Startseite Philosophie From Consensus to Modus Vivendi? Pluralistic Approaches to the Challenge of Moral Diversity and Conflict
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From Consensus to Modus Vivendi? Pluralistic Approaches to the Challenge of Moral Diversity and Conflict

  • Ulrike Spohn
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New Perspectives on Distributive Justice
Ein Kapitel aus dem Buch New Perspectives on Distributive Justice

Abstract

This essay considers two critiques of Rawls’ overlapping consensus that move beyond the Kantian paradigm, investigating instead solutions to problems of value pluralism in terms of a modus vivendi. Specifically, it examines the models of Charles Taylor and John Gray, presented respectively as dialogical and agonistic variants of modus vivendi. It is argued that Taylor, though accepting a form of overlapping consensus, is nonetheless critical of Rawls’ claim that it is justified through a freestanding and independent notion of political liberalism. For Taylor, there is no neutral conception of justification beyond the overlapping consensus itself. Gray also rejects Rawls’ notion of a freestanding justification for overlapping consensus, seeing in it the privileging of a single comprehensive view. However, he also rejects Taylor’s dialogical account which results in a consensus on something like liberal values. While Gray cannot accept Taylor’s optimistic notion that humans want to understand each other, it is argued that Gray’s “neo-Hobbesian” account of modus vivendi is likely inadequate to explain the notions of civic virtue which are an essential part of democracies today.

Abstract

This essay considers two critiques of Rawls’ overlapping consensus that move beyond the Kantian paradigm, investigating instead solutions to problems of value pluralism in terms of a modus vivendi. Specifically, it examines the models of Charles Taylor and John Gray, presented respectively as dialogical and agonistic variants of modus vivendi. It is argued that Taylor, though accepting a form of overlapping consensus, is nonetheless critical of Rawls’ claim that it is justified through a freestanding and independent notion of political liberalism. For Taylor, there is no neutral conception of justification beyond the overlapping consensus itself. Gray also rejects Rawls’ notion of a freestanding justification for overlapping consensus, seeing in it the privileging of a single comprehensive view. However, he also rejects Taylor’s dialogical account which results in a consensus on something like liberal values. While Gray cannot accept Taylor’s optimistic notion that humans want to understand each other, it is argued that Gray’s “neo-Hobbesian” account of modus vivendi is likely inadequate to explain the notions of civic virtue which are an essential part of democracies today.

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Table of Contents V
  3. List of Abbreviations IX
  4. Introduction: Two Opposing Conceptions of Distributive Justice 1
  5. Part I: Deep Disagreements
  6. Deep Disagreements on Social and Political Justice: Their Meta-Ethical Relevance and the Need for a New Research Perspective 23
  7. Are There Irreconcilable Conceptions of Justice? Critical Remarks on Isaiah Berlin 53
  8. Equality beyond Liberal Egalitarianism: Walzer’s Contribution to the Theory of Justice 71
  9. Stuart Hampshire and the Case for Procedural Justice 91
  10. Public Reason in Circumstances of Pluralism 109
  11. Does Rawls’s First Principle of Justice Allow for Consensus? A Note 127
  12. Part II: Ancient Perspectives and Critiques of the Centrality of Justice
  13. Aristotle on Natural Right 133
  14. What Is “Just in Distribution” in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics – Too Much Justice, Too Little Right 151
  15. Justice in Ethics and Political Philosophy: A Fundamental Critique 171
  16. Justicitis 187
  17. Part III: The Problem of Consensus
  18. Rawls on Overlapping Disagreement and the Problem of Reconciliation 207
  19. Public Reason, Compromise within Consensus, and Legitimacy 225
  20. From Consensus to Modus Vivendi? Pluralistic Approaches to the Challenge of Moral Diversity and Conflict 243
  21. What Bonds Citizens in a Pluralistic Democracy? Probing Mouffe’s Notion of a Conflictual Consensus 259
  22. Citizenship, Community, and the Rule of Law: With or Without Consensus? 275
  23. Political Liberalism: The Burdens of Judgement and Moral Psychology 291
  24. Part IV: Expanding the Perspective on Obligations
  25. John Rawls and Claims of Climate Justice: Tensions and Prospects 311
  26. Assistance, Emergency Relief and the Duty Not to Harm – Rawls’ and Cosmopolitan Approaches to Distributive Justice Combined 329
  27. Global Collective Obligations, Just International Institutions and Pluralism 345
  28. Intergenerational Justice in the Age of Genetic Manipulation 361
  29. Part V: Diversifying the Perspective
  30. The Contours of Toleration: A Relational Account 385
  31. Constructing Public Distributive Justice: On the Method of Functionalist Moral Theory 403
  32. Respect as an Object of Equal Distribution? Opacity, Individual Recognition and Second-Personal Authority 423
  33. Responsibility and Justice: Beyond Moral Egalitarianism and Rational Consensus 441
  34. Habermas’s and Rawls’s Postsecular Modesty 449
  35. Part VI: The Difference Principle
  36. A Defense of the Difference Principle beyond Rawls 469
  37. Marxist Critiques of the Difference Principle 487
  38. Part VII: The Economic Perspective: Adam Smith
  39. Justice, Equity, and Distribution: Adam Smith’s Answer to John Rawls’s Difference Principle 505
  40. Statism and Distributive Injustice in Adam Smith 523
  41. Notes on Contributors 541
  42. Author Index 545
  43. Subject Index 551
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110537369-016

