Deficiencies of Gödel’s Ontological Proof

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter I
2. Contents VII
3. Acknowledgements XI
4. The Declaration of the Establishment of the International Society for Formal Ontology XIII
5. Introduction 1
6. Part I: Peter van Inwagen – A Profile
7. Interview with Peter van Inwagen 11
8. Jonathan and Peter 33
9. Part II: The Grounds and Ways of Metaphysics
10. Where Are You Going, Metaphysics, and How Are You Getting There? – Grounding Theory as a Case Study 37
11. On the Relevance of Grounds 59
12. Metaphysical Differences 83
13. A Van Inwagenian Defense of Constitutionalism 103
14. Inside the Metaphysical Workshop 119
15. Part III: Existence, Nonexistence, and Contradiction
16. Existence Predicates 153
17. Modes of Being and the Mind 183
18. Imagining Fictional Characters 203
19. Objects That Are Not Objects 217
20. Part IV: Composition, Organisms, and Persons
21. The Concept of Organism and Degrees of Composition 233
22. Peter van Inwagen and the Hylomorphic Renaissance 247
23. Remnant-Persons: A Commonsense Defence of Animalism 265
24. Part V: Abstract Beings, Nominalism, and Infinity
25. Van Inwagen’s Approach to Relations and the Theory of O-Roles 279
26. Properties, Nominalisms and Things That Can Be Said 297
27. Paraphrase: A (More or Less) Van Inwagenian Way toward (Moderate) Nominalism 315
28. The Problem of the Many: Supervaluation, Rough Sets and Faultless Disagreement 329
29. Realizability as a Kind of Truth-Making 351
30. Part VI: God, Theodicy, and the Best World
31. Optimalism in Explaining the Nature of Things 367
32. Van Inwagen on Testimony and Contingency 399
33. The Problem of Evil and Atonement 413
34. Resisting Rowe’s No-Best-World Argument for Atheism 443
35. Deficiencies of Gödel’s Ontological Proof 469
36. Authors of Contributed Papers 477
37. Person Index 483
38. Subject Index 489