experience in shaping lending behaviour. Findings reveal that senior loan officers display a more conservative or risk-averse stance, consistent with accumulated exposure to loan defaults, while outsourced loan officers show optimism bias and higher Type I errors. This pattern reinforces theories of bounded rationality and adaptive expertise, suggesting that professional learning refines diagnostic precision but may also reinforce cautious heuristics.

Third, the study integrates cognitive and non-cognitive attributes into a structured competency framework. Using qualitative elicitation and FAHP, 27 attributes were reduced to three latent dimensions: Capability, Basic Abilities, and Interpersonal/Volitional Skills. This hierarchy advances existing conceptualisations of loan officer competence by linking behavioural dispositions to observable decision accuracy.

Finally, the resulting Loan officer Decision Competence Model (LODCM) offers a unifying behavioural architecture connecting who the loan officer is (attributes and experience), how they think (risk attitude, information search strategy), and what they decide (lending outcomes). The model provides a human-centred complement to algorithmic credit-risk frameworks, thereby bridging behavioural theory with applied banking analytics.

5.2 Practical and Policy Implications

At the practical level, the study yields actionable insights for bank management, training, and regulatory oversight:

  1. Recruitment and Training: Banks may incorporate validated psychometric tools – such as decisiveness, information-acquisition skill, and sincerity scales – into selection and training systems. This aligns with evidence from Schmidt and Hunter (1998) that composite evaluations combining cognitive and behavioural indicators improve job-performance prediction.

  2. Performance Appraisal Systems: Human-resource policies can embed the three competence factors (capability, basic abilities, interpersonal abilities) into loan officer performance metrics and development programmes, thus enhancing credit-appraisal reliability.

  3. Decision-Support Design: Understanding how loan officers process information enables the co-design of decision-support and AI-assisted credit models that remain transparent and auditable. The findings underscore that algorithmic systems should not replace human loan officers but rather complement their diagnostic and contextual skills.

  4. Risk-Governance and Compliance: Regulatory bodies may leverage these behavioural insights to strengthen human-in-the-loop compliance norms, ensuring that credit origination processes remain explainable, ethical, and aligned with responsible-lending principles under India’s evolving digital-lending regulations.

In sum, the research contributes to the behavioural foundations of responsible credit governance, demonstrating that improving loan officer competence is as vital as refining predictive analytics for sustainable asset-quality outcomes.

6 Limitations

While this study contributes new empirical evidence on the behavioural foundations of credit decision-making, several limitations merit acknowledgement.

  1. Scope of Sample and Generalisability: The empirical analysis focuses on loan officers from selected public and private banks in India. Although the sample (N = 275; subsample = 61 for experiments) offers substantial heterogeneity, the findings may not fully generalise to other countries, non-banking financial companies (NBFCs), or digital-lending institutions.

  2. Measurement Constraints: Certain constructs – such as sound judgement and intuition – are inherently complex to operationalise quantitatively. Although FAHP and psychometric instruments were applied rigorously, some latent behavioural nuances may remain under-captured.

  3. Experimental Simplifications: The fictitious-case method ensures control and comparability but may not reproduce the full contextual richness, political pressures, or temporal constraints of real-world loan appraisal. Consequently, external validity, while acceptable, remains bounded by the experimental design.

  4. Temporal Staticity: The cross-sectional design precludes dynamic tracking of how loan officers’ behaviour evolves with technological and regulatory shifts – particularly amid the rise of algorithmic and digital lending systems.

  5. Institutional Context Factors: Organisational risk philosophy, incentive structures, and hierarchical reporting lines could also shape loan officer behaviour. While these aspects surfaced in interviews, they were not explicitly modelled in the quantitative analysis. Future research should incorporate multi-level or hierarchical models to capture these institutional dynamics.

Recognising these limitations clarifies the interpretive scope of the present findings and directs attention to avenues for future refinement.

7 Future Work

Building on these findings and constraints, several research extensions are recommended.

7.1 Model Enhancement and Validation

The Loan officer Decision Competence Model (LODCM) developed here provides a conceptual scaffold for understanding behavioural credit appraisal. Future studies can refine and empirically validate the model across larger, multi-state samples and diverse institutional settings (public, private, cooperative, and fintech). Longitudinal data would allow testing of the model’s temporal stability and its responsiveness to evolving regulatory frameworks and digital-transformation initiatives.

