11. The slow soviet recovery from the surprise of low-intensity conflict in Afghanistan

Chapters in this book

1. Frontmatter i
2. Table of contents vii
3. Acknowledgments ix
4. Introduction 1
5. Part one. The challenge of force planning facing future surprises
6. 1. Prediction and intelligence: the dominant approach in force planning and its failure to answer the challenge of technological and doctrinal surprise 21
7. Part two. Flexibility-based recovery— a theoretical view
8. 2. Conceptual and doctrinal flexibility 55
9. 3. Organizational and technological flexibility 73
10. 4. Cognitive and command and control (c2) flexibility 98
11. 5. The mechanism for lesson learning and rapid dissemination 111
12. Part three. Recovery from surprise— a historical view
13. 6. The German recovery from the surprise of British chaff 123
14. 7. The German recovery from the soviet t-34 tank surprise 138
15. 8. The Israeli recovery from the Egyptian Sagger missile surprise 150
16. 9. The Israeli air force recovery from the Arab anti-aircraft missile surprise 164
17. 10. The slow British recovery from the German armor and anti-tank tactics 179
18. 11. The slow soviet recovery from the surprise of low-intensity conflict in Afghanistan 191
19. 12. The french failure to recover from the surprise of the German blitzkrieg 205
20. Summary and conclusions 223
21. Appendixes to chapter 1 233
22. Notes 249
23. Bibliography 301
24. Index 321