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The One, the Many, and the Trinity: A Dialetheist Response to the Trinitarian Contradiction

  • Susana Gómez Gutiérrez
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Contradiction and the Absolute
Ein Kapitel aus dem Buch Contradiction and the Absolute

Abstract

The historical development of the doctrine of the Trinity evidences an apparent contradiction. On the one hand, the doctrine says that there are three divine beings, which apparently implies that there are three gods. On the other hand, it declares that there is only one God. This problem has also been interpreted in terms of identity: f=g, s=g, and h=g, but f≠s, f≠h, and s≠h, which means that they are identical and not identical. Contradictions are problematic for many people. So, what to do with this contradiction? Some people have tried to solve it affirming one side of the contradiction and denying the other. Others have tried to dissolve it, i.e., they have attempted to show that there is no contradiction at all. In this paper, I propose a third alternative. To accept the contradiction. Taking this as my starting point, I develop two dialetheist models of the Trinity. These models are based on Priest’s gluon theory and are inspired by Jeffry Pelletier’s book review of Priest’s book One. Through them, I explain how the trinitarian contradiction is possible by showing either how many things can form a unity or how three things identical to another are different. At the end of the paper, I present some objections to these models and suggest, first, that metaphysical models are not as unnecessary as Beall makes them appear, and second, that if the gluon models I present do not work, we probably must accept mysterianism. Unless a free-trouble, non-transitive-based model is offered.

Abstract

The historical development of the doctrine of the Trinity evidences an apparent contradiction. On the one hand, the doctrine says that there are three divine beings, which apparently implies that there are three gods. On the other hand, it declares that there is only one God. This problem has also been interpreted in terms of identity: f=g, s=g, and h=g, but f≠s, f≠h, and s≠h, which means that they are identical and not identical. Contradictions are problematic for many people. So, what to do with this contradiction? Some people have tried to solve it affirming one side of the contradiction and denying the other. Others have tried to dissolve it, i.e., they have attempted to show that there is no contradiction at all. In this paper, I propose a third alternative. To accept the contradiction. Taking this as my starting point, I develop two dialetheist models of the Trinity. These models are based on Priest’s gluon theory and are inspired by Jeffry Pelletier’s book review of Priest’s book One. Through them, I explain how the trinitarian contradiction is possible by showing either how many things can form a unity or how three things identical to another are different. At the end of the paper, I present some objections to these models and suggest, first, that metaphysical models are not as unnecessary as Beall makes them appear, and second, that if the gluon models I present do not work, we probably must accept mysterianism. Unless a free-trouble, non-transitive-based model is offered.

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Dedication V
  3. Contents VII
  4. Introduction: Facing Contradiction in the Absolute 1
  5. Part I : Asian Philosophy
  6. Transcendental Contradictions: The Spectre of Non-Being in Early to Middle Brāhmanic-Hindu Thought-System 9
  7. “It is Distant, it is Near” – Vedāntic Hindu Visions of Divine Contradictions 39
  8. Contradictions and Certainty: The Mīmāṃsā Defense of the Authorless Veda 61
  9. Buddhism, Emptiness, and Paradox 77
  10. All in One Mind. Huayan’s Holistic Panbuddhism 89
  11. Heidegger and Dōgen on the Ineffable 105
  12. Part II : Christian Philosophy
  13. Contradiction and God Between Neoplatonism and the Byzantine Tradition: Proclus, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Nicholas of Methone 137
  14. The Ways God Overcomes Contradictions in Human Understanding: Nicholas of Cusa 169
  15. Identity and non-Identity of the Human Soul with God in Meister Eckhart’s Metaphysical Mysticism 185
  16. Hegel’s Absolute from a Logical Point of View 211
  17. The One, the Many, and the Trinity: A Dialetheist Response to the Trinitarian Contradiction 221
  18. Part III: Jewish and Islamic Philosophy
  19. “Laud and praise Him justly and uprightly, not by attributing to Him exaggerations and absurdities”: God and logic in Jewish thought 249
  20. On Ayin, or the Divine Nothing 269
  21. Transcendence vs. Immanence in Jewish Philosophy and Poetry 289
  22. God’s attributes; Are aḥwāl contradictory? 297
  23. God and Impossibility: A Classical Ashʿarī Perspective 311
  24. Is Being Contradictory? — Ibn al-ʿArabī and the Principle of Non-Contradiction 347
  25. Contributors
  26. Names Index
  27. Topic Index
Heruntergeladen am 4.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783111369983-012/html?lang=de
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