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Thomas Reid and Some Regress Arguments

Published/Copyright: May 17, 2006
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
From the journal Volume 88 Issue 1

Abstract

This paper reconstructs Reid's responses to regress arguments against the possibility of free will, highlighting the role played by long-term decisions (“general fixed purposes”) in the explanation of paradigmatic free actions on Reid's account. In addition to reconstructing Reid's response to the two versions of the regress argument that he explicitly discusses, I also construct a Reidian response to Galen Strawson's contemporary version of the regress argument. The depth of Reid's position is most apparent in the resources it provides for responding to this sophisticated articulation of a traditional argument against freedom of the will.

Published Online: 2006-05-17
Published in Print: 2006-03-24

© Walter de Gruyter

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Aristotle's Notion of Experience
  2. Respect for the Law and the Use of Dynamical Terms in Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation
  3. Thomas Reid and Some Regress Arguments
  4. Goldschmidt and Gueroult: Some Facts, Some Enigmas
  5. Rezensionen
https://doi.org/10.1515/AGPH.2006.003

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Aristotle's Notion of Experience
  2. Respect for the Law and the Use of Dynamical Terms in Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation
  3. Thomas Reid and Some Regress Arguments
  4. Goldschmidt and Gueroult: Some Facts, Some Enigmas
  5. Rezensionen
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