Chapters in this book

1. Front Matter i
2. Contents vii
3. Acknowledgements ix
4. Abbreviations xi
5. Prolegomenon: Husserl's turn to history and pure phenomenology 1
6. Plato's and Aristotle's theory of eidē
7. Plato's Socratic theory of eidē: the first pillar of the ancient precedent to pure phenomenology 21
8. Pluto's arithmological theory of eidē: the second pillar of the ancient precedent to pure phenomenology 34
9. Aristotle's criticism of Plato's theory of eidē: the third (and final) pillar of the ancient precedent to pure phenomenology 60
10. From descriptive psychology to transcendentally pure phenomenology
11. Origin of the task of pure phenomenology 83
12. Pure phenomenology and Platonism 96
13. Pure phenomenology as the transcendental-phenomenological investigation of absolute consciousness 110
14. Transcendental phenomenology of absolute consciousness and phenomenological philosophy 125
15. Limits of the transcendental-phenomenological investigation of pure consciousness 139
16. From the phenomenology of transcendental consciousness to that of monadological intersubjectivity
17. Phenomenological philosophy as transcendental idealism 148
18. The intersubiective foundation of transcendental idealism: the immanent transcendency of the world's obiectivity 156
19. From monadological intersubjectivity to the historical a priori constitutive of all meaning
20. The pure phenomenological motivation of Husserl's turn to history 174
21. The essential connection between intentional history and actual history 181
22. The historicity of both the intelligibility of ideal meanings and the possibility of actual history 187
23. Desedimentation and the link between intentional history and the constitution of a historical tradition 192
24. Transcendental phenomenology as the only true explanation of objectivity and all meaningful problems in previous philosophy 204
25. The unwarranted historical presuppositions guiding the fundamental ontological and deconstructive criticisms of transcendental philosophy
26. The methodological presupposition of the ontico-ontological critique of intentionality: Plato's Socratic seeing of the eidē 216
27. The mereological presupposition of fundamental ontology: that Being as a whole has a meaning overall 232
28. The presupposition behind the proto-deconstructive critique of intentional historicity: the conflation of intrasu biective and intersu biective idealities 246
29. The presupposition behind the deconstruction of phenomenology: the subordination of being to speech 254
30. Epilogue: Transcendental-phenomenological criticism of the criticism of phenomenological cognition 264
31. Coda: Phenomenological self-responsi bility and the singularity of transcendental philosophy 273
32. Notes 275
33. Bibliograpb y 283
34. Index 287