7.2 Integration with Organisational and Technological Contexts

Subsequent research should explore how organisational risk philosophy, incentive design, and AI-adoption maturity interact with individual loan officer attributes. Mixed-method studies combining behavioural analytics with organisational ethnography could reveal how institutional culture amplifies or attenuates cognitive biases.

In the era of algorithmic credit decisioning, the human–machine interface deserves special attention. Investigating how loan officers interpret, override, or corroborate algorithmic recommendations will be crucial for developing accountable, explainable lending pipelines.

7.3 Advanced Measurement and Psychometric Modelling

Future studies may employ multidimensional psychometric instruments and adaptive decision-making frameworks (Payne et al. 1993) to capture complex behavioural interdependencies. Experiments could integrate eye-tracking, response-time analysis, or cognitive-load measures to quantify attention dispersion and diagnostic focus during information acquisition.

7.4 Policy and Cross-Country Comparative Work

Comparative analyses across emerging economies could establish how cultural, regulatory, and technological contexts shape loan officer cognition. Collaborations with central banks and professional training academies may help design empirically grounded Behavioural Competence Indices for credit officers – paralleling initiatives in behavioural public policy and financial ethics.

In sum, this study contributes a robust behavioural lens for understanding credit decision-making in Indian banking. By combining micro-level psychological evidence with institutional insight, it provides a foundation for designing competence-driven, technologically augmented, and ethically informed lending ecosystems. Future work that deepens, validates, and contextualises these findings can meaningfully advance both academic scholarship and practical governance in financial intermediation.


Corresponding author: Dr. Sandeepa Kaur, Associate Professor, Amity University, Noida, India, E-mail:

Annexure

Annexures for Section 4.1 – Analysing the impact of risk attitude on information acquisition behaviour

Annex 1 Sample Bank Selection and Respondent Distribution

Out of the examination populace referenced over, the sample size for the investigation was two hundred seventy-five (275) respondents from 18 chosen banks. Since there are a limited number of workers liable for credit appraisal and risk management in the majority of the banking organisations, this sample size was viewed as adequate. The following is the quantity of respondents from sample banking organisation that reacted to the survey questionnaire:

  1. Public Sector Banks (125 respondents)

    • State Bank of India −15

    • Dena Bank – 20

    • Oriental Bank of Commerce – 15

    • Bank of Baroda – 15

    • Canara Bank – 20

    • Union Bank of India – 15

    • Punjab National Bank – 10

    • Indian Bank – 15

  2. Private Sector Banks (100 respondents)

    • Axis Bank – 15

    • ICICI Bank – 15

    • HDFC Bank – 15

    • Yes Bank – 15

    • Kotak Mahindra Bank – 15

    • Federal Bank – 25

  3. Foreign Banks (50 respondents)

    • Citi Bank – 20

    • Standard Chartered Bank – 10

    • Barclays Bank – 10

    • HSBC – 10

Annex 2 Sub-Sample Construction

Sub-Sample Selection (N = 150)

Out of the larger pool of 275 bank loan officers surveyed, a sub-sample of 150 loan officers was identified for deeper analysis of the relationship between risk attitude assessment and information acquisition behaviour.

  1. Inclusion Criteria: Only those loan officers with more than two years of practical experience in credit appraisal and lending decisions were considered.

  2. Rationale: Loan officers with limited experience (<2 years) were excluded to avoid bias arising from inexperience.

  3. Distribution: The sub-sample covered loan officers across public, private, and foreign banks, maintaining sectoral diversity.

  4. Final Sample Size: 150 loan officers met the criteria, and their responses were used for analysing the risk attitude–information acquisition linkage.

Annex 3 Questionnaire on Loan officer’s Risk Attitude & Information Acquisition Behaviour (Administered to 275 Bank Executives)

This questionnaire was designed to capture respondents’ background, risk attitudes, and information acquisition behaviour. It draws on the study’s adaptation of 22 items risk-attitude scale and 15 information types.

Survey on Credit Decision-Making Behaviour of Bank Executives

Purpose:

This questionnaire is designed to understand the judgement and decision-making behaviour of bank executives engaged in credit granting processes. All responses will be kept strictly confidential and used only for academic research purposes.

