Contents

Chapters in this book

1. Frontmatter i
2. Preface and acknowledgments vii
3. Contents xi
4. Part i: the phenomenon and how to explain it
5. 1 the phenomenon of oughtness 3
6. 2 the grounds for explaining oughtness 26
7. 3 two angles and a dialectical dead end 44
8. Part ii: four theories of oughtness
9. 4 stemmer’s humean theory of oughtness 55
10. 5 halbig’s value realism 79
11. 6 schroeder’s hypotheticalism 103
12. 7 scanlon’s reasons fundamentalism 120
13. 8 why humeanism ‘wins’ 147
14. Part iii: constructing conativism
15. 9 a look ahead 157
16. 10 an anthropological framework for humeanism 160
17. 11 the argument from favored desires 175
18. 12 the nature of desiring 185
19. 13 promoting desires 195
20. 14 idealization, epistemic error, and autonomy 208
21. 15 the nature of practical reasons 228
22. 16 the weight of favorings 241
23. 17 conativism and the morality angle 248
24. 18 the origin of oughtness: a recapitulation 266
25. Bibliography 277
26. Index 283