Chapter 1 Introspection and Access: Some Conceptual Remarks on Attention and the Sense of Agency
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Diego D’Angelo
Abstract
In my contribution I will try to address the role that attention plays in our sense of agency. In order to achieve this, I will proceed in the following steps. The first section of the paper will review current empirical research showing that some level of attention is required for action control and, conversely, that action can modify attention (for an overview see Bruya 2010). Moreover, I will show that the relative position and movements of bodily organs can boost or impair our attention span, referring to some illustrative results in cognitive sciences (such as Yu, Smith and Pereira 2007, Thura et al. 2008, Yu and Smith 2012). In the second section, I will claim that such findings need to be taken seriously when reflecting philosophically about the concept of attention. Attention is not merely the intellectual capacity of directing the focus of one’s mind toward something, but implies a feedback relation to action. Therefore, I will introduce and define the concept of attention-action-feedback: according to this model, whenever we pay attention to something, bodily action is involved. In the third part I will tentatively spell out the consequences of this model for the question concerning our sense of agency (for an overview see Pfister 2019). We have a sense of agency when we pay some level of attention to what we are doing. But paying attention does not imply introspection or a purely ‘mental state’: paying attention means being bodily active, so that a phenomenology of attention does not need concepts such as introspection or mental state. Some closing remarks will sum up the main arguments of the paper and point out further directions of inquiry.
Abstract
In my contribution I will try to address the role that attention plays in our sense of agency. In order to achieve this, I will proceed in the following steps. The first section of the paper will review current empirical research showing that some level of attention is required for action control and, conversely, that action can modify attention (for an overview see Bruya 2010). Moreover, I will show that the relative position and movements of bodily organs can boost or impair our attention span, referring to some illustrative results in cognitive sciences (such as Yu, Smith and Pereira 2007, Thura et al. 2008, Yu and Smith 2012). In the second section, I will claim that such findings need to be taken seriously when reflecting philosophically about the concept of attention. Attention is not merely the intellectual capacity of directing the focus of one’s mind toward something, but implies a feedback relation to action. Therefore, I will introduce and define the concept of attention-action-feedback: according to this model, whenever we pay attention to something, bodily action is involved. In the third part I will tentatively spell out the consequences of this model for the question concerning our sense of agency (for an overview see Pfister 2019). We have a sense of agency when we pay some level of attention to what we are doing. But paying attention does not imply introspection or a purely ‘mental state’: paying attention means being bodily active, so that a phenomenology of attention does not need concepts such as introspection or mental state. Some closing remarks will sum up the main arguments of the paper and point out further directions of inquiry.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Contents V
- Introduction. Access and Mediation: Attention Beyond Selectivity 1
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Part 1: Attention and Access
- Chapter 1 Introspection and Access: Some Conceptual Remarks on Attention and the Sense of Agency 23
- Chapter 2 Aesthetic Attention and Change of Perspectives 43
- Chapter 3 Attention in Joint Attention: From Selection to Prioritization 65
- Chapter 4 Sharing Attention, Sharing Affordances: From Dyadic Interaction to Collective Information 91
- Chapter 5 Attention as Vigilant Openness 113
- Chapter 6 Different Ways of Attending to Experience: Formalizing the Phenomenological Epoché to Translate Between Science and Philosophy 135
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Part 2: Attention and Mediation
- Chapter 7 The Role of Attention and Intention in Dreams 163
- Chapter 8 Improving Attention in Psychosis With Digital Tools 189
- Chapter 9 Attending to Your Lifestyle: Self-Tracking Technologies and Relevance 217
- Chapter 10 Attention and Technology: From Focusing to Multiple Attentions 239
- Chapter 11 How Can Attention Seeking Be Good? From Strategic Ignorance to Self-Experiments 259
- Chapter 12 Exploring Attention Through Technologically-Mediated Musical Improvisation: An Enactive-Ecological Perspective 279
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Contents V
- Introduction. Access and Mediation: Attention Beyond Selectivity 1
-
Part 1: Attention and Access
- Chapter 1 Introspection and Access: Some Conceptual Remarks on Attention and the Sense of Agency 23
- Chapter 2 Aesthetic Attention and Change of Perspectives 43
- Chapter 3 Attention in Joint Attention: From Selection to Prioritization 65
- Chapter 4 Sharing Attention, Sharing Affordances: From Dyadic Interaction to Collective Information 91
- Chapter 5 Attention as Vigilant Openness 113
- Chapter 6 Different Ways of Attending to Experience: Formalizing the Phenomenological Epoché to Translate Between Science and Philosophy 135
-
Part 2: Attention and Mediation
- Chapter 7 The Role of Attention and Intention in Dreams 163
- Chapter 8 Improving Attention in Psychosis With Digital Tools 189
- Chapter 9 Attending to Your Lifestyle: Self-Tracking Technologies and Relevance 217
- Chapter 10 Attention and Technology: From Focusing to Multiple Attentions 239
- Chapter 11 How Can Attention Seeking Be Good? From Strategic Ignorance to Self-Experiments 259
- Chapter 12 Exploring Attention Through Technologically-Mediated Musical Improvisation: An Enactive-Ecological Perspective 279