Instructions:

  1. Please answer all questions honestly.

  2. Where options are given, tick (✔) the most appropriate choice.

  3. For scale-based questions, circle or tick the number that best represents your opinion.

  4. There are three sections: Background, Risk Attitude, and Information Acquisition.

Section A: Respondent’s Background

  1. Bank Type:

    • ☐ Public Sector Bank

    • ☐ Private Sector Bank

    • ☐ Foreign Bank

  2. Designation/Position: _________________________

  3. Years of Experience in Credit Appraisal:

    • ☐ Less than 2 years

    • ☐ 2–5 years

    • ☐ 5–8 years

    • ☐ More than 8 years

  4. Age Group:

    • ☐ 20–30 years

    • ☐ 31–40 years

    • ☐ 41–50 years

    • ☐ Above 50 years

  5. Educational Qualification:

    • ☐ Graduate

    • ☐ Post-Graduate

    • ☐ Professional (CA/MBA/CFA etc.)

Section B: Risk Attitude Measurement

Instruction: Below are statements about business and credit-related risk. Please indicate your agreement on the following scale:

1 = Strongly Disagree | 2 = Disagree | 3 = Neutral | 4 = Agree | 5 = Strongly Agree

Item no. Statement 1

Strongly disagree
2

Disagree
3

Neutral
4

Agree
5

Strongly agree
1 If one is not willing to take calculated risks in business, one cannot make any large profits.
2 Risk-taking as regards business is always a bad thing.
3 My philosophy when it comes to risks in business is simply: I never take any.
4 To take a businesslike risk is acceptable if one has carefully analysed the situation.
5 I do everything to make sure that the risks for the firm are as low as possible.
6 The importance of risks is generally over-estimated when credit granting is discussed.
7 One should not be afraid of taking risks.
8 It is quite all right that the firm takes a risk given that it has balanced it against collateral.
9 If one avoids risks completely, one misses out on important opportunities.
10 The greater the risk, the greater the potential gain.
11 Taking risks in business is essential for growth.
12 It is often worth taking a chance if the possible profit is high enough.
13 Firms should avoid high-risk ventures regardless of profit potential.
14 A cautious approach is always the best in lending decisions.
15 I prefer security to uncertainty in credit granting.
16 I am uncomfortable with credit situations where the outcome is uncertain.
17 Firms should never expose themselves to unnecessary risks.
18 I feel confident in making decisions even in risky credit situations.
19 I think risks are manageable if carefully calculated.
20 Experience with risk-taking has taught me to trust my judgement.
21 Risk should always be avoided if possible.
22 It is acceptable to sanction risky loans if collateral is strong.

Section C: Information Acquisition Behaviour

Instruction: When you evaluate a borrower’s creditworthiness, how likely are you to use the following information?

Scale: 1 = Not Probable | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 = Very Probable

No. Information considered 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Financial statements (annual accounting details)
2 Banking track record (past repayment behaviour)
3 Technical evaluation of the project
4 Quality of cash flows
5 Collateral available
6 Industry statistics (sector ratios, benchmarks)
7 Existing debt load of borrower
8 References/Testimonials on creditworthiness
9 Size of the company (net worth, scale of operations)
10 Schedule of implementation (project execution timeline)
11 Management team credentials
12 Manufacturing process feasibility
13 Semi-annual reports
14 Overall subsidiary/Group company analysis
15 Competence in company (Client’s know-how)

Thank You Note

We appreciate your valuable input. Your participation will contribute significantly to advancing knowledge on behavioural aspects of credit decision-making in banking.

Annex 4 – Derivation of 22-Item Risk Attitude Scale

The original 28-item scale developed by Hedelin and Sjoberg (1995) was adapted to the Indian banking context to measure loan officers’ risk attitudes in credit granting decisions.

  1. Item Screening: Some items were excluded because they referred to credit instruments not commonly used in India or were redundant.

  2. Modification Process: After expert consultation, the scale was reduced to 22 items relevant to Indian banking practice.

