Ontological Commitment and State of Affairs
-
Jesús Padilla Gálvez
Abstract
This chapter deals with the discussion on the anti-Kantian proposal developed by Bolzano when he introduced the “Satz an sich”. Bolzano’s proposal clearly deviated from the idealistic tradition. As such, a gap was opened between representation on the one hand and the notion of “objective” on the other hand, which belongs to the field of assumptions. The aim was to assume an immanent object that is intentionally given. The Brentano School devoted extensive research to this topic. Aristotelian logic gives way to a new structure whose minor premise is a conditional structure that expresses what C. Stumpf coined as “Sachverhalt”, its English translation being “state of affairs.” This may be expressed in two different ways: as a that-clause or as something that “subsists”. This investigation focuses on the content of judgment when expressed as a state of affairs. Frege considered this content as predicative and Husserl regarded state of affairs is carrier of properties.Wittgenstein proposed a distinction between object and carrier. This investigation aims to clarify the question of states of affairs and its ontology.
Abstract
This chapter deals with the discussion on the anti-Kantian proposal developed by Bolzano when he introduced the “Satz an sich”. Bolzano’s proposal clearly deviated from the idealistic tradition. As such, a gap was opened between representation on the one hand and the notion of “objective” on the other hand, which belongs to the field of assumptions. The aim was to assume an immanent object that is intentionally given. The Brentano School devoted extensive research to this topic. Aristotelian logic gives way to a new structure whose minor premise is a conditional structure that expresses what C. Stumpf coined as “Sachverhalt”, its English translation being “state of affairs.” This may be expressed in two different ways: as a that-clause or as something that “subsists”. This investigation focuses on the content of judgment when expressed as a state of affairs. Frege considered this content as predicative and Husserl regarded state of affairs is carrier of properties.Wittgenstein proposed a distinction between object and carrier. This investigation aims to clarify the question of states of affairs and its ontology.
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Contents V
- Ontological Commitment: An Introduction 1
- Meinong’s Objectives 21
- Metaphysical Aspects of Agency 33
- Representation as Ontological Problem 63
- Ontological Commitment and State of Affairs 79
- “I know” Language-games in Wittgenstein’s Late Philosophy 99
- Against Propositional Substantivism 111
- Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, a Case for Practical Ontology? 131
- Paradox in Ontology: Black Holes, Cosmology, Wittgenstein versus Stephen Hawking’s Claim that Philosophy is Dead 139
- List of Contributors 153
- Index of Names 155
- Subject Index 157
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Contents V
- Ontological Commitment: An Introduction 1
- Meinong’s Objectives 21
- Metaphysical Aspects of Agency 33
- Representation as Ontological Problem 63
- Ontological Commitment and State of Affairs 79
- “I know” Language-games in Wittgenstein’s Late Philosophy 99
- Against Propositional Substantivism 111
- Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, a Case for Practical Ontology? 131
- Paradox in Ontology: Black Holes, Cosmology, Wittgenstein versus Stephen Hawking’s Claim that Philosophy is Dead 139
- List of Contributors 153
- Index of Names 155
- Subject Index 157
