1. Introduction

Michael R. Fenzel

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1. Introduction

Michael R. Fenzel

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Fenzel, Michael R.. "1. Introduction". No Miracles: The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan War, Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2017, pp. 1-4. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804799102-003

Fenzel, M. (2017). 1. Introduction. In No Miracles: The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan War (pp. 1-4). Redwood City: Stanford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804799102-003

Fenzel, M. 2017. 1. Introduction. No Miracles: The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan War. Redwood City: Stanford University Press, pp. 1-4. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804799102-003

Fenzel, Michael R.. "1. Introduction" In No Miracles: The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan War, 1-4. Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804799102-003

Fenzel M. 1. Introduction. In: No Miracles: The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan War. Redwood City: Stanford University Press; 2017. p.1-4. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804799102-003

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Chapters in this book

Frontmatter i
Contents vii
Acknowledgments viii
List of Abbreviations x
1. Introduction 1
2. The Soviet Failure in Afghanistan 5
3. Setting the Stage: Evolution of Party-military Relations 11
4. Getting In: Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet Decision to Invade Afghanistan 29
5. No Retreat . . . No Miracles: Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko in Afghanistan (1980–85) 58
6. Gorbachev’s Quest for “Reluctant, Silent Agreement” to Withdraw from Afghanistan (1985) 87
7. Getting Out: Gorbachev and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (1986–89) 96
8. Losing Afghanistan 119
Appendix: Soviet Stakeholder Agencies 137
Notes 141
Refererences 163
Index 171

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https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804799102-003

Chapters in this book

Frontmatter i
Contents vii
Acknowledgments viii
List of Abbreviations x
1. Introduction 1
2. The Soviet Failure in Afghanistan 5
3. Setting the Stage: Evolution of Party-military Relations 11
4. Getting In: Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet Decision to Invade Afghanistan 29
5. No Retreat . . . No Miracles: Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko in Afghanistan (1980–85) 58
6. Gorbachev’s Quest for “Reluctant, Silent Agreement” to Withdraw from Afghanistan (1985) 87
7. Getting Out: Gorbachev and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (1986–89) 96
8. Losing Afghanistan 119
Appendix: Soviet Stakeholder Agencies 137
Notes 141
Refererences 163
Index 171

1. Introduction

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