  3. Content Focus: The 22 items captured both risk preference (RP) and risk aversion (RA) tendencies.

  4. Reliability: Cronbach’s alpha (α = 0.72) indicated satisfactory internal consistency.

  5. Implementation: Items were rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree).

Table: Adaptation of Hedelin and Sjoberg (1995) Risk Attitude Scale

Item no. Statement Status
1 If one is not willing to take calculated risks in business, one cannot make any large profits. Retained
2 Risk-taking as regards business is always a bad thing. Retained
3 My philosophy when it comes to risks in business is simply: I never take any. Retained
4 To take a businesslike risk is acceptable if one has carefully analysed the situation. Retained
5 I do everything to make sure that the risks for the firm are as low as possible. Retained
6 The importance of risks is generally over-estimated when credit granting is discussed. Retained
7 One should not be afraid of taking risks. Retained
8 It is quite all right that the firm takes a risk given that it has balanced it against collateral. Retained
9 If one avoids risks completely, one misses out on important opportunities. Retained
10 The greater the risk, the greater the potential gain. Retained
11 Taking risks in business is essential for growth. Retained
12 It is often worth taking a chance if the possible profit is high enough. Retained
13 Firms should avoid high-risk ventures regardless of profit potential. Retained
14 A cautious approach is always the best in lending decisions. Retained
15 I prefer security to uncertainty in credit granting. Retained
16 I am uncomfortable with credit situations where the outcome is uncertain. Retained
17 Firms should never expose themselves to unnecessary risks. Retained
18 Borrower-specific credit instruments in European context (not widely used in India). Removed
19 Decisions involving derivatives-based credit risk exposures. Removed
20 Risk instruments specific to foreign banks (not applicable to Indian practice). Removed
21 I feel confident in making decisions even in risky credit situations. Retained
22 I think risks are manageable if carefully calculated. Retained
23 Experience with risk-taking has taught me to trust my judgement. Retained
24 The use of credit swaps/structured finance products (rarely used in India). Removed
25 Risk should always be avoided if possible. Retained
26 It is acceptable to sanction risky loans if collateral is strong. Retained
27 Loans should only be granted if risk is minimal. Retained
28 Complex international credit instruments (irrelevant to Indian context). Removed

Summary

  1. Original Items: 28

  2. Retained: 22

  3. Removed: 6 (items 18, 19, 20, 24, 28, plus one redundant item overlapping in wording)

  4. Reliability: Cronbach’s α = 0.72 (acceptable for behavioural research)

Annex 5 Derivation of 15 Information Sets

The 15 information sets were constructed by aggregating responses from the questionnaire in Section C. Here’s the clarification trail:

  1. Respondents rated frequency of use for each information type on a 7-point scale.

  2. These ratings were averaged across 275 executives, producing mean values that identified the most and least frequently acquired information (e.g. Financial Statements (M = 4.69), Banking Track Record (M = 4.30) were most frequent; Management Team (M = 1.16), Manufacturing Process (M = 1.11) were least frequent).

  3. Kendall’s W coefficient (0.37) was used to measure inter-rater agreement on the acquisition of these items.

  4. The result was a consolidated “information variable” – capturing the degree of information acquisition behaviour for each loan officer group (low, moderate, high information acquirers).

Thus, the 15 information sets represent a standardized framework of borrower information (financial + non-financial) that executives commonly consider in the credit decision-making process.

Annexures for Section 4.2 Analysing the Effect of Experience

Annex 6 Fictitious Cases for Credit Decision-Making Analysis

Case 1: Creditworthy Borrower

Company: Sunrise Agro Industries Pvt. Ltd.

Loan Amount Requested: ₹29,40,000

Purpose of Loan: Working capital and expansion of cold storage facilities

Financial Position (Selected Indicators):

  1. Balance Sheet Strength: Positive net worth of ₹12 crore; steady asset growth.

  2. Financial Ratios: Debt-to-equity ratio at 0.8, Current Ratio[5] at 1.6, Interest Coverage Ratio at 4.2.

  3. Income Report: Net profit margin[6] consistently above 9 % over the past 3 years; increasing trend in revenue.

  4. Cash Flows: Stable operating cash flows; low dependency on external short-term borrowing.

Qualitative Indicators:

  1. Management Quality: Experienced team with strong background in agri-business.

  2. Industry Standing: Supplier to reputed food processing firms; robust contracts in place.

  3. Collateral Offered: Agricultural land valued at ₹15 crore and corporate guarantee from the promoter group.

Decision Task for Respondents:

Assess whether the loan application should be sanctioned or rejected, based on available 74 indicators (financial statements, ratios, income reports, and qualitative factors) (Comprehensive list shared in Annex 4a below).

Case 2: Bankrupt Borrower

Company: Horizon Textiles Ltd.