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Table of Contents V
  3. List of Abbreviations IX
  4. Introduction: Two Opposing Conceptions of Distributive Justice 1
  5. Part I: Deep Disagreements
  6. Deep Disagreements on Social and Political Justice: Their Meta-Ethical Relevance and the Need for a New Research Perspective 23
  7. Are There Irreconcilable Conceptions of Justice? Critical Remarks on Isaiah Berlin 53
  8. Equality beyond Liberal Egalitarianism: Walzer’s Contribution to the Theory of Justice 71
  9. Stuart Hampshire and the Case for Procedural Justice 91
  10. Public Reason in Circumstances of Pluralism 109
  11. Does Rawls’s First Principle of Justice Allow for Consensus? A Note 127
  12. Part II: Ancient Perspectives and Critiques of the Centrality of Justice
  13. Aristotle on Natural Right 133
  14. What Is “Just in Distribution” in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics – Too Much Justice, Too Little Right 151
  15. Justice in Ethics and Political Philosophy: A Fundamental Critique 171
  16. Justicitis 187
  17. Part III: The Problem of Consensus
  18. Rawls on Overlapping Disagreement and the Problem of Reconciliation 207
  19. Public Reason, Compromise within Consensus, and Legitimacy 225
  20. From Consensus to Modus Vivendi? Pluralistic Approaches to the Challenge of Moral Diversity and Conflict 243
  21. What Bonds Citizens in a Pluralistic Democracy? Probing Mouffe’s Notion of a Conflictual Consensus 259
  22. Citizenship, Community, and the Rule of Law: With or Without Consensus? 275
  23. Political Liberalism: The Burdens of Judgement and Moral Psychology 291
  24. Part IV: Expanding the Perspective on Obligations
  25. John Rawls and Claims of Climate Justice: Tensions and Prospects 311
  26. Assistance, Emergency Relief and the Duty Not to Harm – Rawls’ and Cosmopolitan Approaches to Distributive Justice Combined 329
  27. Global Collective Obligations, Just International Institutions and Pluralism 345
  28. Intergenerational Justice in the Age of Genetic Manipulation 361
  29. Part V: Diversifying the Perspective
  30. The Contours of Toleration: A Relational Account 385
  31. Constructing Public Distributive Justice: On the Method of Functionalist Moral Theory 403
  32. Respect as an Object of Equal Distribution? Opacity, Individual Recognition and Second-Personal Authority 423
  33. Responsibility and Justice: Beyond Moral Egalitarianism and Rational Consensus 441
  34. Habermas’s and Rawls’s Postsecular Modesty 449
  35. Part VI: The Difference Principle
  36. A Defense of the Difference Principle beyond Rawls 469
  37. Marxist Critiques of the Difference Principle 487
  38. Part VII: The Economic Perspective: Adam Smith
  39. Justice, Equity, and Distribution: Adam Smith’s Answer to John Rawls’s Difference Principle 505
  40. Statism and Distributive Injustice in Adam Smith 523
  41. Notes on Contributors 541
  42. Author Index 545
  43. Subject Index 551
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Heruntergeladen am 27.10.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110537369-016/html?lang=de
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