Chapters in this book

1. Frontmatter i
2. CONTENTS vii
3. PREFACE ix
4. ABBREVIATIONS xiii
5. CHAPTER ONE Introduction 1
6. PART ONE: THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962
7. CHAPTER TWO. Missiles to Cuba: Foreign-Policy Motives 19
8. CHAPTER THREE. Missiles to Cuba: Domestic Politics 51
9. CHAPTER FOUR. Why Did Khrushchev Miscalculate? 67
10. CHAPTER FIVE. Why Did the Missiles Provoke a Crisis? 94
11. CHAPTER SIX. The Crisis and Its Resolution 110
12. PART TWO: THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, OCTOBER 1973
13. CHAPTER SEVEN. The Failure to Prevent War, October 1973 149
14. CHAPTER EIGHT. The Failure to Limit the War: The Soviet and American Airlifts 182
15. CHAPTER NINE. The Failure to Stop the Fighting 198
16. CHAPTER TEN. The Failure to Avoid Confrontation 226
17. CHAPTER ELEVEN. The Crisis and Its Resolution 261
18. PART THREE: DETERRENCE, COMPELLENCE, AND THE COLD WAR
19. CHAPTER TWELVE. How Crises Are Resolved 291
20. CHAPTER THIRTEEN. Deterrence and Crisis Management 324
21. CHAPTER FOURTEEN. Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Weapons 348
22. POSTSCRIPT: Deterrence and the End of the Cold War 369
23. NOTES 377
24. APPENDIX 523
25. NAME INDEX 527
26. GENERAL INDEX 535