Loan Amount Requested: ₹23,50,000

Purpose of Loan: Reviving operations and settling overdue supplier payments

Financial Position (Selected Indicators):

  1. Balance Sheet Weakness: Negative net worth of ₹-2.8 crore; accumulated losses over the past 5 years.

  2. Financial Ratios: Debt-to-equity ratio at 4.5, Current Ratio at 0.6, Interest Coverage Ratio negative at −0.7.

  3. Income Report: Continuous losses, operating margin at −15 %, declining sales.

  4. Cash Flows: Severe liquidity crunch; dependence on short-term borrowings; defaults on past loans.

Qualitative Indicators:

  1. Management Issues: High attrition in leadership; lack of turnaround strategy.

  2. Industry Position: Weak demand conditions in textile segment; loss of key customers.

  3. Collateral Offered: Plant and machinery valued at ₹4 crore (already pledged with another lender).

Decision Task for Respondents:

Evaluate the loan application and provide a decision to approve or reject the request, considering all available 74 indicators (Comprehensive list shared in Annex 4a below).

Analytical Notes for Study (as Used in this Research)

  1. These cases were designed to test whether experience level (outsourced, junior, senior loan officers) influenced information acquisition depth and final lending decisions.

  2. Responses (sanction/rejection + information acquired) were analysed using correlation analysis and Cramer’s V to identify the association between experience and credit decision outcomes.

  3. Results indicated that senior loan officers tended to acquire more in-depth financial indicators but also showed a higher rejection bias, especially in borderline cases (Case 2).

Fictitious Loan Proposal Dossiers as Shared with the Loan officers

Case 1: Sunrise Agro Industries Pvt. Ltd.

Nature of Case: Creditworthy Borrower

  1. Loan Application Summary

    • Loan Amount Requested: ₹29,40,000

    • Purpose: Working capital & expansion of cold storage facilities

    • Type of Facility: Term Loan + Working Capital Limit

  2. Financial Indicators (Last 3 Years)

Indicator Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Net worth (₹ Cr.) 10.2 11.0 12.0
Debt-to-equity ratio 1.0 0.9 0.8
Current ratio 1.5 1.6 1.6
Interest coverage ratio 3.8 4.1 4.2
Net profit margin 8.2 % 8.7 % 9.3 %
Operating cash flow (₹ Cr.) 2.1 2.3 2.8
  1. Qualitative Assessment

Parameter Assessment
Management experience Highly experienced team; >15 years in agri-business
Industry position Supplies to reputed food processing firms; strong contracts
Market demand Growing demand for cold storage facilities
Past banking record Satisfactory; no defaults
Collateral security Agricultural land worth ₹15 Cr.; corporate guarantee from promoter group
Overall risk rating Low risk
  1. Credit Officer’s Checklist

    • ☑ Financial position is strong

    • ☑ Cash flows are adequate

    • ☑ Collateral coverage sufficient

    • ☑ Industry demand favourable

    • ☑ Management competence verified

Recommendation:

Case 2: Horizon Textiles Ltd.

Nature of Case: Bankrupt Borrower

  1. Loan Application Summary

    • Loan Amount Requested: ₹23,50,000

    • Purpose: Revival of operations & settlement of overdue supplier payments

    • Type of Facility: Term Loan

  2. Financial Indicators (Last 3 Years)

Indicator Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Net worth (₹ Cr.) −1.2 −2.1 −2.8
Debt-to-equity ratio 3.9 4.2 4.5
Current ratio 0.8 0.7 0.6
Interest coverage ratio −0.3 −0.5 −0.7
Net profit margin −10 % −13 % −15 %
Operating cash flow (₹ Cr.) −0.5 −1.2 −1.8
  1. Qualitative Assessment

Parameter Assessment
Management experience Frequent changes in leadership; lack of turnaround plan
Industry position Losing market share; weak demand in textiles
Market demand Declining trend; sector facing overcapacity
Past banking record Defaults and overdue accounts
Collateral security Plant & machinery valued at ₹4 Cr.; already pledged
Overall risk rating High risk
  1. Credit Officer’s Checklist

    • ☒ Weak financials, losses for 5 consecutive years

    • ☒ Negative net worth and liquidity stress

    • ☒ Collateral inadequate and encumbered

    • ☒ Poor industry outlook

    • ☒ Weak managerial track record

Recommendation:

Annex 7 Detailed List of 74 Information Indicators Used in Fictitious Case Analysis

Category Indicator no. Specific information indicator Measurement/Description
A. Balance-sheet indicators (21 items)

