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On the scope of negation1

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Looking at Language
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https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110549119-011On the scope of negation1I shall henceforth not use the word not.Bertrand Russell1 IntroductionAll languages provide their speakers with the possibility to negate a sentence, for example by adding an affix to the verb, as in Japanese, by using a negative verb, as in Finnish, or by special particles such as bu or mei in Chinese, not in English, ne...pas in French or nicht in German; very often, a language combines several of these means (see Dahl 1979, Payne 1985, Bernini and Ramat 1996, Miestamo 2005, for typological comparisons). The most common device is parti-cles. Their form and functioning vary considerably across languages and within a language; but four features are commonly held to be characteristic. First, they are syntactically optional, i.e., the sentence without the particle would also be syntactically complete. Second, they preserve the illocutionary role of the sen-tences, i.e., they do not turn an assertion into a question, or a question into a command. Third, they can be inserted at various places and under varying forms in the sentence.2 German, the language under investigation here, is particularly flexible in that regard:(1)a.Isa ist gestern zum ersten Mal nicht gekommen.Isa has yesterday for the first time not come.b.Isa ist gestern nicht zum ersten Mal gekommen.Isa has yesterday not for the first time come.1 This paper was originally written in 2006 and is first published here after substantial revision. Over the years, it was presented to a number of various audiences; I wish to thank the partici-pants for useful discussions. I am also very grateful to Manfred Bierwisch, Christine Dimroth, Cathrine Fabricius-Hansen, Arnim von Stechow, Rosemary Tracy and Heide Wegener for helpful comments. They all should not be held responsible for my errors.2 There is, of course, a difference between (a) a sentence – i.e., an abstract object with a par-ticular linguistic structure, (b) the propositional content (or proposition) expressed by such a sentence, – and (c) an utterance –, i.e., the event of uttering or understanding such a sentence on some occasion. In what follows, I shall often ignore this distinction, and simply speak of “sentences”, as long as there is no major risk of misunderstanding.
© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Munich/Boston

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110549119-011On the scope of negation1I shall henceforth not use the word not.Bertrand Russell1 IntroductionAll languages provide their speakers with the possibility to negate a sentence, for example by adding an affix to the verb, as in Japanese, by using a negative verb, as in Finnish, or by special particles such as bu or mei in Chinese, not in English, ne...pas in French or nicht in German; very often, a language combines several of these means (see Dahl 1979, Payne 1985, Bernini and Ramat 1996, Miestamo 2005, for typological comparisons). The most common device is parti-cles. Their form and functioning vary considerably across languages and within a language; but four features are commonly held to be characteristic. First, they are syntactically optional, i.e., the sentence without the particle would also be syntactically complete. Second, they preserve the illocutionary role of the sen-tences, i.e., they do not turn an assertion into a question, or a question into a command. Third, they can be inserted at various places and under varying forms in the sentence.2 German, the language under investigation here, is particularly flexible in that regard:(1)a.Isa ist gestern zum ersten Mal nicht gekommen.Isa has yesterday for the first time not come.b.Isa ist gestern nicht zum ersten Mal gekommen.Isa has yesterday not for the first time come.1 This paper was originally written in 2006 and is first published here after substantial revision. Over the years, it was presented to a number of various audiences; I wish to thank the partici-pants for useful discussions. I am also very grateful to Manfred Bierwisch, Christine Dimroth, Cathrine Fabricius-Hansen, Arnim von Stechow, Rosemary Tracy and Heide Wegener for helpful comments. They all should not be held responsible for my errors.2 There is, of course, a difference between (a) a sentence – i.e., an abstract object with a par-ticular linguistic structure, (b) the propositional content (or proposition) expressed by such a sentence, – and (c) an utterance –, i.e., the event of uttering or understanding such a sentence on some occasion. In what follows, I shall often ignore this distinction, and simply speak of “sentences”, as long as there is no major risk of misunderstanding.
© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Munich/Boston
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