Auguste Comte and Philosophy as Science
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Michel Bourdeau is Senior Researcher at Institut d'histoire et de philosophie des sciences et des techniques, Université Paris 1–CNRS, and has published a dozen articles on Comte’s philosophy in French and English.
Abstract
What distinguishes Comte from all those who have wanted to render philosophy more scientific is that he also wanted to render science more philosophical. His point of departure is not philosophy but rather the science of his day, which he judged to be unsatisfactory.
His position rests on an analysis of the distinction between natural philosophy and moral philosophy. Originating in Greece, its appearance coincides with the move from the theological state to the metaphysical state, and the distinction is abolished by the rise of positive philosophy. Thus, science becomes philosophy, and philosophy becomes scientific.
In this restoration of the unity destroyed by the Greeks, sociology plays an essential role. Sociology is the ultimate science. With sociology, human phenomena, that is, social phenomena, which had remained in the domain of philosophy, become an object of science. Thus, sociology has a dual status: it is a science like the others—the science of social phenomena, just as biology is the science of vital phenomena—but as the ultimate science, it presupposes and recapitulates all the other sciences. In sociology, we have just one science, the human science. In sociology, the distinction between science and philosophy no longer has a place; social science is at the same time social philosophy.
Comte’s position is therefore inseparable from a concern for the unity of science. Philosophy is characterized not only by attention to the human but also by concern for unity, the search for universality, and a comprehensive view. And if science must become more philosophical, it is so as to struggle against the undesirable effects of increasing division of labor and specialization, which continue to prevail in the scientific world.
Abstract
What distinguishes Comte from all those who have wanted to render philosophy more scientific is that he also wanted to render science more philosophical. His point of departure is not philosophy but rather the science of his day, which he judged to be unsatisfactory.
His position rests on an analysis of the distinction between natural philosophy and moral philosophy. Originating in Greece, its appearance coincides with the move from the theological state to the metaphysical state, and the distinction is abolished by the rise of positive philosophy. Thus, science becomes philosophy, and philosophy becomes scientific.
In this restoration of the unity destroyed by the Greeks, sociology plays an essential role. Sociology is the ultimate science. With sociology, human phenomena, that is, social phenomena, which had remained in the domain of philosophy, become an object of science. Thus, sociology has a dual status: it is a science like the others—the science of social phenomena, just as biology is the science of vital phenomena—but as the ultimate science, it presupposes and recapitulates all the other sciences. In sociology, we have just one science, the human science. In sociology, the distinction between science and philosophy no longer has a place; social science is at the same time social philosophy.
Comte’s position is therefore inseparable from a concern for the unity of science. Philosophy is characterized not only by attention to the human but also by concern for unity, the search for universality, and a comprehensive view. And if science must become more philosophical, it is so as to struggle against the undesirable effects of increasing division of labor and specialization, which continue to prevail in the scientific world.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Dedication 5
- Acknowledgment 7
- Contents IX
- Abbreviations
- Introduction 1
- Who Needs Modern Philosophy? 11
- Auguste Comte and Philosophy as Science 29
- Could Philosophy be an Empirical Science? On Brentano’s Fourth Habilitation Thesis 45
- Brentano and the Idea of Philosophy as Science in German Idealism 57
- From Kantian Philosophy as Wissenschaft to Nietzschean Philosophy as Gaya Scienza 79
- Representation, Consciousness, and the Foundation of a Philosophy in General: On the Reappearance of Conceptual Themes from the Kantian Systematic Philosophy of Karl Leonhard Reinhold in the Psychology of Franz Brentano 97
- The Twofold Meaning of Brentano’s “Pure Theoretical Interest” and His Metaphysics and Psychology 137
- Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy in Brentano’s Metaphysics Lectures (during His Vienna Years) 197
- Natural Theology and Its Discontents: Brentano and Kierkegaard 217
- Beyond Brentano: Stumpf and the Scientific Method of Philosophy 247
- Meinong’s Empirical Philosophy from Below 269
- On Twardowski’s Early Idea of Philosophy as Science: Sources and Context 293
- Is Science in a Reistic World Possible at All? Marty’s Critique of Brentano in Raum und Zeit 313
- “Was gilt?” On Husserl’s and Brentano’s Standpoints on Ideal Objects and Evidence 333
- Philosophy as Science as Core Feature of the School of Brentano: Comparing Brentano and Paulsen 355
- Dilthey’s Philosophy of Philosophy: Science, Worldview, and Critical Self-Reflection 381
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Appendix: Franz Brentano on Induction and on Metaphysics as Wisdom
- The Problem of Induction (1903) 405
- What is Metaphysics? (1901) 423
- The Blessings for which Wisdom has been Praised Throughout the Ages (1913) 425
- Wisdom: Its Scientific Character; Its Object; and Its Specific Tasks (1916) 429
- Index of Names
- Index of Subjects
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Dedication 5
- Acknowledgment 7
- Contents IX
- Abbreviations
- Introduction 1
- Who Needs Modern Philosophy? 11
- Auguste Comte and Philosophy as Science 29
- Could Philosophy be an Empirical Science? On Brentano’s Fourth Habilitation Thesis 45
- Brentano and the Idea of Philosophy as Science in German Idealism 57
- From Kantian Philosophy as Wissenschaft to Nietzschean Philosophy as Gaya Scienza 79
- Representation, Consciousness, and the Foundation of a Philosophy in General: On the Reappearance of Conceptual Themes from the Kantian Systematic Philosophy of Karl Leonhard Reinhold in the Psychology of Franz Brentano 97
- The Twofold Meaning of Brentano’s “Pure Theoretical Interest” and His Metaphysics and Psychology 137
- Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy in Brentano’s Metaphysics Lectures (during His Vienna Years) 197
- Natural Theology and Its Discontents: Brentano and Kierkegaard 217
- Beyond Brentano: Stumpf and the Scientific Method of Philosophy 247
- Meinong’s Empirical Philosophy from Below 269
- On Twardowski’s Early Idea of Philosophy as Science: Sources and Context 293
- Is Science in a Reistic World Possible at All? Marty’s Critique of Brentano in Raum und Zeit 313
- “Was gilt?” On Husserl’s and Brentano’s Standpoints on Ideal Objects and Evidence 333
- Philosophy as Science as Core Feature of the School of Brentano: Comparing Brentano and Paulsen 355
- Dilthey’s Philosophy of Philosophy: Science, Worldview, and Critical Self-Reflection 381
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Appendix: Franz Brentano on Induction and on Metaphysics as Wisdom
- The Problem of Induction (1903) 405
- What is Metaphysics? (1901) 423
- The Blessings for which Wisdom has been Praised Throughout the Ages (1913) 425
- Wisdom: Its Scientific Character; Its Object; and Its Specific Tasks (1916) 429
- Index of Names
- Index of Subjects
