Startseite The Empirical Research on Macro Decision-Making Factors of Implementing Countervailing Policy
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The Empirical Research on Macro Decision-Making Factors of Implementing Countervailing Policy

  • Xiaoyong Qiao
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 25. Februar 2013
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Abstract

At present, with the rapid development of foreign trade, trade friction of China has transformed from the microcosmic aspects of enterprise to the macroscopical aspects of government. Countervailing policy as a trade policy has a profound effect on many aspects. Based on constructing Binary Choice Model of the influencing factors of macro decision-making, this paper tries to carry out an empirical study on the influencing factors of macro decision-making form foreign countries against China with the data of the 38 countervailing files initiated by the United States, Canada, Australia, South Africa and India from 2004 to 2009. This paper makes contributions to provide reference to China’s macro decision-making sectors.


Supported by the National Social Science Fund of China (Project No. 12CGL088)


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Received: 2013-11-27
Accepted: 2013-12-18
Published Online: 2013-2-25

© 2013 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Heruntergeladen am 1.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/JSSI-2013-0060/html?lang=de
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