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3. Deterrence by De-legitimization in the Information Environment: Concept, Theory, and Practice
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Alex Wilner
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Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter i
- CONTENTS v
- Foreword ix
- PREFACE xi
- Introduction 1
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Section I. Deterrence as an Evolving Concept
- 1. Deterrence Is Always about Information: A New Framework for Understanding 23
- 2. Nuclear Crisis Management for the Information Age 39
- 3. Deterrence by De-legitimization in the Information Environment: Concept, Theory, and Practice 63
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Section II. Wider Strategic Context and Experiences
- 4. Understanding Russia’s Approaches to Information Warfare 81
- 5. The Evolution of China’s Information Exploitation of COVID-19 119
- 6. Deterrence in the Gaza Conflict: Hamas Case Study Analysis 143
- 7. Resilience as a Framework for Deterrence in the Information Age: Lessons Learned from Israel about Information and Influence Operations 163
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Section III. Canada’s Context
- 8. Deterrence and Strategic Disinformation: An Overview of Canada’s Responses 189
- 9. Exit, Voice, or Loyalty? Functional Engagement as Cyber Strategy for Middle Power Statecraft 211
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Section IV. Emerging Tools and Approaches
- 10. Digital Tribalism and Ontological Insecurity: Manipulating Identities in the Information Environment 237
- 11. Deterrence for Online Radicalization and Recruitment in the Twenty-First Century 267
- 12. Assessing Influence in Target Audiences that Won’t Say or Don’t Know How Much They Have Been Influenced 301
- Conclusion 327
- Afterword 349
- Postface 351
- List of Abbreviations 353
- About the Authors 357
- Index 365
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter i
- CONTENTS v
- Foreword ix
- PREFACE xi
- Introduction 1
-
Section I. Deterrence as an Evolving Concept
- 1. Deterrence Is Always about Information: A New Framework for Understanding 23
- 2. Nuclear Crisis Management for the Information Age 39
- 3. Deterrence by De-legitimization in the Information Environment: Concept, Theory, and Practice 63
-
Section II. Wider Strategic Context and Experiences
- 4. Understanding Russia’s Approaches to Information Warfare 81
- 5. The Evolution of China’s Information Exploitation of COVID-19 119
- 6. Deterrence in the Gaza Conflict: Hamas Case Study Analysis 143
- 7. Resilience as a Framework for Deterrence in the Information Age: Lessons Learned from Israel about Information and Influence Operations 163
-
Section III. Canada’s Context
- 8. Deterrence and Strategic Disinformation: An Overview of Canada’s Responses 189
- 9. Exit, Voice, or Loyalty? Functional Engagement as Cyber Strategy for Middle Power Statecraft 211
-
Section IV. Emerging Tools and Approaches
- 10. Digital Tribalism and Ontological Insecurity: Manipulating Identities in the Information Environment 237
- 11. Deterrence for Online Radicalization and Recruitment in the Twenty-First Century 267
- 12. Assessing Influence in Target Audiences that Won’t Say or Don’t Know How Much They Have Been Influenced 301
- Conclusion 327
- Afterword 349
- Postface 351
- List of Abbreviations 353
- About the Authors 357
- Index 365