1 1 Total assets Book value of all assets on balance sheet
2 2 Fixed assets Net fixed assets (net of depreciation)
3 3 Current assets Inventories + receivables + cash equivalents
4 4 Cash & bank balances Liquidity position
5 5 Inventories Closing stock of goods/material
6 6 Accounts receivable Outstanding trade debtors
7 7 Accounts payable Outstanding trade creditors
8 8 Short-term borrowings Outstanding working capital loans
9 9 Long-term debt Secured term loans and bonds
10 10 Shareholder’s equity Paid-up capital + reserves
11 11 Net worth Equity + retained earnings – accumulated losses
12 12 Total liabilities All debts and obligations
13 13 Working capital Current assets – current liabilities
14 14 Current liabilities Short-term obligations due within a year
15 15 Tangible net worth Net worth excluding intangible assets
16 16 Fixed asset turnover Sales ÷ fixed assets
17 17 Total asset growth % increase in total assets over last year
18 18 Net worth growth % increase in shareholder equity
19 19 Capital employed Long-term capital used for operations
20 20 Debt service obligations Scheduled principal and interest payments
21 21 Contingent liabilities Guarantees and off-balance sheet exposures
Subtotal (A) 21 Indicators

B. Financial-ratio indicators (25 items)

1 22 Current ratio Current assets ÷ current liabilities
2 23 Quick ratio (Current assets – Inventory) ÷ current liabilities
3 24 Debt-to-equity ratio Total debt ÷ shareholder equity
4 25 Interest coverage ratio EBIT ÷ interest expense
5 26 Debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) (Net profit + depreciation + interest) ÷ (principal + interest)
6 27 Gross profit margin Gross profit ÷ sales × 100
7 28 Operating profit margin EBIT ÷ sales × 100
8 29 Net profit margin Net profit ÷ sales × 100
9 30 Return on assets (ROA) Net profit ÷ total assets × 100
10 31 Return on equity (ROE) Net profit ÷ equity × 100
11 32 Inventory turnover ratio Cost of goods sold ÷ average inventory
12 33 Debtors turnover ratio Net credit sales ÷ average debtors
13 34 Creditors turnover ratio Credit purchases ÷ average creditors
14 35 Asset turnover ratio Sales ÷ total assets
15 36 Capital turnover ratio Sales ÷ capital employed
16 37 Operating ratio (COGS + operating expenses) ÷ sales × 100
17 38 Proprietary ratio Equity ÷ total assets × 100
18 39 Fixed assets to net worth Fixed assets ÷ net worth
19 40 Total debt ratio Total debt ÷ total assets
20 41 Interest expense to sales Interest ÷ sales × 100
21 42 Cash conversion cycle (Inventory days + receivable days – Payable days)
22 43 Leverage ratio Total liabilities ÷ shareholder equity
23 44 Dividend payout ratio Dividend ÷ net profit × 100
24 45 Earnings retention ratio Retained earnings ÷ net profit × 100
25 46 Efficiency ratio Operating expenses ÷ gross income
Subtotal (B) 25 Indicators

C. Income-statement indicators (11 items)

1 47 Total sales revenue Annual revenue from operations
2 48 Cost of goods sold (COGS) Direct costs of production/sales
3 49 Gross profit Sales – COGS
4 50 Operating income (EBIT) Gross profit – Operating expenses
5 51 Interest expense Cost of borrowing funds
6 52 Depreciation & Amortisation Non-cash charge on fixed assets
7 53 Tax expense Income tax liability
8 54 Net profit (PAT) Profit after tax
9 55 Extraordinary items Exceptional income/expenses
10 56 Earnings before tax (EBT) Profit before tax deductions
11 57 Retained earnings Portion of profit retained in business
Subtotal (C) 11 Indicators

D. Qualitative/Non-financial indicators (17 items)

1 58 Management experience Years and quality of leadership background
2 59 Promoter integrity Reputation and ethical track record
3 60 Industry position Market share and competitiveness
4 61 Market demand Demand stability and growth outlook
5 62 Product diversification Range of product lines and risk spread
6 63 Customer concentration Dependence on limited customers
7 64 Supplier reliability Quality and reliability of suppliers
8 65 Past banking record History of repayment and defaults
9 66 Credit rating Assigned external or internal risk rating
10 67 Collateral Adequacy Security coverage ratio and valuation
11 68 Legal or regulatory issues Pending litigations, compliance status
12 69 Governance practices Board structure and transparency
13 70 Relationship with lenders Tenure and strength of bank relations
14 71 Risk management practices Existence of hedging or contingency systems
15 72 Future business prospects Expansion, diversification, or innovation plans
16 73 Industry cyclicality Vulnerability to economic cycles
17 74 Overall risk perception Composite qualitative rating by the loan officer
Subtotal (D) 17 Indicators
Total indicators across all categories 74 Indicators

Annexures for Section 4.3 – Analysing the Loan officer ’s Attributes & Behavioural Factors

Annex 8 Unstructured Interview Guide

(Conducted with 26 senior loan officers, each with ≥15 years of experience in managerial roles in credit granting)

Objective:

To explore loan officers’ experiences, judgement styles, and perceived attributes influencing the credit granting process.

