Infinitism and the Epistemic Regress Problem

Chapters in this book

1. Frontmatter i
2. Preface and Acknowledgements v
3. Contents vii
4. Introduction 1
5. Chapter One. Knowledge, Ability, and Manifestation
6. Part One: Knowledge As Ability
7. Knowledge and Knowing: Ability and Manifestation 73
8. Wie Wissen funktioniert 101
9. Part Two: Knowledge Through Ability
10. Knowing Full Well 129
11. Die Natur von Fähigkeiten und der Zweck von Wissen 141
12. The Genealogy of the Concept of Knowledge and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology 159
13. Knowledge, Abilities, and Epistemic Luck: What Is Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and What Can It Do? 179
14. Knowledge as a Fallible Capacity 215
15. Part Three: Knowing-How
16. Knowing-How: Indispensable but Inscrutable 245
17. Knowledge-How, Linguistic Intellectualism, and Ryle’s Return 269
18. Chapter Two. Knowledge in Situations: Contexts and Contrasts
19. Part One: Contextualism
20. Two Varieties of Knowledge 307
21. Nonindexical Contextualism – an Explication and Defense 329
22. Part Two: Contrastivism
23. What is Contrastivism? 353
24. Contrastive Knowledge 357
25. Contrastivism rather than Something Else? – On the Limits of Epistemic Contrastivism 395
26. Contrastive Knowledge: Reply to Baumann 411
27. PS: Response to Schaffer’s Reply 425
28. Chapter Three. Challenging Justification – The Nature and Structure of Justification
29. Verantwortlichkeit und Verlässlichkeit 435
30. Justification, Deontology, and Voluntary Control 461
31. Infinitism and the Epistemic Regress Problem 487
32. Das einfache Argument 509
33. What Is Transmission Failure? 527
34. Chapter Four. Varieties and Forms of Knowledge: Animal, Phenomenal, and Practical Knowledge
35. Epistemology and Cognitive Ethology 535
36. Non-Human Knowledge and Non-Human Agency 557
37. Phänomenales Wissen und der Hintergrund 589
38. Rechtliches Wissen 617
39. Chapter Five. Skepticism: Pragmatic Answers?
40. Wittgensteins Zweifel 629
41. Skepticism, Contextualism and Entitlement 649
42. Wittgenstein and Williamson on Knowing and Believing 671
43. Notes on Contributors 691
44. Register: Conceptions of Knowledge 697