Essentially Rational Animals

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. Foreword v
3. Contents ix
4. Two Varieties of Skepticism 1
5. I. First-, Second-, and Third-Personal Knowledge
6. Knowing What You Believe 77
7. From Transparency to Expressivism 101
8. On Finkelstein’s Account of the Distinction between Conscious and Unconscious States of Mind 119
9. Practical Knowledge and the Structure of Action 133
10. Three Forms of the First Person Plural 229
11. Testimony, Address, and the Second Person 257
12. II. Knowledge and the Problem of Dualism
13. Tyler Burge on Disjunctivism 289
14. Motivating Disjunctivism 309
15. Disjunctive Conceptions of Experience and Perceiving 349
16. Trusting One’s Senses: McDowell on Experience, Belief and Justification 375
17. Essentially Rational Animals 395
18. Notes on Contributors 429
19. Index of Persons 431
20. Index of Topics 435