A Lost Peace
-
Galen Jackson
About this book
In A Lost Peace, Galen Jackson rewrites an important chapter in the history of the middle period of the Cold War, changing how we think about the Arab-Israeli conflict.
During the June 1967 Middle East war, Israeli forces seized the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan. This conflict was followed, in October 1973, by a joint Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel, which threatened to drag the United States and the Soviet Union into a confrontation even though the superpowers had seemingly embraced the idea of détente. This conflict contributed significantly to the ensuing deterioration of US-Soviet relations.
The standard explanation for why détente failed is that the Soviet Union, driven mainly by its Communist ideology, pursued a highly aggressive foreign policy during the 1970s. In the Middle East specifically, the conventional wisdom is that the Soviets played a destabilizing role by encouraging the Arabs in their conflict with Israel in an effort to undermine the US position in the region for Cold War gain.
Jackson challenges standard accounts of this period, demonstrating that the United States sought to exploit the Soviet Union in the Middle East, despite repeated entreaties from USSR leaders that the superpowers cooperate to reach a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement. By leveraging the remarkable evidence now available to scholars, Jackson reveals that the United States and the Soviet Union may have missed an opportunity for Middle East peace during the 1970s.
Author / Editor information
Galen Jackson is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College.
Reviews
Illuminating. Jackson effectively uses declassified American diplomatic records to show that it was not Soviet policies but rather those of the United States—specifically, those of Henry Kissinger—that were responsible for the lost opportunity to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Salim Yaqub, University of California, Santa Barbara, author of Imperfect Strangers:
With boldness, nuance, and unflagging thoroughness, Galen Jackson dismantles conventional wisdom on the US role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, showing how Cold War thinking prevented Washington from pursuing an eminently achievable political settlement.
Jeremy Pressman, University of Connecticut, author of The Sword Is Not Enough:
An excellent and persuasive book. A Lost Peace is a compelling and deeply researched account of Middle East peace efforts during this period, convincingly challenging the conventional wisdom about the responsibilities borne by the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the failure of the peace process.
Topics
-
Download PDFPublicly Available
Frontmatter
i -
Download PDFPublicly Available
Contents
vii -
Download PDFPublicly Available
Acknowledgments
ix -
Download PDFPublicly Available
List of Abbreviations
xiii -
Requires Authentication UnlicensedLicensed
Introduction: A Great Power Peace?
1 -
Requires Authentication UnlicensedLicensed
1. Deadlock: The Superpowers after the June 1967 War
8 -
Requires Authentication UnlicensedLicensed
2. Toward a Breakthrough? Nixon, the War of Attrition, and a Shift in Soviet Policy
34 -
Requires Authentication UnlicensedLicensed
3. Waiting for 1973: The Election, the Summit, and Sadat’s Expulsion of the Soviets
72 -
Requires Authentication UnlicensedLicensed
4. “Under the Cover of Détente”: The October War, Watergate, and Kissinger
95 -
Requires Authentication UnlicensedLicensed
5. “The Maximum Anti-Soviet Policy”: The Superpowers and the Road to Sinai II
133 -
Requires Authentication UnlicensedLicensed
6. A Peace Too Far? The Comprehensive Framework Collapses
162 -
Requires Authentication UnlicensedLicensed
Conclusion: What Drove the Cold War?
188 -
Requires Authentication UnlicensedLicensed
Notes
197 -
Requires Authentication UnlicensedLicensed
Index
251