Jakob Friedrich Fries as an Opponent of German Idealism
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Tadahiro Oota
Abstract
Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843) was a nineteenth-century German philosopher, contemporaneous with so-called “German Idealism,” who is best known for his main work, New Critique of Reason (1807/1828-1831).¹ Fries regards Kant’s philosophy as incomplete and tries to revise and renew it. Since he adopts Kant’s spirit of criticism, he emphasises the finitude of human cognition and in this respect he criticises his contemporaneous opponents: Reinhold, Fichte, and Schelling. Fries criticises Kant’s conception of transcendental cognition as follows: Although transcendental cognition concerns cognitions a priori, transcendental cognition itself can be acquired only in an empirical way because human cognition always begins with experience. Hence Kant was in error to regard it as a priori. German Idealists elaborated on Kant’s mistake and interpreted mere inner perception as cognition a priori, which led them to adopt the “synthetic method” as a means of philosophising. Fries corrects them by assuming the “analytical method,” whereby he starts from the standpoint of ordinary experience by analysing “the ordinary opinions (Beurtheilungen) in daily life” in order to reveal the philosophical cognitions constructing the general presuppositions of opinions. He calls such a project “Critique of Reason.” Kuno Fischer (1824-1907), however, contradicts Fries’s approach by defending German Idealists, arguing that the cognition a priori can never be acquired in an empirical way. Otto Liebmann (1840 -1912) also follows Fischer and criticises Fries’s approach as a “retrogression to Locke.” In this article I deal with Fries’s conception of the “Critique of Reason” and respond to the objections above. Fries’s method is an analysis of opinions, which are neither mere experience nor logical judging (urtheilen). The philosophical cognitions constructing the presuppositions of opinions belong to “reason,” which is to be distinguished from “understanding,” which conducts the “analysing” operation by relying on arbitrary reflection.
Abstract
Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843) was a nineteenth-century German philosopher, contemporaneous with so-called “German Idealism,” who is best known for his main work, New Critique of Reason (1807/1828-1831).¹ Fries regards Kant’s philosophy as incomplete and tries to revise and renew it. Since he adopts Kant’s spirit of criticism, he emphasises the finitude of human cognition and in this respect he criticises his contemporaneous opponents: Reinhold, Fichte, and Schelling. Fries criticises Kant’s conception of transcendental cognition as follows: Although transcendental cognition concerns cognitions a priori, transcendental cognition itself can be acquired only in an empirical way because human cognition always begins with experience. Hence Kant was in error to regard it as a priori. German Idealists elaborated on Kant’s mistake and interpreted mere inner perception as cognition a priori, which led them to adopt the “synthetic method” as a means of philosophising. Fries corrects them by assuming the “analytical method,” whereby he starts from the standpoint of ordinary experience by analysing “the ordinary opinions (Beurtheilungen) in daily life” in order to reveal the philosophical cognitions constructing the general presuppositions of opinions. He calls such a project “Critique of Reason.” Kuno Fischer (1824-1907), however, contradicts Fries’s approach by defending German Idealists, arguing that the cognition a priori can never be acquired in an empirical way. Otto Liebmann (1840 -1912) also follows Fischer and criticises Fries’s approach as a “retrogression to Locke.” In this article I deal with Fries’s conception of the “Critique of Reason” and respond to the objections above. Fries’s method is an analysis of opinions, which are neither mere experience nor logical judging (urtheilen). The philosophical cognitions constructing the presuppositions of opinions belong to “reason,” which is to be distinguished from “understanding,” which conducts the “analysing” operation by relying on arbitrary reflection.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Acknowledgements V
- Table of Contents VII
- Introduction 1
-
Goethe’s (Anti-)Classicism and Experientialism
- Embracing the Enemy: The Problem of Religion in Goethe’s “Confessions of a Beautiful Soul” 13
- “Meine Schwester Natalie ist hiervon ein lebhaftes Beispiel:” Bildung and Gender in Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre 27
- Mediating Subjectivities: Anti-Classical and Anti-Ideal Impulses in Goethe’s Zur Farbenlehre and Die Wahlverwandtschaften 49
- Reading Surfaces: Goethe and Benjamin 69
-
Kant-Critique and the Romanticist Movement
- Jakob Friedrich Fries as an Opponent of German Idealism 87
- Apparent Purposes. How Does the Purpose of Purposelessness Operate? 103
- Antecedents to Hegel’s Conception of Judaism in Kant’s Practical Philosophy 115
- “Diese Unwissenheit ist mir der unerträglichste Mangel, der gröste Widerspruch”: The Search for Pre-rational Knowledge in Karoline von Günderrode 131
- Romantic Anti-Idealism and Re-evaluations of Gender: Schlegel, Günderrode and Literary Gender Politics 147
- The Polymorphous Political Theology of Novalis and Marcuse 161
-
Hölderlin and Nietzsche: The Ecological Complication of Idealist Aesthetics
- Hölderlin’s Poetics of Zärtlichkeit: The Corporeal Turn of Transcendental Idealism 175
- Grund/Abgrund. On Kant and Hölderlin 187
- Nietzsche and Cognitive Ecology 209
- Overturning Philosophy: Classic and (Anti)-Classic Considerations on Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo 227
- Index 243
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Acknowledgements V
- Table of Contents VII
- Introduction 1
-
Goethe’s (Anti-)Classicism and Experientialism
- Embracing the Enemy: The Problem of Religion in Goethe’s “Confessions of a Beautiful Soul” 13
- “Meine Schwester Natalie ist hiervon ein lebhaftes Beispiel:” Bildung and Gender in Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre 27
- Mediating Subjectivities: Anti-Classical and Anti-Ideal Impulses in Goethe’s Zur Farbenlehre and Die Wahlverwandtschaften 49
- Reading Surfaces: Goethe and Benjamin 69
-
Kant-Critique and the Romanticist Movement
- Jakob Friedrich Fries as an Opponent of German Idealism 87
- Apparent Purposes. How Does the Purpose of Purposelessness Operate? 103
- Antecedents to Hegel’s Conception of Judaism in Kant’s Practical Philosophy 115
- “Diese Unwissenheit ist mir der unerträglichste Mangel, der gröste Widerspruch”: The Search for Pre-rational Knowledge in Karoline von Günderrode 131
- Romantic Anti-Idealism and Re-evaluations of Gender: Schlegel, Günderrode and Literary Gender Politics 147
- The Polymorphous Political Theology of Novalis and Marcuse 161
-
Hölderlin and Nietzsche: The Ecological Complication of Idealist Aesthetics
- Hölderlin’s Poetics of Zärtlichkeit: The Corporeal Turn of Transcendental Idealism 175
- Grund/Abgrund. On Kant and Hölderlin 187
- Nietzsche and Cognitive Ecology 209
- Overturning Philosophy: Classic and (Anti)-Classic Considerations on Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo 227
- Index 243