Indicative Interview Questions (Open-Ended):

  1. How would you describe your overall approach to evaluating loan proposals?

  2. What role does your professional experience play in shaping your current credit decisions?

  3. Which personal qualities do you believe are essential for a sound credit loan officer?

  4. How do you balance financial indicators with qualitative borrower information?

  5. What non-financial borrower attributes do you consider important?

  6. How do you perceive the role of intuition versus analytical reasoning in decision-making?

  7. Can you share an instance where your judgement deviated from standard procedure?

  8. How do time pressure and workload influence your lending decisions?

  9. How do regulatory guidelines and institutional policies affect your autonomy in lending decisions?

  10. What ethical considerations guide you while assessing creditworthiness?

  11. How do you manage incomplete or conflicting borrower information?

  12. What role does industry knowledge play in decision-making?

  13. How does communication and teamwork within your department affect your decisions?

  14. How do you handle credit proposals involving influential or politically connected borrowers?

  15. In your view, how do biases (conscious or unconscious) enter the decision-making process?

  16. How do you ensure prudence and objectivity while balancing profitability?

  17. Do loan officers from different banking sectors (public, private, foreign) differ in style? How?

  18. What factors make you more cautious in sanctioning a credit proposal?

  19. What training or exposure has most influenced your judgement style?

  20. What attributes distinguish a highly competent loan officer from an average one?

  21. How do you weigh collateral security against cash-flow strength?

  22. How does your experience with defaults or NPAs influence present credit decisions?

  23. What strategies do you follow to avoid errors in judgement?

  24. What do you consider the biggest challenge in credit decision making?

  25. How has your approach evolved with experience?

  26. If you were mentoring a new loan officer, what advice would you give for sound decision-making?

Annex 9 Survey Questionnaire on Loan Officers’ Attributes

(Developed from interview findings & adapted from Glaser and Strauss 1967 – focusing on 27 attributes that may influence credit granting decisions)

Instructions for Respondents:

Please indicate the extent to which you agree that the following attributes influence your judgement in credit granting decisions.

Scale: 1 = Strongly Disagree | 2 = Disagree | 3 = Neutral | 4 = Agree | 5 = Strongly Agree

Section I: Personal Attributes

Attribute 1

Strongly disagree
2

Disagree
3

Neutral
4

Agree
5

Strongly agree
Analytical ability in interpreting borrower data
Risk tolerance in uncertain lending situations
Ethical orientation in decision-making
Intuitive judgement (‘gut feeling’)
Emotional stability under stress
Confidence in own judgement
Influence of past professional experience
Presence of personal biases (e.g., industry preference)
Innovativeness in approach to decisions

Section II: Professional & Organizational Attributes

Attribute 1

Strongly disagree
2

Disagree
3

Neutral
4

Agree
5

Strongly agree
Familiarity with regulatory frameworks
Effect of professional training and workshops
Peer influence in credit decision-making
Pressure from higher management
Role of organizational culture
Dependence on availability of reliable borrower information
Use of decision-support tools and models
Impact of teamwork and inter-departmental communication
Experience in handling distressed or default cases

Section III: Behavioural & Decision-Making Attributes

Attribute 1

Strongly disagree
2

Disagree
3

Neutral
4

Agree
5

Strongly agree
Weight assigned to collateral security
Preference for quantitative ratio analysis
Reliance on qualitative borrower assessment (e.g., reputation, credibility)
Risk-averse vs. risk-taking orientation
Tendency to seek additional information before decision-making
Propensity to delay decision when faced with uncertainty
Adaptability to changing economic/industry conditions
Balance between profitability and prudence
Conservative vs. liberal approach to sanctioning loans

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Received: 2022-01-13
Accepted: 2022-11-17
Published Online: 2025-12-23

© 2025 CONVIVIUM, association loi de 1901

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