Open texture and schematicity as arguments for non-referential semantics
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Christopher Gauker
Abstract
Many of the terms of our language, such as “jar”, are open-textured in the sense that their applicability to novel objects is not entirely determined by their past usage. Many others, such as the verbs “use” and “have”, are schematic in the sense that they have only a very general meaning although on any particular occasion of use they denote some more particular relation. The phenomena of open texture and schematicity constitute a sharp challenge to referential semantics, which assumes that every non-logical term has a definite extension. A different, non-referential approach to formal semantics defines truth as relative to a context and defines contexts as built up from exclusively linguistic entities. For any given utterance of a sentence, there will be one of these contexts that pertains to it. In this framework, open texture and schematicity can be understood as consequences of the complex nature of the pertaining relation between contexts and utterances.
Abstract
Many of the terms of our language, such as “jar”, are open-textured in the sense that their applicability to novel objects is not entirely determined by their past usage. Many others, such as the verbs “use” and “have”, are schematic in the sense that they have only a very general meaning although on any particular occasion of use they denote some more particular relation. The phenomena of open texture and schematicity constitute a sharp challenge to referential semantics, which assumes that every non-logical term has a definite extension. A different, non-referential approach to formal semantics defines truth as relative to a context and defines contexts as built up from exclusively linguistic entities. For any given utterance of a sentence, there will be one of these contexts that pertains to it. In this framework, open texture and schematicity can be understood as consequences of the complex nature of the pertaining relation between contexts and utterances.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- Contents v
- Introduction 1
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Part 1: The contextual turn and the case for reference, truth-conditions and meaning
- Open texture and schematicity as arguments for non-referential semantics 13
- Full but not saturated: The myth of mandatory primary pragmatic processes 31
- How to get lost in context: Searle on context, content and literal meaning 51
- Meaning and interpretation 75
- The role of context in semantics: A Relevance Theory perspective 91
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Part 2: The contextual turn and the case for language use
- Boo semantics: Radical nonfactualism and non truth-conditional meaning 117
- Metaphor and mercurial content 141
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Part 3: The contextual turn and the case of analysis
- Context, two-dimensional semantics and conceptual analysis 171
- The use of the Binding Argument in the debate about location 191
- Slices of meaning: Levels of analysis and the unity of understanding 213
- Contributors 227
- Index 229
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- Contents v
- Introduction 1
-
Part 1: The contextual turn and the case for reference, truth-conditions and meaning
- Open texture and schematicity as arguments for non-referential semantics 13
- Full but not saturated: The myth of mandatory primary pragmatic processes 31
- How to get lost in context: Searle on context, content and literal meaning 51
- Meaning and interpretation 75
- The role of context in semantics: A Relevance Theory perspective 91
-
Part 2: The contextual turn and the case for language use
- Boo semantics: Radical nonfactualism and non truth-conditional meaning 117
- Metaphor and mercurial content 141
-
Part 3: The contextual turn and the case of analysis
- Context, two-dimensional semantics and conceptual analysis 171
- The use of the Binding Argument in the debate about location 191
- Slices of meaning: Levels of analysis and the unity of understanding 213
- Contributors 227
- Index 229
