Tempting Fate

Unpacking of the dynamics of conflict under conditions of nuclear monopoly, Paul C. Avey argues in Tempting Fate that the costs and benefits of using nuclear weapons create openings that weak nonnuclear actors can exploit. Avey uses four case studies to show the key strategies available to nonnuclear states: Iraqi decision-making under Saddam Hussein in confrontations with the United States; Egyptian leaders' thinking about the Israeli nuclear arsenal during wars in 1969–70 and 1973; Chinese confrontations with the United States in 1950, 1954, and 1958; and a dispute that never escalated to war, the Soviet-United States tensions between 1946 and 1948 that culminated in the Berlin Blockade.

Strategies employed include limiting the scope of the conflict, holding chemical and biological weapons in reserve, seeking outside support, and leveraging international non-use norms. Avey demonstrates clearly that nuclear weapons cast a definite but limited shadow, and while the world continues to face various nuclear challenges, understanding conflict in nuclear monopoly will remain a pressing concern for analysts and policymakers.

Thanks to generous funding from Virginia Tech and its participation in TOME, the ebook editions of this book are available as Open Access volumes, available from Cornell Open (cornellpress.cornell.edu/cornell-open) and other repositories.

Paul C. Avey is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech.

Tempting Fate makes a meaningful and insightful contribution to security studies and nuclear security. [T]his book is an important and novel contribution.

Tempting Fate illustrates that, when it comes to challenging the strong, the weak seem to oscillate between faith in the nuclear taboo and fear of nuclear retaliation. This insight will make few theorists happy, but it does mark a step forward in our understanding of how nuclear weapons alter the calculus of risk accepting decision makers.

In Tempting Fate, Avey puts forth a simple but meaningful question: Why do states that do not have nuclear weapons pick fights with states that do? Avey's logic is sound and straightforward. This is a cogent and well-researched book.

Scott D. Sagan, Stanford University, author of The Limits of Safety:

Paul Avey peers into the dark shadow cast by nuclear weapons and finds disturbing evidence of why weaker powers, without such weapons, attack nuclear-armed states and their allies. The case studies of Mao, Saddam, and Sadat produce novel insights into risk-taking behavior and challenge conventional wisdom about the stability of nuclear deterrence.

Matthew Fuhrmann, Texas A&M University, author of Atomic Assistance:

Nonnuclear countries sometimes attack states armed with nuclear weapons despite the belief that nuclear arsenals protect countries. Tempting Fate provides a thought-provoking explanation for why this happens, offers a significant contribution to our understanding of conflict dynamics in the shadow of nuclear weapons, and is required reading for anyone interested in nuclear deterrence.