External Goals and Inherent Norms – A Cluster-Conception of Epistemic Normativity

Chapters in this book

1. Frontmatter i
2. Table of Contents v
3. Acknowledgements ix
4. Introduction: Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals 1
5. I. Epistemic Reasons
6. In Defense of Psychologism About Reasons 33
7. Learning from Learning from our Mistakes 51
8. Destabilizing the Error Theory 71
9. Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against 95
10. II. Epistemic Norms
11. Belief, Truth and Radical Disagreement 117
12. Assertion, Knowledge and Rational Credibility: The Scoreboard 137
13. Commonality Reconsidered: On the Common Source of Epistemic Standards 165
14. Epistemic Standards: High Hopes and Low Expectations 185
15. What do I care About Epistemic Norms? 199
16. III Epistemic Consequentialism
17. Epistemic Normativity: From Direct to Indirect Epistemic Consequentialism 227
18. Tradeoffs, Self-Promotion, and Epistemic Teleology 249
19. Epistemic Consequentialism: Its Relation to Ethical Consequentialism and the Truth-Indication Principle 277
20. How to Overstretch the Ethics-Epistemology Analogy: Berker’s Critique of Epistemic Consequentialism 307
21. IV. Epistemic Goals and Values
22. External Goals and Inherent Norms – A Cluster-Conception of Epistemic Normativity 325
23. The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth: Reflections on Rosenberg 357
24. Ought to Believe, Evidential Understanding and the Pursuit of Wisdom 383
25. Epistemic Axiology 407
26. Objectual Understanding, Factivity and Belief 423
27. Contributors 443
28. Author Index 445
29. Subject Index 449