3. The Decision to Negotiate

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. Preface vii
3. Contents xiii
4. List of Illustrations xv
5. List of Abbreviations xvii
6. PART I. Prelude to Geneva: The Diplomacy of Nonintervention
7. 1. The Seven-Year War 1
8. 2. The Berlin Conference and Its Political Context 21
9. 3. The Decision to Negotiate 39
10. 4. Washington on the Eve of the Crisis 53
11. 5. United Action 72
12. 6. Avoiding Intervention 91
13. 7. The Western Alliance in the Indochina Crisis 108
14. 8. The Sino-Soviet Alliance and the Indochina Periphery 136
15. PART II. The Geneva Conference and World Politics
16. 9. The Korean Conference 157
17. 10. Diplomacy under a Pall 169
18. 11. Solutions 190
19. 12. The Indochina Phase 205
20. 13. Deadlock 228
21. 14. Giap Moves on the Delta 247
22. 15. The Geneva Negotiations and the Government Crisis in France 267
23. 16. Diplomatic Interlude 289
24. 17. Mobile Diplomacy 308
25. 18. The Deadline 332
26. 19. Reactions to the Settlements 350
27. 20. The French Reject EDC 373
28. PART III. The Geneva Agreements: Analysis and Implementation
29. 21. The Vietnam Cease-Fire Agreement 389
30. 22. The Final Declaration and the Vietnam Settlement 409
31. 23. The Vietnamese State and the Geneva Agreements 428
32. 24. The Implementation of the Settlement in Vietnam 455
33. 25. The Settlement for Cambodia 482
34. 26. The Settlement for Laos 504
35. 27. The Spirit of Geneva 524
36. 28. An Accounting 548
37. Appendix: Documents Pertaining to the Settlement of the Indochinese War 569
38. Bibliography 611
39. Index 619